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Spain Western Sahara (formerly Spanish Sahara)

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL


FILE NO. 935 | 28 | 2

28 OCTOBER 1980

PART NO. 3

TITLE F

Spain



935/28/2 30

WESTERN SAHARA

(Formerly SPANISH SAHARA)

RELATED FILES

PREVIOUS PAPERS

P_{T2}

SUBSEQUENT PAPERS

9_T 4

ARCHIVAL ACTION

FILE NO. 935-282



28 OCTOBER 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

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SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE ON FILE.....

14074/67

*Send in pls
Place these on →
in chronological order Ram, 8/10*
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

935/28/2
212

INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.UN19377 DBKE
TOR 1125 25.10.80

O.UN19377 2105 24.10.80 UNC

TO.
PP CANBERRA/8534

FM. UN NEW YORK /

U N C L A S S I F I E D

UNGA 35 - FOURTH COMMITTEE - ITEM 18 - WESTERN SAHARA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT TABLED BY MOROCCO TODAY (24 OCTOBER):

- IMPELEMNTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING -
OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES
- QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA -

COMOROS, EQUITORIAL GUINEA, GABON, GUINEA, MOROCCO, SAUDI ARABIA,
SENEGAL AND ZAIRE: DRAFT RESOLUTION

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

HAVING CONSIDERED THE QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA,

RECALLING ITS REOLUTIONS 1514 (XV) OF 14 DECEMBER, 1960, AND 1541
(XV) OF 15 DECEMBER, 1960,

RECALLING THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 33 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, WHICH STATES THAT THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES
SHOULD BE SOUGHT BY RESORT TO REGIONAL AGENCIES,

CONSIDERING THE DECISION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND
GOVERNMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AT ITS FIFTEENTH
ORDINARY SESSION, HELD AT KHARTOUM FROM 18 TO 22 JULY, 1978, TO
ESTABLISH AN AD HOC COMMITTEE OF HEADS OF STATE TO CONSIDER ALL THE
DATA ON THE QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA,

BEARING IN MIND THE DECISION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND
GOVERNMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AT ITS SEVENTEENTH
ORDINARY SESSION, HELD AT FREETOWN FROM 1 TO 4 JULY, 1980, REQUESTING
THE ADHOC COMMITTEE TO CONTINUE ITS WORK WITH A VIEW TO RECONCILING
THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT AND SEEKING A PEACEFUL AND LASTING SOLU-
TION THERETO,

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENTS OF THE PARTIES INTERESTED AND CONCERNED
IN THE CONFLICT IN WESTERN SAHARA AND OF THE ORGANISATIONS ORIGINA-
TING IN THE TERRITORY WHICH WERE HEARD AT THE FIFTH SESSION OF THE AD

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.UN19377

HOC COMMITTEE OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, HELD AT FREETOWN FROM 9 TO 12 SEPTEMBER, 1980,

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 34/21 OF 9 NOVEMBER, 1979, REGARDING CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY,

1. TAKES NOTE WITH SATISFACTION OF THE DECISION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AT ITS SEVENTEENTH SESSION HELD AT FREETOWN FROM 1 TO 4 JULY, 1980, TO REQUEST THE AH HOC COMMITTEE TO CONTINUE ITS WORK WITH A VIEW TO RECONCILING THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT AND SEEKING A PEACEFUL AND LASTING SOLUTION THERETO:
2. WELCOMES THE FULL PARTICIPATION IN THE WORK OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OF ALL THE PARTIES INTERESTED AND CONCERNED IN THE CONFLICT AND THE ORGANIZATIONS ORIGINATING IN WESTERN SAHARA:
3. WELCOMES THE PEACE PROCESS INITIATED BY THE FIFTH SESSION OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OF HEADS OF STATES OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, HELD AT FREETOWN FROM 9 TO 12 SEPTEMBER, 1980:
4. APPEALS TO ALL STATES TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION THAT MIGHT IMPEDE THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE RECONCILIATION EFFORTS OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY:
5. EXPRESSES ITS CONFIDENCE IN THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND ENCOURAGES IT TO FULFIL THE MANDATE GIVEN IT BY THE SEVENTEENTH CONFERENCE OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, HELD AT FREETOWN FROM 1 TO 4 JULY, 1980:
6. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY TO KEEP THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS INFORMED OF THE RESULTS ACHEIVED BY THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY ON THE SUBJECT OF WESTERN SAHARA:
7. INVITED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO REPORT ON THIS SUBJECT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS THIRTY-SIXTH SESSION.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

3-0.UN19377

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ONA

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
JIO

ACTION: IO

OGBAAFA

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(EANZ)		FAS(DN)	
DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)		FAS(ECO)		FAS(LT)
IL	FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M		FAREP-P		FAREP-S

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

O.CH923808 DBKE

O.CH923808 1721 24.10.80 CLA

TO.

PP PARIS EMB/7828
RR UN NEW YORK/3151

RP.

RR ALGIERS/7295

FM. CANBERRA / FILE 141/7/1 REF O.PAB1965

CONFIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L

POLICY ON WESTERN SAHARA

WHILE WE TAKE YOUR POINT THAT AUSTRALIA'S RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO MAY WELL HAVE BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY OUR POLICY ON THE WESTERN SAHARA DISPUTE, WE CANNOT AGREE WITH THE IMPLICATION THAT THE MERITS OF THE CLAIMS OF THE DISRUPTING PARTIES ARE EQUAL. WITHOUT DELVING TOO DEEPLY INTO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF NORTH AFRICA, IT SEEMS TO US THAT, CONTRARY TO YOUR POINT IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF REFTEL, IT IS CLEARLY MOROCCO WHICH IS SEEKING TO ALTER COLONIAL BOUNDARIES NOT THE POLISARIO, AND IT IS MOROCCO WHICH CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO PERMIT A GENUINE ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION BY THE POPULACE OF WESTERN SAHARA. AUSTRALIA HAS, WITH MOST WESTERN STATES, SUPPORTED THE PRINCIPLE THAT UPON THE WITHDRAWAL OF A COLONIAL POWER FROM ITS TERRITORY, THE INHABITANTS SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO AN EXERCISE OF SELF-DETERMINATION. SUCH AN EXERCISE, LARGELY FOR THE REASONS YOU MENTION, DOES NOT REQUIRE A REDEFINITION OF BOUNDARIES.

2. THE OAU HAS NOT RECOGNISED POLISARIO AS THE 'SOLE' REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SAHARAN PEOPLE, ALTHOUGH A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF MEMBER COUNTRIES WOULD NOW SUPPORT SUCH A MOVE. A MAJOR REASON FOR THE CONTINUED LACK OF RECOGNITION IS THAT MOROCCO (AND EGYPT) HAS THREATENED TO WALK OUT OF THE ORGANISATION IF THE SADR IS RECOGNISED. WE APPRECIATE THAT THIS MAY NOT BE THE ONLY REASON. THE OAU IS SPLIT ON THE ISSUE AND SOMEWHAT EMBARRASSED BY IT. IT SEEK TO PLAY A MEDIATING ROLE IN THE DISPUTE AND TO AVOID ANTAGONISING MOROCCO. HAVE SEEN NOTHING HOWEVER TO SUPPORT YOUR CONTENTION THAT THERE IS ''WIDESPREAD CONCERN AMONG AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS THAT A POLITICAL VICTORY FOR POLISARIO WOULD ESTABLISH A PRECEDENT FOR CHANGES TO BOUNDARIES ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA'', AND WOULD BE GLAD TO RECEIVE ANY INFORMATION YOU CAN PROVIDE ON THIS POINT.

3. AS YOU KNOW WE DO NOT RECOGNISE POLISARIO AS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SAHARAN PEOPLE, AND DO NOT INTEND TO CHANGE THIS POSITION IN THE COURSE OF THE CURRENT GENERAL ASSEMBLY. WE DO, HOWEVER RECOGNISE THE POLISARIO IS A PARTY TO THE DISPUTE WITH A ROLE

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

2-O.CH923808

TO PLAY IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. INDEED AT UNGA 34 WE SUPPORTED A RESOLUTION WHICH AFFIRMED THE POLISARIO AS 'THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF WESTERN SAHARA', ALTHOUGH WE INDICATED IN OUR RESERVATION THAT WE DID NOT REGARD IT AS THE 'SOLE' REPRESENTATIVE.

OVERALL, OUR POSITION IS SIMILAR TO THE LINE TAKEN BY THE OAU. WHILE IT MAY BE A LITTLE ADVANCED OF THE POSITION ADOPTED BY MOST WESTERN STATES WE DO NOT CONSIDER IT TO BE UNREASONABLY SO NOR DO WE ACCEPT THAT IT GIVES AUSTRALIA A PARTICULARLY HIGH PROFILE ON THE ISSUE.

4. THE MATTER OF COURSE IS BEING CONSIDERED AT THE MOMENT AT UNGA. THE ALGERIANS HAVE FLOATED A TEXT AND HAVE SOUGHT OUR SUPPORT. THE MOROCCANS ARE NOW SEEKING COSPONSORS FOR A RIVAL TEXT WHICH MAY HOWEVER NOT GET OFF THE GROUND. WE ARE REPEATING TO YOU RELEVANT CABLES.

FOR U.N. NEW YORK

GRATEFUL YOU REPEAT CABLES ON WESTERN SAHARA AS A MATTER OF COURSE TO PARIS AND ALGIERS.

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ONA

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: PRO
AME JBAAE

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(EANZ)		ANZ	EUR
FAS(DN)	NUC	DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)		IO
FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)		FAS(MFS)	PER	FAREP-M	
FAREP-P	FAREP-S					

ACCRA CAIRO JEDDAH LAGOS MADRID TRIPOLI

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

O.CH923808 DBKE

O.CH923808 1721 24.10.80 CLA

TO.
PP PARIS EMB/7828
RR UN NEW YORK/3151RP.
RR ALGIERS/7295

FM. CANBERRA / FILE 141/7/1 REF O.PAB1965

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

POLICY ON WESTERN SAHARA

WHILE WE TAKE YOUR POINT THAT AUSTRALIA'S RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO MAY WELL HAVE BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY OUR POLICY ON THE WESTERN SAHARA DISPUTE, WE CANNOT AGREE WITH THE IMPLICATION THAT THE MERITS OF THE CLAIMS OF THE DISRUPTING PARTIES ARE EQUAL. WITHOUT DELVING TOO DEEPLY INTO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF NORTH AFRICA, IT SEEMS TO US THAT, CONTRARY TO YOUR POINT IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF REFTEL, IT IS CLEARLY MOROCCO WHICH IS SEEKING TO ALTER COLONIAL BOUNDARIES NOT THE POLISARIO, AND IT IS MOROCCO WHICH CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO PERMIT A GENUINE ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION BY THE POPULACE OF WESTERN SAHARA. AUSTRALIA HAS, WITH MOST WESTERN STATES, SUPPORTED THE PRINCIPLE THAT UPON THE WITHDRAWAL OF A COLONIAL POWER FROM ITS TERRITORY, THE INHABITANTS SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO AN EXERCISE OF SELF-DETERMINATION. SUCH AN EXERCISE, LARGELY FOR THE REASONS YOU MENTION, DOES NOT REQUIRE A REDEFINITION OF BOUNDARIES.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

2-O.CH923808

TO PLAY IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. INDEED AT UNGA 34 WE SUPPORTED A RESOLUTION WHICH AFFIRMED THE POLISARIO AS "THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF WESTERN SAHARA", ALTHOUGH WE INDICATED IN OUR RESERVATION THAT WE DID NOT REGARD IT AS THE "SOLE" REPRESENTATIVE.

OVERALL, OUR POSITION IS SIMILAR TO THE LINE TAKEN BY THE OAU. WHILE IT MAY BE A LITTLE ADVANCED OF THE POSITION ADOPTED BY MOST WESTERN STATES WE DO NOT CONSIDER IT TO BE UNREASONABLY SO NOR DO WE ACCEPT THAT IT GIVES AUSTRALIA A PARTICULARLY HIGH PROFILE ON THE ISSUE.

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FOR U.N. NEW YORK

GRATEFUL YOU REPEAT CABLES ON WESTERN SAHARA AS A MATTER OF COURSE TO PARIS AND ALGIERS.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ONA

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
JIO

ACTION: PRO
AME JBAAE

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(EANZ)		ANZ	EUR
FAS(DN)	NUC	DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)		IO
FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)		FAS(MFS)	PER	FAREP-M	
FAREP-P	FAREP-S					

ACCRA CAIRO JEDDAH LAGOS MADRID TRIPOLI

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205

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.UN19372 DBKE
TOR 1031 25.10.80

O.UN19372 2020 24.10.80 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/8529

RP.
RR PARIS EMB/910 ALGIERS/100

FM. UN NEW YORK /

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

UNGA 35 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 - WESTERN SAHARA

THE MOROCCAN DELEGATION TABLED ITS DRAFT RESOLUTION TODAY 24 OCTOBER WITH THE COSPONSORSHIP OF ZAIRE, SENEGAL, GUINEA, COMOROS, EQUATORIAL GUINEA, GABON AND SAUDI ARABIA. TEXT BY FAX.

2. THE MOROCCANS HAVE REQUESTED OUR SUPPORT. WE SAID THAT THEIR EARLIER WORKING PAPER WAS STILL UNDER STUDY BUT MADE THE PRELIMINARY COMMENT THAT THE DRAFT DID NOT MAKE EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION. THE MOROCCANS REPLIED THAT THIS WAS IMPLICIT IN THE PREAMBULAR REFERENCE RESOLUTIONS 1514 AND 1541.

3. MOST WESTERN EUROPEANS ARE IN FAVOUR OF ABSTAINING ON BOTH TEXTS. THE UNITED STATES MISSION WILL NOT SUPPORT THE ALGERIAN TEXT BUT MAY SUPPORT THE MOROCCAN. SWEDEN AND AUSTRIA WOULD PREFER TO VOTE, AS IN 1978, IN FAVOUR OF BOTH, BUT WOULD LIKE TO DO SO IN OUR COMPANY. FINLAND WILL ALSO BE INFLUENCED BY THE DECISIONS OF AUSTRALIA, SWEDEN AND AUSTRIA. THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR HAS NOW SPOKEN TO BEDJAQUI (ALGERIA) IN SUPPORT OF OUR SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 8 OF THE ALGERIAN DRAFT. BEDJAQUI AGAIN SAID HE WOULD STUDY THE POSSIBILITIES.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ONA

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
J10

I think so

204

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.UN19372

ACTION: IO

OGBAAFA

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(EANZ)		FAS(DN)	
DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)		FAS(ECO)		FAS(LT)
IL	FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M		FAREP-P		FAREP-S

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

0.CH923807 DRHA

RESTRICTED

0.CH923807 1721 24.10.80 CLA

TO.
RR PARIS EMB/7834 ALGIERS/7297
FM. CANBERRA / REF 0.PA81965

RESTRICTED

WESTERN SAHARA

FOLLOWING CABLES REPEATED FOR INFORMATION.

0.CH922586
0.UN19278
0.UN19306
0.UN19318
0.UN19353

BEGIN:

0.CH922586 1609 20.10.80 CLA FIRST

TO.
PP UN NEW YORK/3078

FM. CANBERRA / FILE 935/28/2

CONFIDENTIAL

UNGA 35 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 : WESTERN SAHARA

WE HAVE NOTED THAT WHILE THE DRAFT ON WESTERN SAHARA HAS NOT BEEN STIFFENED TO ANY REAL EXTENT, THE THRUST HAS BEEN ALTERED WITH SOME SUBTLETY TO EFFECTIVELY DISTANCE ALGERIA FROM THE DISPUTE TO, IN TURN, PLACE GREATER EMPHASIS ON THE POLISARIO AND TO GIVE THE POLISARIO IMPLICIT RECOGNITION AS A SOVEREIGN ENTITY. TO THIS END WE NOTE THAT PREAMBULAR PARA 5 HAS BEEN ALTERED SLIGHTLY AND OPERATIVE PARA 3 MODIFIED TO ESTABLISH THE PATTERN SET OUT SUBSEQUENTLY IN OPERATIVE PARAS 6 AND 8.

2. WE WOULD PREFER TO SEE OP PARA 6 AMENDED TO READ '... THE NECESSITY OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE BELLIGERENTS, WITH A VIEW TO CREATING ...', AND WE WOULD LIKE A CORRESPONDING GENERALISATION OF PARA 8 TO BE MADE.

3. PLEASE CONSULT OTHER WESTERN DELEGATIONS, BUT PARTICULARLY SWEDEN

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.CH923807

AND AUSTRIA, WHO TOGETHER WITH AUSTRALIA SUPPORTED LAST YEAR'S TEXT, AND REPORT THEIR VIEWS. WE WOULD ALSO LIKE YOU TO PURSUE OUR PROPOSED AMENDMENTS WITH THE ALGERIANS AND ADVISE.

O.UN19278 1845 20.10.80 CLA

TO.

PP CANBERRA/8436

FM. UN NEW YORK / FILE 412/1 REF O.CH922586

CONFIDENTIAL

UNGA 35 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 WESTERN SAHARA

YOUR REFTEL ARRIVED COINCIDENTALLY WITH A REQUEST FROM THE ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR (BEDJAQUI) FOR A MEETING TO DISCUSS THE ALGERIAN DRAFT.

2. AT THIS MEETING THIS MORNING 20 OCTOBER, BEDJAQUI APPEALED FOR OUR SUPPORT, ARGUING THAT ALGERIA HAD BEEN AT PAINS TO KEEP THE DRAFT MODERATE IN TONE AND SUBSTANCE. HE POINTED OUT THAT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 6 SIMPLY "COMMENDS THE EFFORTS MADE" BY THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE OAU, INSTEAD OF CALLING FOR MOROCCAN COMPLIANCE WITH THE COMMITTEE'S RESOLUTION INCLUDING ITS CALL FOR A CEASE FIRE WHICH MOROCCO IS NOT YET PREPARED TO ACCEPT. HE ALSO SAID THAT WHEREAS POLISARIO HAD WANTED TO BE DESCRIBED AS "SOLE AND AUTHENTIC REPRESENTATIVE" OF THE SAHRAOUI PEOPLE, THE DRAFT STOPPED SHORT OF THIS.

3. THE AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED OUR STRONG PREFERENCE FOR THE AMENDMENTS INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF OUR REFTEL AND ALSO SUGGESTED THAT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE WORKING PAPER WOULD BE LESS OFFENSIVE TO MOROCCO AND ITS FRIENDS IF THE CONCLUDING PHRASE "DUE TO THE REFUSAL OF MOROCCO ETC", WHICH SEEMED SUPERFLUOUS, WERE DROPPED.

4. BEDJAQUI ARGUED STRONGLY FOR THE IDENTIFICATION IN PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 8 OF THE POLISARIO AND MOROCCO AS THE BELLIGERENTS, ASSERTING THAT ALGERIA WAS NOT INVOLVED, THAT THESE WERE THE TERMS USED BY THE OAU ITSELF AND EVEN THAT THE POLISARIO WOULD ARGUE THAT THE TERM "BELLIGERENTS" (IF THE PARTIES WERE NOT IDENTIFIED) SHOULD INCLUDE THE UNITED STATES WHICH WAS SUPPLYING ARMS TO MOROCCO. WITH REGARD TO THE DESCRIPTION OF THE POLISARIO IN PARAGRAPH 8 AS "THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF WESTERN SAHARA", BEDJAQUI SAID THAT THIS PHRASE HAD ALREADY BEEN USED IN LAST YEAR'S RESOLUTION BUT THAT AS THE FRENCH TEXT SIMPLY READ "REPRESENTANT" WITHOUT AN ARTICLE, THE ARTICLE COULD ALSO BE DROPPED FROM THE ENGLISH TEXT. HE INDICATED READINESS TO CONSIDER DROPPING THE REFERENCE TO THE

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

3-0.CH923807

"REFUSAL OF MOROCCO" IN PARAGRAHP 2.

5. AFTER SOME FURTHER INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION, THE AMBASSADOR UNDERTOOK TO REPORT BEDJAQUI'S DIFFICULTIES WITH OUR PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND HE UNDERTOOK ON HIS SIDE TO DISCUSS THEM WITH THE PROSPECTIVE COSPONSORS OF HIS DRAFT. BEDJAQUI SAID HE WOULD CONSIDER WHETHER SOME OTHER FORMULA COULD BE DEVISED TO MEET OUR DIFFICULTY. IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION SEMAICHI OF THE ALGERIAN MISSION SAID THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO LOOK AT ANY ALTERNATIVE FORMULA WE MIGHT PROPOSE. WE EXPECT, HOWEVER, THAT BEDJAQUI WILL NOT IN FACT GIVE GROUND ON THE IDENTIFICATION OF MORROCO AND THE POLISARIO AS THE BELLIGERENTS, AND THAT HE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS THE ARGUMENT THAT THE IDENTIFICATION HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE AND SANCTIFIED BY THE OAU AS THE COMPETENT REGIONAL BODY.

6. IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR (WHOM BEDJAQUI ALSO SAW THIS MORNING) EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT BEDJAQUI'S READINESS TO DROP THE ARTICLE IN PARAGRAPH 8 AND IN GENERAL AT WHAT HE SAW AS THE MODERATE APPROACH THE ALGERIANS ARE ADOPTING THIS YEAR. HE WAS NOT RESPONSIVE TO THE IDEA BEHIND OUR AMENDMENTS AND SAID THAT IN THE LIGHT OF A CONVERSATION HE HAD HAD WITH CHANCELLOR KREISKY IN THE SUMMER HE WOULD EXPECT AUSTRIA TO VOTE FOR THE DRAFT IN ITS PRESENT FORM.

7. WE SHALL BE IN TOUCH WITH THE SWEDES AND REPORT FURTHER.

O.UN19306 2000 21.10.80 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/8464

FM. UN NEW YORK / FILE 103/3/4 412/1 REF O.UN19278

CONFIDENTIAL

UNGA 35 : FOURTH COMMITTEE: ITEM 18: QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

FURTHER TO OUR REFTEL, SWEDES HAVE TOLD US THAT THE ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR ALSO APPROACHED THEIR AMBASSADOR (THUNBORG) YESTERDAY. BEDJAQUI REMARKED THAT THE TEXT ON WESTERN SAHARA WAS INTENDED TO BE A MODERATE ONE AND WAS NOT VERY DIFFERENT FROM THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED LAST YEAR. THUNBORG RESPONDED THAT SWEDEN DID HAVE SOME DIFFICULTY WITH THE WORDING IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE DRAFT WHICH CRITICISED MOROCCO FOR IMPEDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 34/37. SWEDEN STATED THAT IT WOULD PREFER TO HAVE THIS REFERENCE TO MOROCCO DELETED. BEDJAQUI SAID THIS WOULD BE CONSIDERED.

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RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

4-0.CH923807

RESTRICTED

2. THE SWEDES ALSO TOOK UP THE QUESTION OF AMENDMENTS TO THE TEXT WITH POLISARIO WHICH RESPONDED THAT IT WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY FURTHER CHANGES TO THE DRAFT (THAT IS, THE VERSION SENT YOU BY FAX). AUSTRIA, IN TALKING FURTHER TO THE ALGERIAN MISSION, RECEIVED THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO GET AMENDMENTS ALONG THE LINES WHICH WE AND THEY HAVE SUGGESTED. BOTH THE SWEDES AND THE AUSTRIANS, HOWEVER, HAVE TOLD US IN CONFIDENCE THAT THEY STILL EXPECTED TO VOTE FOR THE RESOLUTION WHILE MAKING A STRONG EXPLANATION OF THEIR VOTE.

3. IN A SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT, MOROCCO HAS TRIED TO MARSHALL SOME SUPPORT FOR ITS POSITION IN THE AFRICAN GROUP. IN A MEETING BEFORE THE GROUP TODAY (21 OCTOBER) MOROCCO SOUGHT COSPONSORS FOR A DRAFT OF ITS OWN (WE HAVE NOT SEEN TEXT AS YET) BUT WAS UNSUCCESSFUL IN THIS. IT ALSO APPEALED TO THE AFRICAN GROUP TO HAVE THE WEST SAHARAN QUESTION WITHDRAWN FROM THE UNITED NATIONS ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WAS A BILATERAL ISSUE AND NOT ONE OF DECOLONIZATION. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THIS APPEAL WAS REJECTED.

4. WE ARE SENDING BY FAX A MOROCCAN PRESS RELEASE ON WESTERN SAHARA.

0.UN19318 1715 22.10.80 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/8475

FM. UN NEW YORK / FILE 103/3/4 412/1 0.UN19306

CONFIDENTIAL

UNGA 35 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 WESTERN SAHARA

MOROCCO HAS BEEN CIRCULATING ITS OWN TEXT ON WESTERN SAHARA IN THE FOURTH COMMITTEE BUT HAS NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO TABLE IT AS A DRAFT RESOLUTION. (SEPARATE COPY BY FAX).

2. ITS PROBLEM IS TO FIND CREDIBLE COSPONSORS AS WELL AS VOTING SUPPORT FOR ITS DRAFT. IN THIS REGARD FIVE OF THE SIX MEMBERS OF THE OAU'S AD HOC COMMITTEE ON WESTERN SAHARAN DISPUTE (MALI, SUDAN, TANZANIA, NIGERIA AND SIERRE LEONE) INTEND TO VOTE FOR THE ALGERIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION WHILE GUINEA, WHICH HAS SOME SYMPATHY FOR THE MOROCCAN POSITION, WILL ABSTAIN.

3. YOU WILL NOTE THAT WHILE THE MOROCCAN DRAFT, AT OPERATIVE 3 WELCOMES THE "PEACE PROCESS" INITIATED BY THE AD HOC COMMITTEE, MOROCCO'S POSITION IN FACT HAS BEEN TO REJECT THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE COMMITTEE'S SIX POINT PLAN, NAMELY THE HOLDING OF A REFERENDUM

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OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

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AND A CALL FOR A CEASE FIRE. VIEW IS THAT IT WILL PROBABLY DECIDE, IN THE END, NOT TO PROCEED WITH ITS OWN DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR LACK OF SUPPORT.

O.UN19353 2145 23.10.80 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/8510

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UNGA 35 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 : WESTERN SAHARA

THIS EVENING MOROCCAN DELEGATION WAS TALKING MORE FIRMLY ABOUT TABLING ITS DRAFT RESOLUTION ON WESTERN SAHARA AND CLAIMED THAT IT HAD AT LEAST A DOZEN COSPONSORS.

2. IN CHECKING WITH SOME WEST EUROPEAN (AUSTRIA, FINLAND, AND SWEDEN) AND AFRICAN COLLEAGUES WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THIS IS AN INFLATED ESTIMATE AND THAT MOROCCO HAS ONLY ABOUT SIX COSPONSORS AT PRESENT (ZAIRE, CAMEROON, SENEGAL, GUINEA, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND COMOROS).

3. FURTHERMORE, GIVEN THE LARGE NUMBER OF COSPONSORS ALGERIA HAS NOW GATHERED FOR ITS RESOLUTION (44) MOROCCO IS EXPRESSING SOME CONCERN WHETHER OR NOT ITS DRAFT RESOLUTION (SENT TO YOU YESTERDAY) CAN COMMEND SUFFICIENT SUPPORT TO BE ADOPTED. THE POSITION ON TABLING SHOULD BE CLEARER TOMORROW.

4. ALGERIA ESTIMATES THAT IT MAY GET ABOUT 90 VOTES FOR ITS RESOLUTION. THE NINE HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY WILL ABSTAIN ON THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION AND PROBABLY THE MOROCCAN ONE IF IT IS TABLED. AUSTRIA AND SWEDEN HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THEY WILL PROBABLY VOTE FOR BOTH RESOLUTIONS. SO TOO WILL FINLAND ALTHOUGH IT HAS NOT RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF MOVING TO AN ABSTENTION ON BOTH TEXTS.

COMMENT

5. THE MOROCCAN DRAFT HAS BEEN CAREFULLY PUT TOGETHER IN A WAY WHICH SUGGESTS THAT MOROCCO FULLY SUPPORTS FURTHER CONSULTATIVE PROCESSES ON THE QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA PROVIDED THEY TAKE PLACE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OAU, BUT GIVEN ITS REJECTION OF SEVERAL KEY POINTS IN THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON WESTERN SAHARA. ITS DRAFT HAS SOWN DOUBTS IN THE MINDS OF SOME DELEGATIONS ABOUT THE SINCERITY OF MOROCCO'S COMMIT-

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

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MENT TO FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE OAU.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

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PP CANBERRA/8510

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UNGA 35 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 : WESTERN SAHARA

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2. IN CHECKING WITH SOME WEST EUROPEAN (AUSTRIA, FINLAND, AND SWEDEN) AND AFRICAN COLLEAGUES WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THIS IS AN INFLATED ESTIMATE AND THAT MOROCCO HAS ONLY ABOUT SIX COSPONSORS AT PRESENT (ZAIRE, CAMEROON, SENEGAL, GUINEA, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND COMOROS).

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COMMENT

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

20 JUN 19353

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.UN19318 NASH
TOR 0726 23.10.80

O.UN19318 1715 22.10.80 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/8475

FM. UN NEW YORK / FILE 103/3/4 412/1 O.UN19306

C O N F I D E N T I A L

UNGA 35 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 - WESTERN SAHARA

MOROCCO HAS BEEN CIRCULATING ITS OWN TEXT ON WESTERN SAHARA IN THE FOURTH COMMITTEE BUT HAS NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO TABLE IT AS A DRAFT RESOLUTION. (SEPARATE COPY BY FAX).

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3. YOU WILL NOTE THAT WHILE THE MOROCCAN DRAFT, AT OPERATIVE 3 WELCOMES THE "PEACE PROCESS" INITIATED BY THE AD HOC COMMITTEE, MOROCCO'S POSITION IN FACT HAS BEEN TO REJECT THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE COMMITTEE'S SIX POINT PLAN, NAMELY THE HOLDING OF A REFERENDUM AND A CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE. VIEW IS THAT IT WILL PROBABLY DECIDE, IN THE END, NOT TO PROCEED WITH ITS OWN DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR LACK OF SUPPORT.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ONA

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
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CONFIDENTIAL

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.UN19321 RLOP
TOR 0751 23.10.80

O.UN19321 1750 22.10.80 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/8478

FM. UN NEW YORK / FILE 103/3/4 412/1 REF O.UN19306

C O N F I D E N T I A L

UNGA 35 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 - QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF SWEDEN AND AUSTRIA BOTH HAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO VOTE FOR THE ALERGIAN DRAFT IN ITS PRESENT FORM, IF NECESSARY, MAKING EXPLANATIONS OF VOTE. FOR THE PRESENT, HOWEVER THEY WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO PERSUADE THE ALGERIANS TO ACCEPT OUR AMENDMENTS TO OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 8 AS WELL AS DELETION OF THE EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO MOROCCO IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
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ACTION: IO
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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
FACSIMILE MESSAGE

Precedence: PP

Date / Time of Lodgement: 17/10/80 22.10.80

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For Information:

F. LN 056

CSN 073

TO CANBERRA

FM UNNY

FM FILE 103/3/4;412/1

TO FILE 935/28/2

REF.

NO. OF PAGES 3

Subject Heading or Summary of Text:

UNGA 35 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 - WESTERN SAHARA

FOLLOWING IS DRAFT TEXT PREPARED BY MOROCCO.

Oct 23 08 25

Sender	Signature & Date	Dept/Section	Phone No.	No. of copies to be returned to sender
CHAN	22/10/80 FCA			

The General Assembly,

Having examined the question of Western Sahara,

Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960 and 1541 (XV) of December 15, 1960,

Recalling the provisions of article 33 of the Charter of the Organization of the United Nations, which stipulate that settlement of international disputes should be sought by resorting to regional organizations,

Bearing in mind the decision adopted by the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its seventeenth ordinary session held in Freetown (Sierra Leone) from 1st to 4th July 1980, requesting the ad hoc Committee to continue its work with a view to reconciling the parties to the conflict and seeking a peaceful and lasting solution to this question,

Having heard the statements made by the organizations from the territory which had already been heard by the ad hoc Committee of the Organization of African Unity at its fifth session held in Freetown from September 9th to 11th, 1980,

Recalling its resolution 34/21 of 9th November 1979, regarding the co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity,

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the decision ANG/DEC.118 (XVII) of Heads of State and Government of the OAU at its 17th session held in Freetown from July 1st to 4th, 1980, requesting the ad hoc Committee to continue its work with a view to reconciling the parties to the conflict and seeking a peaceful and lasting solution to this question;
2. Welcomes the participation in the work of the ad hoc Committee of all the parties concerned, and especially the organizations from Western Sahara;
3. Welcomes the peace process initiated by the fifth session of the ad hoc Committee of the Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity held in Freetown from 9th to 12th September 1980;
4. Calls upon all States to abstain from any action which ~~may~~ impede this peace process or hamper the efforts of reconciliation undertaken by the ad hoc Committee of the Organization of African Unity;
5. Expresses its confidence in, and encourages the ad hoc Committee in carrying out the mandate intrusted to it by the 17th Summit Conference of the Organization of African Unity, held in Freetown in July 1980;
6. Requests the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity to inform the Secretary General of the United Nations of the results achieved by the OAU, regarding Western Sahara;
7. Invites the Secretary General of the United Nations to report thereon to the General Assembly at its 36th session.

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the decision AHG/DEC.118(XVII) of Heads of State and Government of the OAU at its 17th session held in Freetown from July 1st to 4th, 1980, requesting the ad hoc Committee to continue its work with a view to reconciling the parties to the conflict and seeking a peaceful and lasting solution to this question;
2. Welcomes the participation in the work of the ad hoc Committee of all the parties concerned, and especially the organizations from Western Sahara;
3. Welcomes the peace process initiated by the fifth session of the ad hoc Committee of the Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity held in Freetown from 9th to 12th September 1980;
4. Calls upon all States to abstain from any action which ~~may~~ impede this peace process or hamper the efforts of reconciliation undertaken by the ad hoc Committee of the Organization of African Unity;
5. Expresses its confidence in, and encourages the ad hoc Committee in carrying out the mandate intrusted to it by the 17th Summit Conference of the Organization of African Unity, held in Freetown in July 1980;
6. Requests the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity to inform the Secretary General of the United Nations of the results achieved by the OAU, regarding Western Sahara;
7. Invites the Secretary General of the United Nations to report thereon to the General Assembly at its 36th session.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

FACSIMILE MESSAGE

Precedence: PP

F. UN 051

Date / Time of Lodgement: 2000 21.10.80

CSN 068

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TO CANBERRA

FM UN NEW YORK

For Information: PARIS EMBASSY FM FILE 103/3/4,412/1
ALGIERS

TO FILE 935728/2

REF.

NO. OF PAGES 3

Subject Heading or Summary of Text: UNGA 35: FOURTH COMMITTEE: ITEM 18:
WESTERN SAHARA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MOROCCAN PRESS RELEASE SETTING
 OUT ITS ATTITUDE TO THE QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA, IN THE
 CONTEXT OF THE 17TH SUMMIT OF THE OAU AT FREETOWN:

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Sender	Signature & Date	Dept/Section	Phone No.	No. of copies to be returned to sender
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MOROCCO'S ATTITUDE REGARDING THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED AT
FREETOWN DURING THE 17th SUMMIT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF
AFRICAN UNITY, CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA
AND THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AD-HOC COMMITTEE ON
THE SAME QUESTION, 9-12th SEPTEMBER 1980

Morocco accepts the decision of the Summit of the OAU, and expresses
its satisfaction regarding the recommendations adopted by the ad-hoc
Committee in Freetown.

In order to cast a light on the attitude of Morocco regarding the decision of OAU Summit Conference, and the recommendations of the ad-hoc Committee adopted in Freetown concerning Western Sahara, it is useful to refer to the declaration of His Majesty King Hassan II made on September 16th, 1980 on this matter, while receiving the Sahara delegations, who were heard by the ad-hoc Committee during its meeting in Freetown. His Majesty said :

"We are aware of the recommendations of the ad-hoc Committee convened in Freetown. Our aim is not to analyze these recommendations today, as we are still waiting that they will be communicated to us officially by the Secretary General of the OAU. However, we can as from now state that we have reasons to be highly satisfied, since we regard the meeting of Freetown as a great victory in comparison with the previous meeting of the ad-hoc Committee".

During a press conference held in New-York on October 7th, 1980, His Excellency Mr. M'Hamed Boucetta, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, made the following clarifications :

"With regards to the African Summit of Freetown, our Heads of State have adopted a much more constructive attitude by inviting the ad-hoc Committee to resume its mission with the concerned parties, with a view to reaching reconciliation and a lasting peace.

Despite the legitimate reservations which Morocco could have expressed regarding the serenity of certain members of the Committee who cannot be judges and parties at the same parties, Morocco has shown the proof of its good will, and will continue in the future to participate normally in the work of the ad-hoc Committee (Committee of wise men), and to contribute in the effort of peace in the best manner possible.

The ad-hoc Committee has issued recommendations based on two ideas : the first idea is the cease-fire. We have no problem with the cease-fire because, as I have already said, it is not Morocco who opens the fire, and it does nothing but to respond to the aggression emanating from the Algerian territory. The cease-fire for us, will be therefore, be established from the moment in which we will be no more attacked from outside.

The second idea of the ad-hoc Committee deals with the consultation of the population.

The ad-hoc Committee has heard, from among the parties concerned, ten movements and organizations of the Sahara, i.e. the movements and organizations who had actually fought against the colonialism in the Sahara. They were composed of the political parties of the region, the elected members of the Saharan provinces on all levels, the Army of Liberation, AOSARIO, and the representatives of the abducted in Tindouf, etc...

All those organizations have voiced their direct testimony which reaffirm, their Moroccan identity both during the struggle and after their liberation, and have demonstrated the authenticity of their free choice of joining the fatherland, Morocco.

If the OAU now would like to verify the genuine and free expression of their will, the Sahara is already opened, and the OAU can choose the means to do so".

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.UN19306 2000 21.10.80 CLA

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PP CANBERRA/8464

FM. UN NEW YORK / FILE 103/3/4 412/1 REF O.UN19278

C O N F I D E N T I A L

UNGA 35 : FOURTH COMMITTEE: ITEM 18: QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

FURTHER TO OUR REFTEL, SWEDES HAVE TOLD US THAT THE ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR ALSO APPROACHED THEIR AMBASSADOR (THUNBORG) YESTERDAY. BEDJAQUI REMARKED THAT THE TEXT ON WESTERN SAHARA WAS INTENDED TO BE A MODERATE ONE AND WAS NOT VERY DIFFERENT FROM THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED LAST YEAR. THUNBORG RESPONDED THAT SWEDEN DID HAVE SOME DIFFICULTY WITH THE WORDING IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE DRAFT WHICH CRITICISED MOROCCO FOR IMPEDED THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 34/37. SWEDEN STATED THAT IT WOULD PREFER TO HAVE THIS REFERENCE TO MOROCCO DELETED. BEDJAQUI SAID THIS WOULD BE CONSIDERED.

2. THE SWEDES ALSO TOOK UP THE QUESTION OF AMENDMENTS TO THE TEXT WITH POLISARIO WHICH RESPONDED THAT IT WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY FURTHER CHANGES TO THE DRAFT (THAT IS, THE VERSION SENT YOU BY FAX). AUSTRIA, IN TALKING FURTHER TO THE ALGERIAN MISSION, RECEIVED THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO GET AMENDMENTS ALONG THE LINES WHICH WE AND THEY HAVE SUGGESTED. BOTH THE SWEDES AND THE AUSTRIANS, HOWEVER, HAVE TOLD US IN CONFIDENCE THAT THEY STILL EXPECTED TO VOTE FOR THE RESOLUTION WHILE MAKING A STRONG EXPLANATION OF THEIR VOTE.

3. IN A SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT, MOROCCO HAS TRIED TO MARSHALL SOME SUPPORT FOR ITS POSITION IN THE AFRICAN GROUP. IN A MEETING BEFORE THE GROUP TODAY (21 OCTOBER) MOROCCO SOLICITED CO-SPONSORS FOR A DRAFT OF ITS OWN (WE HAVE NOT SEEN TEXT AS YET) BUT WAS UNSUCCESSFUL IN THIS. IT ALSO APPEALED TO THE AFRICAN GROUP TO HAVE THE WEST SAHARAN QUESTION WITHDRAWN FROM THE UNITED NATIONS ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WAS A BILATERAL ISSUE AND NOT ONE OF DECOLONIZATION. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THIS APPEAL WAS REJECTED.

4. WE ARE SENDING BY FAX A MOROCCAN PRESS RELEASE ON WESTERN SAHARA.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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ACTION: IO
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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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UNGA 35 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 - WESTERN SAHARA

YOUR REFTEL ARRIVED COINCIDENTALLY WITH A REQUEST FROM THE ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR (BEDJAQUI) FOR A MEETING TO DISCUSS THE ALGERIAN DRAFT.

2. AT THIS MEETING THIS MORNING 20 OCTOBER, BEDJAQUI APPEALED FOR OUR SUPPORT, ARGUING THAT ALGERIA HAD BEEN AT PAINS TO KEEP THE DRAFT MODERATE IN TONE AND SUBSTANCE. HE POINTED OUT THAT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 6 SIMPLY "COMMENDS THE EFFORTS MADE" BY THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE OAU, INSTEAD OF CALLING FOR MOROCCAN COMPLIANCE WITH THE COMMITTEE'S RESOLUTION INCLUDING ITS CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE WHICH MOROCCO IS NOT YET PREPARED TO ACCEPT. HE ALSO SAID THAT WHEREAS POLISARIO HAD WANTED TO BE DESCRIBED AS "SOLE AND AUTHENTIC REPRESENTATIVE" OF THE SAHRAOUI PEOPLE, THE DRAFT STOPPED SHORT OF THIS.

3. THE AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED OUR STRONG PREFERENCE FOR THE AMENDMENTS INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF OUR REFTEL AND ALSO SUGGESTED THAT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE WORKING PAPER WOULD BE LESS OFFENSIVE TO MOROCCO AND ITS FRIENDS IF THE CONCLUDING PHRASE "DUE TO THE REFUSAL OF MOROCCO ETC", WHICH SEEMED SUPERFLUOUS, WERE DROPPED.

4. BEDJAQUI ARGUED STRONGLY FOR THE IDENTIFICATION IN PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 8 OF THE POLISARIO AND MOROCCO AS THE BELLIGERENTS, ASSERTING THAT ALGERIA WAS NOT INVOLVED, THAT THESE WERE THE TERMS USED BY THE OAU ITSELF AND EVEN THAT THE POLISARIO WOULD ARGUE THAT THE TERM "BELLIGERENTS" (IF THE PARTIES WERE NOT IDENTIFIED) SHOULD INCLUDE THE UNITED STATES WHICH WAS SUPPLYING ARMS TO MOROCCO. WITH REGARD TO THE DESCRIPTION OF THE POLISARIO IN PARAGRAPH 8 AS "THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF WESTERN SAHARA", BEDJAQUI SAID THAT THIS PHRASE HAD ALREADY BEEN USED IN LAST YEAR'S RESOLUTION BUT THAT AS THE FRENCH TEXT SIMPLY READ "REPRESENTANT" WITHOUT AN ARTICLE, THE ARTICLE COULD ALSO BE DROPPED FROM THE ENGLISH TEXT. HE INDICATED READINESS TO CONSIDER DROPPING THE REFERENCE TO THE "REFUSAL OF MOROCCO" IN PARAGRAPH 2.

5. AFTER SOME FURTHER INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION, THE AMBASSADOR UNDERTOOK TO REPORT BEDJAQUI'S DIFFICULTIES WITH OUR PROPOSED

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AMENDMENTS AND HE UNDERTOOK ON HIS SIDE TO DISCUSS THEM WITH THE PROSPECTIVE COSPONSORS OF HIS DRAFT. BEDJAQUI SAID HE WOULD CONSIDER WHETHER SOME OTHER FORMULA COULD BE DEVISED TO MEET OUR DIFFICULTY. IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION SEMAICHI OF THE ALGERIAN MISSION SAID THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO LOOK AT ANY ALTERNATIVE FORMULA WE MIGHT PROPOSE. WE EXPECT, HOWEVER, THAT BEDJAQUI WILL NOT IN FACT GIVE GROUND ON THE IDENTIFICATION OF MORROCO AND THE POLISARIO AS THE BELLIGERENTS, AND THAT HE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS THE ARGUMENT THAT THE IDENTIFICATION HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE AND SANCTIFIED BY THE OAU AS THE COMPETENT REGIONAL BODY.

6. IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR (WHOM BEDJAQUI ALSO SAW THIS MORNING) EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT BEDJAQUI'S READINESS TO DROP THE ARTICLE IN PARAGRAPH 8 AND IN GENERAL AT WHAT HE SAW AS THE MODERATE APPROACH THE ALGERIANS ARE ADOPTING THIS YEAR. HE WAS NOT RESPONSIVE TO THE IDEA BEHIND OUR AMENDMENTS AND SAID THAT IN THE LIGHT OF A CONVERSATION HE HAD HAD WITH CHANCELLOR KREISKY IN THE SUMMER HE WOULD EXPECT AUSTRIA TO VOTE FOR THE DRAFT IN ITS PRESENT FORM.

7. WE SHALL BE IN TOUCH WITH THE SWEDES AND REPORT FURTHER.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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FOREIGN MINISTER
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CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: IO
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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

UNGA 35 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 : WESTERN SAHARA

WE HAVE NOTED THAT WHILE THE DRAFT ON WESTERN SAHARA HAS NOT BEEN STIFFENED TO ANY REAL EXTENT, THE THRUST HAS BEEN ALTERED WITH SOME SUBTLETY TO EFFECTIVELY DISTANCE ALGERIA FROM THE DISPUTE TO, IN TURN, PLACE GREATER EMPHASIS ON THE POLISARIO AND TO GIVE THE POLISARIO IMPLICIT RECOGNITION AS A SOVEREIGN ENTITY. TO THIS END WE NOTE THAT PREAMBULAR PARA 5 HAS BEEN ALTERED SLIGHTLY AND OPERATIVE PARA 3 MODIFIED TO ESTABLISH THE PATTERN SET OUT SUBSEQUENTLY IN OPERATIVE PARAS 6 AND 8.

2. WE WOULD PREFER TO SEE OP PARA 6 AMENDED TO READ '... THE NECESSITY OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE BELLIGERENTS, WITH A VIEW TO CREATING ...', AND WE WOULD LIKE A CORRESPONDING GENERALISATION OF PARA 8 TO BE MADE.

3. PLEASE CONSULT OTHER WESTERN DELEGATIONS, BUT PARTICULARLY SWEDEN AND AUSTRIA, WHO TOGETHER WITH AUSTRALIA SUPPORTED LAST YEAR'S TEXT, AND REPORT THEIR VIEWS. WE WOULD ALSO LIKE YOU TO PURSUE OUR PROPOSED AMENDMENTS WITH THE ALGERIANS AND ADVISE.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ONA

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

180

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.CH922586

ACTION: IO
AME OGBAAF

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	FAS(EANZ)			ANZ	
FAS(DN)	DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)		FAS(ECO)	
FAS(LT)	IL	FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M		FAREP-P	
FAREP-S						

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

179
935/28/2

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

FACSIMILE MESSAGE

Precedence:

Date / Time of Lodgement: 1300 12-10-80

UNCLASSIFIED

F. UN DRAFT

CSN UNGA DRAFT

TO CANBERRA

FM UN NEW YORK

FM FILE 103/3/4,412/1

TO FILE

REFL

NO. OF PAGES 5

Subject Heading or Summary of Text: UNGA 35: FOURTH COMMITTEE: ITEM 18:
WESTERN SAHARA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF WORKING PAPER ON WESTERN SAHARA
PREPARED BY ALGERIA AND AGREED TO BY AFRICAN SUPPORTERS
OF THE RESOLUTION:

F. UN035/2

The General Assembly,

Having considered in depth the question of Western Sahara,
Recalling the inalienable right of all people to self-determination and
independence in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter
of the United Nations and its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,
containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples,

Recalling its resolution 34/37 of 31 November 1979 concerning the question
of Western Sahara,

Having considered the relevant chapter of the report of the Special
Committee on the Situation with regard to the implementation of the Decla-
ration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;

Having heard the statements made on the subject of Western Sahara, in
particular the statement of the representative of the Frente Popular para
la Liberación de Sagüiú-El Hamra y Río de Oro (Frente Polisario),

- 3 -

Bearing in mind the profound concern of the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity and the non-aligned countries for the decolonization of Western Sahara,

Also bearing in mind the deep concern of the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity and the non-aligned countries at the aggravation of the situation prevailing in Western Sahara because of the continuation of the occupation of that territory by Morocco,

Commending the efforts made by the Organisation of African Unity and its Ad-Hoc Committee with a view to promoting a just and definitive political solution of the question of Western Sahara in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and of the Organisation of African Unity,

Taking note of the declaration concerning Western Sahara taken by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity, at its seventeenth ordinary session held at Pretoria from 1 to 4 July 1990,

Recalling its resolution 34/21 of 3 November 1978 regarding the co-operation between the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity,

1.- Reaffirm the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, and the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and the legitimacy of their struggle for the exercise of that right, as envisaged in the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity,

FUN035/4

- 3 -

2.- Deeply deplores that its resolution 34/37 of 21 November 1979 stating the ways and means of a just and definitive political solution of the question of Western Sahara was not possible to be implemented, due to the refusal of Morocco to comply with the provisions of this resolution.

3.- Declares itself now deeply concerned at the aggravation of the situation proceeding from the continuation of the occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco and the extension of this occupation to the part of Western Sahara which was the subject of the peace agreement concluded on 5 August 1979 between the Mauritanian Government and the Fronte Polisario.

4.- Reaffirms that a solution to the question of Western Sahara is to be found in the exercise by the people of this Territory of their inalienable rights, including the right to self determination and independence.

5.- Takes note of the decision concerning Western Sahara taken by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity at its seventeenth ordinary session,

6.- Commends the efforts made by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Organisation of African Unity with a view to promoting a just and definitive solution to the question of Western Sahara and urges on the necessity of negotiations between the two belligerents, the Fronte Polisario and Morocco, with a view to creating a propitious atmosphere to achieving this efforts.

F.UA035/5

- 9 -

7.- Reiterates its appeal contained in its resolution 34/37 in which the General Assembly urges Morocco to join in the peace process and to terminate the occupation of the territory of Western Sahara,

8.- Urges to this end, Morocco and Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Sagmat El Haika y Rio de Oro (Frente Polisario) the representative of the people of Western Sahara, to enter into direct negotiations with a view to reaching a definitive settlement of the question of Western Sahara,

9.- Requests the Special Committee on the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial Countries and Peoples to continue to consider the situation in Western Sahara as a priority question and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-six session.

10.- Requests the Administrative Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity to keep the Secretary General of the United Nations informed of the progress achieved with regard to the implementation of the decisions of the Organization of African Unity concerning Western Sahara.

11.- Invites the Secretary General to follow closely the situation in Western Sahara with a view to implementing the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

ends.

935/28/2
174
RESTRICTED

Algeria

Siwa gram
dated 15/10/80

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Mauritania

INWARD BB MESSAGE

8. Mauritania's President Khouna Ould Haidallah, visited Algiers from 28 September to 1 October. Discussions touched on regional and Islamic politics. Mauritania has openly sided with Iraq in the war with Iran, as has Morocco. The communique issued at the end of the visit also referred to the situation in the Western Sahara, expressing a hope that a solution would soon be found, and noting Mauritania's adhesion to the principle of self-determination for the Saharan people. The Communique was significant, however, in that it did not mention the Polisario Front. Haidallah's visit followed immediately upon a meeting of the Algero-Mauritanian Mixed Commission, moribund since Mauritania's entry into the Saharan war in 1975. Algeria has agreed to aid Mauritania in setting up a sugar refinery, and also in a joint fishing venture.

9. While other countries in the region appear to be trying to liberalise, Mauritania, if anything, is hardening. The property of a number of prominent opponents has been confiscated and a former Foreign Minister has been refused permission to leave for urgent medical treatment. In addition, the Mauritanian criminal code has been amended to introduce elements of the Islamic sharia law. The first execution and two medically supervised amputations of the hands of thieves were carried out recently in Nouakchott.

Western Sahara

10. The OAU meeting of the "Committee of Wise Men" on the conflict in the Western Sahara, did not really produce anything spectacular, although it has been hailed by each side to the dispute as a victory for themselves. In calling (again) for a UN/OAU-supervised referendum, the Committee merely repeated other pro-Polisario resolutions. But in not calling for an immediate Moroccan withdrawal from the territory, King Hassan feels the resolution went his way, reiterating that, in any case, Morocco considered that a valid act of self-determination (pro-Moroccan) had already taken place. Predictably, the meeting was preceded and followed by a frenzy of military and diplomatic action by Polisario. The latter claims to have killed hundreds of Moroccan soldiers, often within Morocco itself, and to have shot down at least two Moroccan Mirage F-1's - claims denied by Morocco, and by at least one French journalist who spent eight days in the area. Two more Spanish and one Portuguese fishing vessels were captured off the coast of the Western Sahara by Polisario "marine units". The Front also claims that its attack on the territory's capital, El Ayoun, on 18 September led to a subsequent terror campaign by the Moroccan troops occupying the town.

11. On the diplomatic front, Polisario won only a qualified victory in the resolution of the IPU meeting in Berlin, which referred to the Front as only "a" representative of the Saharan people. Burundi and Nicaragua - who had already recognised the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic - announced that they had entered into diplomatic relations with the S.A.D.R., while Iran gave agreement to an S.A.D.R. ambassador.

RESTRICTED

INWARD CABLEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

0.GE47496 DBKE
TOR 2053 15.10.80

0.GE47496 1111 15.10.80 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/3136RP.
PP PARIS EMB/1812 ALGIERS/091 UN NEW YORK/2592
FM. GENEVA / REF 0.PA81964 0.PA81965

C O N F I D E N T I A L

MOROCCO - POLISARIO FRONT - UNHCR EXCOM

IN THE LIGHT OF REFTELS, YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THE QUESTION OF UNHCR ASSISTANCE FOR REFUGEES IN ALGERIA WAS THE SUBJECT OF HEATED DEBATE BETWEEN ALGERIA AND MOROCCO IN THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (0.GE47455 MENTIONS BUT DOES NOT ELABORATE ON THIS EXCHANGE). IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES WE DID NOT COMMENT ON THE HIGH COMMISSIONER'S PROPOSAL, WHICH WAS SUBSEQUENTLY APPROVED BY THE EXCOM AS PART OF HIS TOTAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DEP IMM ETH AFF T/T
ONA

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
DEP ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEP FINANCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
DEP TREASURY
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

172

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.6E47496

ACTION: PRO
SA
IO
AME JBAAE
CIP OGGF
IOL OGGF

SEC DEPSECS MCO FAS (SEP) FAS (NSA)
FAS (EANZ) FAS (DN) DPR FAS (IOAME)
FAS (CIC) FAS (ECO) FAS (MFS) FAREP-M
FAREP-P FAREP-S DIR-ADAB FAS (BP)
FAS (PTO) PDC

ACCRA CAIRO JEDDAH LAGOS MADRID TRIPOLI

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

171
930728/2

INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.PA81965 JCNI
TOR 0439 15.10.80

O.PA81965 1815 14.10.80 CLA

CONFIDENTIAL

TO.
RR CANBERRA/8591RP.
RR UN NEW YORK/1033 GENEVA/1850 ALGIERS/590

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 226/3/7 REF O.PA81964

C O N F I D E N T I A L

UNGA 35 : FOURTH COMMITTEE - ITEM 18 - WESTERN SAHARA

AS INDICATED IN THE AMBASSADOR'S TELEGRAM ON ACCREDITATION (O.PA81965) WE ARE WONDERING WHETHER OUR RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO, WHICH HAVE ONLY A LIMITED POLITICAL CONTENT BUT WHICH ALSO INCLUDE COMMERCIAL CONTACTS AND A CONTINUING CONSULAR CASE-LOAD, MAY HAVE BEEN AFFECTED BY SOME IMPRESSION THAT AUSTRALIA'S POSITION FAVOURS THE POLISARIO.

2. REPORTING FROM THIS POST AND ELSEWHERE SINCE THE DISPUTE TOOK ON ITS PRESENT SHAPE AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF THE SPANISH IN 1975 SUGGESTS THAT THIS IS A WARFARE IN WHICH BOTH SIDES HAVE A CASE TO MAKE AND IN WHICH THE MILITARY BALANCE HAS REMAINED PRETTY MUCH UNCHANGED DESPITE OCCASIONAL TEMPORARY ADVANCES AND RETREATS. (''LE MONDE'' IN ITS 11 OCTOBER EDITION CARRIED A MAJOR STORY OF SOME NEW MOROCCAN ''VICTORIES''). NEITHER SIDE HAS SUCCEEDED MUCH MORE THAN THE OTHER IN GAINING INTERNATIONAL SYMPATHY. IN THIS LATTER CONTEXT WE NOTE FROM ALGIERS' REPORTS THAT THE LIST OF COUNTRIES RECOGNISING THE POLISARIO FRONT AS A QUASI-GOVERNMENT REMAINS RESTRICTED TO A SOMEWHAT FRINGE GROUP, AND THAT THE OAU HAS TAKEN CARE NOT TO FAVOUR ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER IN ITS CONTINUING EFFORTS FOR A SETTLEMENT, PARTLY WE SUSPECT BECAUSE OF A WIDE-SPREAD CONCERN AMONG AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS THAT A POLITICAL VICTORY FOR POLISARIO WOULD ESTABLISH A PRECEDENT FOR CHANGES TO BOUNDARIES ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA. (THE LONG-STANDING PREFERENCE IS TO RETAIN THOSE RESULTING FROM COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION, RATHER THAN OPEN THE PANDORA'S BOX OF ''SELF-DETERMINATION'' FOR ALL OF AFRICA'S TRIBAL/ETHNIC GROUPS.)

3. WE SHOULD THEREFORE AVOID ANY TENDENCY TO THINK THAT SYMPATHY FOR THE POLISARIO CASE IS NECESSARILY IDENTIFIED WITH THE MAIN STREAM OF THIRD WORLD OPINION. THIS IS NOT SEEN, LEAST OF ALL BY G77 COUNTRIES, AS A STRAIGHTFORWARD ''DECOLONISATION'' SITUATION. WE HAVE IN THE PAST ALSO REPORTED SUGGESTIONS THAT EVEN THE ALGERIANS HAVE THEIR DOUBTS ABOUT THE WISDOM OF SUPPORT FOR POLISARIO, BECAUSE OF THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ALGERIA'S OWN SAHARAN HINTERLAND.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.PA81965

4. WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT WE REMAIN VERY MUCH IN THE BACKGROUND ON THE WESTERN SAHARA QUESTION, AND ENSURE THAT OUR UN VOTES ARE NOT SUCH AS TO PUT US IN ANY WAY AHEAD OF WESTERN COUNTRIES AS A WHOLE.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ONA

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: PRO
AME JBAAE

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(EANZ)		ANZ	EUR
FAS(DN)	NUC	DEF	DPR		FAS(IOAME)	IO
FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)		FAS(MFS)	PER		FAREP-M
FAREP-P	FAREP-S					

ACCRA CAIRO JEDDAH LAGOS MADRID TRIPOLI

169
935728/2

INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.PA81964 JCNI
TOR 0357 15.10.80

O.PA81964 1805 14.10.80 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/8590RP.
RR UN NEW YORK/1032 GENEVA/1849
BB ALGIERS/64

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 226/3/7., 226/5

C O N F I D E N T I A L

MOROCCO: ACCREDITATION AND BILATERAL RELATIONS

DESPITE VARIOUS REMINDERS FROM US, TWO YEARS HAVE NOW GONE BY WITHOUT THE MOROCCANS HAVING OFFERED ME A DATE FOR THE PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS. I THINK THAT WE CANNOT ENTIRELY EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS DOES NOT MERELY REFLECT THE LIMITED NATURE OF OUR DEALINGS WITH MOROCCO AND THE PECULIAR NATURE OF THE REGIME THERE (APPARENTLY EVERYTHING DEPENDS ON THE KING), BUT MAY INDICATE THAT OUR POLICY ON THE WESTERN SAHARA DISPUTE HAS GIVEN SOME OFFENCE.

2. WE RECEIVED SOME FAINT INDICATION OF THIS DURING OUR MOST RECENT VISIT TO MOROCCO (M.PA3255 OF 31DECEMBER 1979 AND RELATED REPORTS REFER). MORE RECENTLY WE NOTED THE REPORT IN O.GE7360 THAT THE POLISARIO BELIEVES, OR AT LEAST CLAIMS TO BELIEVE, THAT AUSTRALIA HAS CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED ITS POSITION IN ITS VOTING IN UN BODIES.

3. I HAVE IN MIND CALLING SHORTLY ON THE MOROCCAN AMBASSADOR (IF I CANNOT FIND ANOTHER OCCASION TO SPEAK TO HIM) IN ORDER TO ASK HIM AGAIN ABOUT THE CREDENTIALS QUESTION. UNLESS YOU PREFER ME NOT TO, I WOULD PROPOSE TO ASK HIM WHETHER THERE IS ANY POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE IN THE LONG DELAY, AND GIVE HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO MENTION OUR SAHARAN POLICY IF HE WISHES.

4. PLEASE ALSO SEE OUR SEPARATE TELEGRAM ON THE UNGA 35 FOURTH COMMITTEE VOTE ON WESTERN SAHARA M.PA81965).

... ROWLAND

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.PA81964

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ONA

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
DEP P M AND CABINET

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: PRO
AME JBAAE

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(EANZ)		ANZ	EUR
FAS(DN)	NUC	DEF	DPR		FAS(IOAME)	IO
FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)		FAS(MFS)	PER		FAREP-M
FAREP-P	FAREP-S					

ACCRA CAIRO JEDDAH LAGOS MADRID TRIPOLI

935728/2 167

INWARD CABLEGRAM

0.AL4235 PDPO
TOR 0156 13.10.80

0.AL4235 1530 12.10.80 UNC

TO.
PP CANBERRA/3098 GENEVA/134RP.
RR UN NEW YORK/170

FM. ALGIERS / FILE 862/98/1 REF 0.GE47406 0.CH920561

U N C L A S S I F I E D

UNHCR : EXCOM 31 - SAHARAN REFUGEES

YOU MIGHT WISH TO RECALL OUR REFERENCE IN 0.AL4129 TO ANNOUNCEMENT MADE IN ALGIERS ON 26 AUGUST OF AGREEMENT SIGNED BETWEEN UNHCR AND ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE ESTIMATED 100,000 REFUGEES IN CAMPS IN SOUTH-WEST ALGERIA. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THIS WAS FIRST INSTANCE OF ANY INTERNATIONAL BODY ACTUALLY RECOGNISING THEM OFFICIALLY AS REFUGEES. AGREEMENT WAS WITH ALGERIANS ONLY, ALTHOUGH CAMPS ARE RUN BY POLISARIO FRONT. GIVEN LACK OF FINANCIAL INCOME FROM SOURCES OTHER THAN FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS, POLISARIO CANNOT RUN THE CAMPS BY ITSELF. ALGERIA, AS YOU KNOW, IS A STRONG SUPPORTER OF POLISARIO, AND ITS ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION TO REFUGEE MAINTENANCE HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT. ASSISTANCE FROM BODIES SUCH AS UNHCR IS THUS REGARDED AS MOST IMPORTANT BY ALGERIA. WE UNDERSTAND FROM UNDP REPRESENTATIVE JAEGER THAT AGREEMENT DOES NOT MENTION POLISARIO AND THAT ANY AID GIVEN FOR REFUGEES WOULD BE ADMINISTERED BY ALGERIAN AGENCIES. IT IS INEVITABLE, HOWEVER, THAT POLISARIO WOULD BE INVOLVED IN PUTTING THE AID TO USE FOR THE REFUGEES. POLISARIO WOULD ALREADY APPEAR TO HAVE SUFFICIENT FUNDS AND MATERIAL TO PURSUE ITS POLICIES OUTSIDE ALGERIA.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DEP IMM ETH AFF T/T

DEP ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEP FINANCE
DEP TREASURY
JIO

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.AL4235

ACTION: IO
CIP
IOL066F
T/TSEC DEPSECS PPU LA PRO EX PA
FAS(10AME) AME FAS(CIC) FAS(LT) GLT
IL DIR-ADAB FAS(BP) FAS(PTO) PDC

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

O.CH920561 MJDE

O.CH920561 1717 9.10.80 CLA FIRST

TO.
PP GENEVA/4337RP.
RR ALGIERS/7269 PARIS EMB/7403

FM. CANBERRA / FILE 932/4/2/16 REF 0.6E47360

R E S T R I C T E D

UNHCR: EXCUM 31: POLISARIO FRONT

BEFORE MAKING OUR ATTITUDE TO THIS PROPOSAL KNOWN, WE SUGGEST YOU CHECK WHETHER UNHCR DOES INTEND TO INCLUDE PROVISION FOR SUCH A PROGRAM IN 1981 ESTIMATES. IF UNHCR CONSIDERATION OF THE PROPOSAL HAS NOT/NOT REACHED THAT STAGE WE SUGGEST THAT, AS WITH THE IRANIAN PROPOSAL, YOU REMAIN NON-COMMITTAL AND MERELY UNDERTAKE TO CONSIDER SYMPATHETICALLY ANY PROGRAM SUGGESTED BY UNHCR.

2. IF UNHCR HAS ALREADY INCLUDED SUCH A PROGRAM IN THE 1981 ESTIMATES, WE WILL HAVE TO LEAVE IT TO YOU TO WEIGH UP CONFLICTING CONSIDERATIONS. ON THE ONE HAND WE ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE STRONG FEELINGS EXPRESSED BY THE AFRICANS AT EXCOM AND, FROM THAT POINT OF VIEW, OUR INTERESTS MAY BE BEST SERVED BY SPECIFICALLY ENDORSING THE PROPOSED PROGRAM. ON THE OTHER HAND WE HAVE A STRONG INTEREST IN EFFORTS TO IMPROVE FINANCIAL CONTROL OVER UNHCR BY DONORS AND HARTLING HAS APPEALED TO DONORS BEFORE (AT THE TIME OF THE ECOSOC MEETING) NOT/NOT TO SUPPORT EXTENSIONS OF UNHCR ACTIVITIES TO WHICH WE DO NOT INTEND CONTRIBUTING.

3. HOWEVER YOU DECIDE TO ACT, PLEASE BEAR IN MIND THAT, AUSTRALIA DOES NOT RECOGNISE THE POLISARIO FRONT AS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SAHARAN PEOPLE ALTHOUGH WE DO RECOGNISE IT AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THESE PEOPLE. WE WOULD, THEREFORE, BE MORE RELUCTANT TO ENDORSE ANY PROGRAM WHICH IS TO BE INSTITUTED SOLELY IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE POLISARIO FRONT. WE ASSUME, HOWEVER, THAT AS POLISARIO IS NOT FORMALLY RECOGNISED BY THE O.A.U., UNHCR WILL IMPLEMENT ANY PROGRAM THROUGH THE ALGERIAN AND, POSSIBLY, THE MAURITANIAN GOVERNMENTS.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

164
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.CH920561

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DEP IMM ETH AFF

DEP ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEP FINANCE
DEP TREASURY
JIO

RESTRICTED

ACTION: IO
CIP
IOL

OGGF

SEC DEPSECS PPU LA PRO EX PA
FAS(10AME) AME FAS(CIC) FAS(LT) GLT
IL DIR-ADAB FAS(BP) FAS(PTO) PDC

163
935/288/2

INWARD CABLEGRAM

RESTRICTED

0.GE47406 MT00
TOR 0523 10.10.80

0.GE47406 2000 9.10.80 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/3059RP.
PP UN NEW YORK/2576 ALGIERS/088

FM. GENEVA / REF 0.CH920561

R E S T R I C T E D

UNHCR : EXCOM 31 - POLISARIO FRONT

UNHCR ESTIMATES FOR 1981 INCLUDE PROPOSAL FOR MULTI- PURPOSE ASSISTANCE UNDER GENERAL PROGRAMMES IN ALGERIA OF DOLLARS US 1,625,000. OUR UNOFFICIAL ADVICE FROM HCR ASSISTANCE DIVISION IS THAT THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THIS ITEM HAS BEEN INCLUDED AND THAT PREVIOUS PROPOSALS FOR ITS INCLUSION HAD GIVEN RISE TO CONSIDERABLE DEBATE. WE GATHERED THAT UNHCR'S DECISION TO INCLUDE IT THIS YEAR WAS A GESTURE OF EVEN-HANDEDNESS TO THOSE WHO WERE DISAPPOINTED AT ITS NON-INCLUSION LAST YEAR.

2. AS THE PROPOSED ALLOCATION IS FROM THE GENERAL PROGRAMME, THE QUESTION OF OUR OWN PARTICIPATION WOULD NOT APPEAR TO BE AN ISSUE. THE POLISARIO FRONT IS NOT, OF COURSE, MENTIONED BY NAME IN THE UNHCR ESTIMATE, AND THE INTENTION IS CLEARLY TO IMPLEMENT THE PROGRAMME THROUGH ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT.

3. UNLESS FURTHER ISSUES ARISE DURING DISCUSSION, WE WOULD PROPOSE, SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS, TO EXPRESS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE GLOBAL PROGRAMME PROPOSED BY UNHCR FOR 1981, AND NOTE PARTICULARLY THE INCLUSION OF, AMONGST OTHERS, THE ASSISTANCE PROPOSALS FOR PAKISTAN, THAILAND AND VARIOUS AFRICAN SITUATIONS, INCLUDING THAT OF REFUGEES IN ALGERIA.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DEP IMM ETH AFF T/T

DEP ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEP FINANCE
DEP TREASURY
JIO

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.6E47406

ACTION: IO
CIP
IOL066F
T/TSEC DEPSECS PPU LA PRO EX PA
FAS(IOAME) AME FAS(CIC) FAS(LT) GLT
IL DIR-ADAB FAS(BP) FAS(PTO) PDC

INWARD CABLEGRAM

930728/2

O.UN19154 MJDE
TOR 0914 09.10.80

O.UN19154 1800 8.10.80 UNC

TO.
RR CANBERRA/8320RP.
RR ALGIERS/096 PARIS EMB/900

FM. UN NEW YORK / FILE 103/3/4, 103/3, 412/1

U N C L A S S I F I E D

UNGA 35 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 : WESTERN SAHARA

COMMITTEE AGREED ON 7 OCTOBER TO THE FOLLOWING ELEVEN
REQUESTS FOR HEARING ON THE ABOVE QUESTION:

- (I) HAKIM IBRAHIM (POLISARIO) ACCCOMPANIED BY AT LEAST NINE OTHER POLISARIO REPRESENTATIVES.
- (II) "DEPUTIES OF THE SAHARAN PROVINCES OF THE KINGDOM OF MOROCCO."
- (III) KHALLI HANNA OULD ERRACHID (SECRETARY-GENERAL, PARTI DE L'UNION NATIONALE SAHRAOUI).
- (IV) DOUIHI MOHAMED RACHID (SECRETARY-GENERAL, FRONT DE LIBERATION ET DE L'UNITE).
- (V) "LEILI MOHAMED SALEM AND THREE OTHER CITIZENS OF MOROCCAN SAHARA."
- (VI) "AHMED MAHMOUD AND THREE OTHERS ELECTED BY THE COMMUNES AND OCCUPATIONAL CHAMBERS, DAKHLA, MOROCCO"
- (VII) ZAZOUALI BRIEA (FRONT DE LIBERATION DU SAHARA)
- (VIII) HABBOUHA HABIB (PRESIDENT, ASSOCIATION OF FORMER MEMBERS OF THE MOROCCAN LIBERATION ARMY IN THE SAHARAN PROVINCES)
- (IX) HAJ KHATRI OULD SIDI SAID EL JOUMANI (PRESIDENT, SAHZAWI ASSEMBLY)
- (X) BOHOY SIDI AHMED, (POLITICAL COMMISSAR, MOREHOB LIBERATION MOVEMENT) ASSISTED BY THREE OTHERS
- (XI) AHMED RACHID (SECRETARY-GENERAL, AOSARIO) ASSISTED BY THREE OTHERS.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.UN19154

2. YOU WILL NOTE THAT ONLY THE FIRST OF THESE REQUESTS IS FROM POLISARIO. THE REST ARE SUPPORTERS OF MOROCCO'S POSITION.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ONA

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
JIO

UNPA
NAT 151

CTM

ACTION: IO

0GBAAFA

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS (SEP)	FAS (NSA)	FAS (EANZ)	FAS (DN)			
DEF	DPR	FAS (IOAME)	FAS (ECO)	FAS (LT)		
IL	FAS (MFS)	FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S		

9357281/159

INWARD CABLEGRAM

0.GE47360 MT00
TOR 0204 09.10.80

0.GE47360 1630 8.10.80 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/3023RP.
RR UN NEW YORK/2566

FM. GENEVA /

R E S T R I C T E D

UNHCR : EXCOM : POLISARIO FRONT

DURING THIS MORNING'S GENERAL DEBATE A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE POLISARIO FRONT, WHICH IS AN OBSERVER AT EXCOM, APPROACHED US PRIVATELY AND ASKED US TO SPEAK IN SUPPORT OF AN ALLOCATION UNDER THE UNHCR GENERAL PROGRAMMES FOR RELIEF OF SAHARA REFUGEES IN THE SOUTH OF ALGERIA. HE BELIEVED THE HIGH COMMISSIONER INTENDED TO INCLUDE THIS ITEM FOR THE FIRST TIME AND TO ALLOCATE ABOUT DOLLARS US 1.6 MILLION TO IT IN 1981. (THIS INTENTION DOES NOT, HOWEVER, APPEAR IN THE HIGH COMMISSIONER'S PREPARED ESTIMATES PAPERS DISTRIBUTED TO MEMBERS).

2. THE POLISARIO FRONT MEMBER SAID THAT THERE WERE 150,000 SAHARAN REFUGEES IN QUESTION AND CLAIMED THAT AUSTRALIA HAD CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED THE POSITION OF HIS ORGANISATION IN ITS VOTING IN UN FORA.

3. GLAD TO KNOW IN LIGHT OF POLISARIO FRONT APPROACH IF YOU WOULD WISH US, INTER ALIA, TO GIVE A SPECIFIC ENDORSEMENT TO A PROGRAM FOR SAHARAN REFUGEES, SHOULD ONE BE PROPOSED. WE WOULD NOT ENVISAGE PROPOSING IT OURSELVES.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DEP IMM ETH AFF T/T

DEP ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEP FINANCE
DEP TREASURY
JIO

*Mr. Morgan Done R/W
G/10*

In liaison with UNST - AME, RI

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.GE47360

ACTION: IO
CIP
IOLOGGF
T/TSEC DEPSECS PPU LA PRO EX IL PA
FAS (IOAME) FAS (CIC) FAS (LT) GLT
DIR-ADAB FAS (BP) FAS (PTO) PDC

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

157

INWARD CABLEGRAM

0.GE47360 MT00
TOR 0204 09.10.80

0.GE47360 1630 8.10.80 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/3023

RP.
RR UN NEW YORK/2566

FM. GENEVA /

RESTRICTED

UNHCR : EXCOM : POLISARIO FRONT

DURING THIS MORNING'S GENERAL DEBATE A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE POLISARIO FRONT, WHICH IS AN OBSERVER AT EXCOM, APPROACHED US PRIVATELY AND ASKED US TO SPEAK IN SUPPORT OF AN ALLOCATION UNDER THE UNHCR GENERAL PROGRAMMES FOR RELIEF OF SAHARA REFUGEES IN THE SOUTH OF ALGERIA. HE BELIEVED THE HIGH COMMISSIONER INTENDED TO INCLUDE THIS ITEM FOR THE FIRST TIME AND TO ALLOCATE ABOUT DOLLARS US 1.6 MILLION TO IT IN 1981. (THIS INTENTION DOES NOT, HOWEVER, APPEAR IN THE HIGH COMMISSIONER'S PREPARED ESTIMATES PAPERS DISTRIBUTED TO MEMBERS).

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3. GLAD TO KNOW IN LIGHT OF POLISARIO FRONT APPROACH IF YOU WOULD WISH US, INTER ALIA, TO GIVE A SPECIFIC ENDORSEMENT TO A PROGRAM FOR SAHARAN REFUGEES, SHOULD ONE BE PROPOSED. WE WOULD NOT ENVISAGE PROPOSING IT OURSELVES.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DEP IMM ETH AFF T/T

DEP ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEP FINANCE
DEP TREASURY
JIO

M. Vincent
I don't see why we shouldn't support. Seems analogous to the Somah situation in some ways

Debuted 10/10/80
advised 10/10/80
Hand 10/10/80

MM

RE
STRICTED

156

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.GE47360

ACTION: IO
CIP
IOL OGGF
T/T

SEC DEPSECS PPU LA PRO EX PA
FAS(IOAME) FAS(CIC) FAS(LT) GLT IL
DIR-ADAB FAS(BP) FAS(PTO) PDC

ESTRICH

RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



① Ms Wesley 22.
② *united nations*
③ *Mr. Otago been sent* ON 935/28/2

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Distr.
GENERAL

A/C.4/35/5
6 October 1980
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

Thirty-fifth session
FOURTH COMMITTEE
Agenda item 18

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING
OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

Request for hearing

Letter dated 30 September 1980 from Mr. Hakim Ibrahim, Frente popular para la liberación de Saguia-el-Hamra y Rio de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), addressed to the Chairman of the Fourth Committee 1/

New York

I have the honour to transmit to you the provisional list of the brothers whom Frente POLISARIO has designated to address the Fourth Committee during the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations:

Hakim Ibrahim, Minister for Foreign Affairs and responsible for the external relations of Frente POLISARIO; Monsour Omar, Ambassador and member of the Political Bureau of Frente POLISARIO; Boukhari Ould Ahmed, Ambassador of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic to Mexico and Panama; Said Filali, Ambassador of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic to Benin; Abdelfattah Mahmoud, representative of Frente POLISARIO in Europe; Abdullah Madjid, representative of Frente POLISARIO in New York; Khalfaoui Abdelazziz, First Secretary of the Embassy of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic to Panama; Mouloud Said, representative of Frente POLISARIO in Addis Ababa; Ali Habib, representative of Frente POLISARIO in New York.

(Signed) Hakim IBRAHIM

1/ Distributed in accordance with a decision taken by the Fourth Committee at its 7th meeting, on 6 October 1980.



UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



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6 October 1980

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ORIGINAL: FRENCH

Thirty-fifth session
FOURTH COMMITTEE
Agenda item 18

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

Request for hearing

Telegram dated 2 October 1980 from the deputies of the Saharan provinces of the Kingdom of Morocco, Chamber of Representatives, Rabat, addressed to the Chairman of the Fourth Committee 1/

Rabat

Strong in the confidence placed in us by the electorate of the Moroccan Saharan provinces during the communal, occupational and legislative elections organized throughout the Kingdom of Morocco in 1976 and 1977, we have the great honour to request you to allow us to make our contribution to the discussion of the item concerning the question of so-called Western Sahara, which is to be debated in the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.

1/ Distributed in accordance with a decision taken by the Fourth Committee at its 7th meeting, on 6 October 1980.

The Deputies of the Saharan provinces
of the Kingdom of Morocco,
Chamber of Representatives,
Rabat

El Haj Khatri Ould Said El JOUMANI	- Deputy of Boujdour, Rassemblement National des indépendants
Maalainine Mohamed Taki ALLAH	- Deputy of Smara, Mouvement populaire
Khalli Hanna Ould ERRACHID	- Deputy of Laayoune, Rassemblement national des indépendants
Douihhi Mohamed RACHID	- Deputy of Laayoune, Parti de l'Istiqlal
Dr. Biadillah Mohamed CHEIKH	- Deputy of Boucraa, Rassemblement national des indépendants
Ahmed Ould El BACHIR	- Deputy of Laayoune, Rassemblement national des indépendants
Ali BOUAYADA	- Deputy of Tantan, Rassemblement national des indépendants



UNITED NATIONS
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FOURTH COMMITTEE
Agenda item 18

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

Request for hearing

Telegram dated 2 October 1980 from Mr. Douih Mohamed Rachid,
Secretary-General of the Front de libération et de l'unité,
addressed to the Chairman of the Fourth Committee 1/

Laayoune

I have the honour to request you to allow the Front de libération et de l'unité, of which I am the Secretary-General, to address the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly during the discussion of the item concerning the question of so-called Western Sahara.

When I address the Fourth Committee I shall be assisted by Mr. Mohamed Bakkar, Mr. Maalainine Chiba and Mr. Abou Zayd Abdelkader.

Douih Mohamed RACHID
Secretary-General of the Front
de libération et de l'unité

1/ Distributed in accordance with a decision taken by the Fourth Committee at its 7th meeting, on 6 October 1980.

UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



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FOURTH COMMITTEE
Agenda item 18

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

Request for hearing

Telegram dated 2 October 1980 from those elected by the communes
and those elected by the occupational chambers, Dakhla, Morocco,
addressed to the Chairman of the Fourth Committee 1/

Dakhla

In our capacity as representatives elected by the inhabitants of the Saharan provinces during the communal, occupational and legislative elections held in the Kingdom of Morocco in 1976 and 1977, we have the honour to request you to allow us to address the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly when the item concerning the question of so-called Western Sahara is discussed.

On behalf of those elected by the communes
and those elected by the occupational
chambers, town of Dakhla, Province of
Oued ed Dahab, Morocco

Ahmed MAHMOUD, President of the Commune
of Haggounia

Sid Alem Ould Sidi SALAH, President of
the Provincial Council of E'Smara

Abdelbaqi MOHAMED, President of the
Commune of Dir Anzarane

Ali REZMA, President of the Provincial
Council of Tantan

1/ Distributed in accordance with a decision taken by the Fourth Committee at its seventh meeting, on 6 October 1980.

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UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



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FOURTH COMMITTEE
Agenda item 18

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

Request for hearing

Telegram dated 2 October 1980 from Mr. Leili Mohamed Salem,
Mr. Amara M'Hamed Ben M'Barek, Mr. Mohamed Laaribi and
Mr. Mohamed Kher, addressed to the Chairman of the
Fourth Committee 1/

Laayoune

In our capacity as relatives of citizens from Moroccan Sahara who are confined at Tindouf, we have the honour to request you to allow us to address the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.

Leili Mohamed SALEM
Amara M'Hamed Ben M'BAREK
Mohamed LAARIBI
Mohamed KHER

1/ Distributed in accordance with a decision taken by the Fourth Committee at its 7th meeting, on 6 October 1980.



UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



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A/C.4/35/5/Add.2
6 October 1980
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FOURTH COMMITTEE
Agenda item 18

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

Request for hearing

Telegram dated 2 October 1980 from Mr. Khalli Hanna Ould Errachid,
Secretary-General of the Parti de l'Union nationale Sahraoui,
addressed to the Chairman of the Fourth Committee 1/

Laayoune

I have the honour to request you to allow me to address the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in my capacity as the Secretary-General of the Parti de l'Union nationale Sahraoui during the discussion of the item concerning the question of so-called Western Sahara, so that I may provide information that will clarify the debate of your honourable Committee.

When I address the Fourth Committee I shall be assisted by Mr. Hammoudi Bouhanana, Mr. Khalifa Boujema El Hihi, Mr. Mohamed Samlali and Mr. Khalil.

Khalli Hanna Ould ERRACHID
Secretary-General of the Parti de
l'Union nationale Sahraoui

1/ Distributed in accordance with a decision taken by the Fourth Committee at its 7th meeting, on 6 October 1980.

UNITED NATIONS
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6 October 1980
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FOURTH COMMITTEE
Agenda item 18

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

Request for hearing

Telegram dated 2 October 1980 from Mr. Bohoy Sidi Ahmed,
Political Commissar of the MOREHOB Liberation Movement,
addressed to the Chairman of the Fourth Committee 1/

Laayoune

In my capacity as Political Commissar of MOREHOB, I have the honour to request you to allow the Movement which I represent to be heard during the discussion on the item concerning the so-called question of Western Sahara, which is to be debated in the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.

When I address the Fourth Committee I shall be assisted by Mr. Bouya Maalainine, Mr. Ali Chiaa and Mr. Mohamed M'Barek Tamek.

(Signed) Bohoy Sidi AHMED
Political Commissar of the MOREHOB
Liberation Movement

1/ Distributed in accordance with a decision taken by the Fourth Committee at its 7th meeting, on 6 October 1980.



UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



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FOURTH COMMITTEE
Agenda item 18

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

Request for hearing

Telegram dated 2 October 1980, from Mr. Habbouha Habib, President
of the Association of Former Members of the Moroccan Liberation
Army in the Saharan Provinces, addressed to the Chairman of the
Fourth Committee 1/

During consideration of the item concerning the so-called question of Western Sahara by the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, I have the honour to request you to allow me to speak on behalf of the Association of Former Members of the Moroccan Liberation Army in the Saharan Provinces, of which I am the President, so that I may clarify any questions that members of the Committee may have.

During my statement to the Fourth Committee, I will be assisted by:
Mr. Chaggaf Sid Ahmed, Mr. Abdallah Khattat, Mr. Chrif Dlimi and
Mr. Hamdati Maalainine.

(Signed) Habbouha HABIB
President of the Association of Former
Members of the Moroccan Liberation
Army in the Saharan Provinces

1/ Circulated in accordance with a decision taken by the Fourth Committee at its 7th meeting, on 8 October 1980.



UNITED NATIONS
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ASSEMBLY



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FOURTH COMMITTEE
Agenda item 18

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

Request for hearing

Telegram dated 2 October 1980 from Mr. Haj Khatri Ould Sidi Said El Joumani,
President of the Sahrawi Assembly, addressed to the Chairman of the Fourth
Committee 1/

Laayoune

In my capacity as President of the Sahrawi Assembly (Jemaa), I have the honour to request you to allow me to express the views of the institution which I represent to the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly during the discussion on the item concerning the so-called question of Western Sahara.

When I address the Fourth Committee, I shall be assisted by Mr. Brahim Mechnan, Mr. Bachir Ben Al Abidine, Mr. Bachir Mohamed Al Mostafa and Mr. Sid El Alem.

(Signed) Haj Khatri Ould Sidi Said EL JOUMANI
President of the Sahrawi Assembly

1/ Distributed in accordance with a decision taken by the Fourth Committee at its 7th meeting, on 6 October 1980.



UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



Distr.
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A/C.4/35/5/Add.6
6 October 1980

ENGLISH

ORIGINAL: FRENCH

Thirty-fifth session
FOURTH COMMITTEE
Agenda item 18

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

Request for hearing

Telegram dated 2 October 1980, from Mr. Zarouali Brika of the
Front de libération du Sahara, addressed to the Chairman of
the Fourth Committee 1/

I have the honour to request you to allow me to speak on behalf of the Front de libération du Sahara in my capacity as a leading member of that organization during the discussion of the so-called question of Western Sahara in the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.

During my statement to the Fourth Committee I shall be assisted by Mr. Biadillah Mohamed Cheikh, Mr. Maalainine Larabass and Mr. Brahim Bouihi.

(Signed) Zarouali BRIKA
For the Front de libération du Sahara

1/ Circulated in accordance with a decision taken by the Fourth Committee at its 7th meeting, on 8 October 1980.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

F-935/28/2

O.CH915965 AMBR

O.CH915965 1722 17.9.80 UNC

TO.

RR UN NEW YORK/2736

FM. CANBERRA / FILE 935/28/2

U N C L A S S I F I E D

OAU: WESTERN SAHARA

FOLLOWING IS REPETITION OF TELEGRAM NO. NA11327 DATED 15.9.80
FROM NAIROBI.

BEGINS:

O.NA11327 1230 15.9.80 UNC

TO.

RR CANBERRA/267

RP.

RR WASHINGTON/435 ALGIERS/033 LAGOS/543

FM. NAIROBI / FILE 235/1

U N C L A S S I F I E D

OAU : WESTERN SAHARA

ACCORDING TO AGENCY REPORTS FROM AFP WHICH HAVE APPEARED IN THE KENYAN PRESS THE OAU'S AD HOC COMMITTEE FORMED TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE IN THE WESTERN SAHARA BETWEEN MOROCCO AND THE POLISARIO HAS PUT FORWARD A SIX POINT PLAN. ACCORDING TO THE REPORTS THE SIX POINTS ARE:

- (I) A FAIR AND GENERAL REFERENDUM IN THE WESTERN SAHARA.,
- (II) A CEASEFIRE BY DECEMBER 1980.,
- (III) THE PARTIES TO BE ASKED TO LEAVE THEIR FORCES IN THEIR BASES AND BARRACKS DURING THE CEASEFIRE.,
- (IV) UN PEACE-KEEPING TROOPS TO BE ENTRUSTED WITH ENSURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CEASEFIRE.,
- (V) THE OAU WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE UN TO ORGANISE THE

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

2-O.CH915965

REFERENDUM AND

(VI) THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE OAU TO INFORM THE PARTIES OF THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE.

2. THE ONLY COMMENTS BY WAY OF REACTION TO THE COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION WERE REPORTED AS COMING FROM THE MOROCCAN PRIME MINISTER, MAATI BOUABIT. HE SPOKE OUT AGAINST THE IDEA OF A REFERENDUM SINCE THE PEOPLE IN WESTERN SAHARA, HE CLAIMED, HAD ALREADY EXERCISED SELF-DETERMINATION BY CHOOSING REINTEGRATION WITH MOROCCO AS THE MOTHER COUNTRY. HE EXPRESSED APPROVAL HOWEVER OF THE FACT THAT THE FINAL RESOLUTION OF THE COMMITTEE HAD MADE NO ALLUSION TO POLISARIO. HIS OTHER REPORTED COMMENTS WERE THAT IF THE OAU APPROACHED THE U.N. FOR HELP IN SETTLING A STRICTLY AFRICAN PROBLEM IT WOULD NO LONGER BE LIVING UP TO ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AND THAT THE COMMITTEE'S SET OF RECOMMENDATIONS WOULD NOT BE PUT INTO EFFECT UNLESS ADOPTED BY A SPECIAL OAU SUMMIT.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ACTION: IO
AME

JCAA

935/28/2
145

INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.NA11327 RLOP
TOR 2152 15.09.80

O.NA11327 1230 15.9.80 UNC

TO.
RR CANBERRA/267RP.
RR WASHINGTON/435 ALGIERS/033 LAGOS/543
FM. NAIROBI / FILE 235/1

U N C L A S S I F I E D

OAU : WESTERN SAHARA

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- (II) A CEASEFIRE BY DECEMBER 1980.,
- (III) THE PARTIES TO BE ASKED TO LEAVE THEIR FORCES IN THEIR BASES AND BARRACKS DURING THE CEASEFIRE.,
- (IV) UN PEACE-KEEPING TROOPS TO BE ENTRUSTED WITH ENSURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CEASEFIRE.,
- (V) THE OAU WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE UN TO ORGANISE THE REFERENDUM AND
- (VI) THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE OAU TO INFORM THE PARTIES OF THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE.

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.../2

*Mr. Rohulhaan
pls repeat to UNM
(after consulting with
CSA) return 16/9*

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.NA11327

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ONA

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
JIO

ACTION: AME JCAA

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(DN)	DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)		IO	
FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)		FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M		
FAREP-P	FAREP-S					

ACCRA CAIRO DAR ES SALAAM LONDON MOSCOW PARIS EMB PEKING
PRETORIA SALISBURY TRIPOLI UN NEW YORK

143

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
CENTRAL REGISTRY

D.F.A.

DATE. 11 September, 1980.

INFORMATION.

cc: ALGIERS

SEP 25	IN REPLY QUOTE	M 189 MC 2143	REGISTRY CODE
TO. DEPT. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.			
INWARDS		TO FILE. 8891118	
REF. M			
FM. MEXICO CITY			
FM. FILE. 225/8		POST SEQUENCE NUMBER	1277

CLASSIFICATION. UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT. MEXICO: RELATIONS WITH THE DEMOCRATIC ARAB REPUBLIC OF SAHARAUI

DP
ENCLOSURES ATTACHED

On 24 October, 1979 Mexico and the Arab Democratic Republic of Saharaui announced that they would establish diplomatic relations. It was announced on 15 August that non resident Ambassadors would be accredited to each country. As was noted in para 5 of M.MC1313, the gesture no doubt pleases the Algerians and presently the Mexican Embassy in Algiers has been responsible for handling Mexico's relations with the Arab Democratic Republic of Saharaui. However, the Mexican Foreign Ministry has not yet decided whether its Ambassador to Algeria will have the double accreditation to Saharaui. (You may wish to note that the Mexican Government does not have an Embassy in Morocco, but has a Consulate General. The Moroccans are accredited to Mexico from Washington.)

2. The new Ambassador for the Saharaui in Mexico is Mr. Bujari Uld Ahmed Uld Barikalla who is resident in Panama. A copy of his biographical notes, supplied by the Mexican Foreign Ministry, is attached. He presented his credentials to President Lopez Portillo in September 1980.

① MAKE NO. Pls note number.
② F 935(28)2 UNP

Murphy
S. Sergi
First Secretary.

BIOGRAPHICAL FACTS ON THE DESIGNATED AMBASSADOR FROM THE
DEMOCRATIC ARAB REPUBLIC OF SAHARAUI, MR. BUJARI ULD AHMED
ULD BARIKALLA

He was born on September 19, 1952. He studied law at the University of La Laguna (Tenerife). As a member of youth and student circles he fought actively against the colonial occupation of his country by Spain. In 1975, he joined the Polisario Front. He was appointed Director of Foreign Information of the Ministry of Information of his country, President of the Sahraui Lawyers Association, and carried out several official and informative missions in different countries. He was elected member of the Political Bureau of the Polisario Front in 1978. He served as Permanent Representative of the Polisario Front in Spain.

Since April of 1980 he has been the ambassador of his country in Panama.

EXRO93

AFP-15

POLISARIO 1

UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK, AUG. 14 (AFP) - MAJID ABDULLAH, 141
REPRESENTING THE POLISARIO FRONT GUERRILLAS, TODAY DENOUNCED
"OBLIGATION" BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND MOROCCO OVER THE WAR IN THE
WESTERN SAHARA. 235/2812

SPEAKING BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS (U.N.) DECOLONIZATION
COMMITTEE, MR. ABDULLAH SAID THAT THE POLISARIO HAD CAPTURED DOZENS
OF SOUTH AFRICAN-MADE TANKS FROM THE MOROCCAN ARMY. HE CALLED FOR A
DELEGATION OF U.N. EXPERTS TO SEE THE TANKS FOR THEMSELVES.

MR. ABDULLAH ALSO ACCUSED MOROCCO, WHICH IS BATTLING THE
POLISARIO FOR CONTROL OF THE WESTERN SAHARA, OF "REVIVING ITS OLD
CONTENTIONS WITH MAURITANIA" AND THEREBY PRACTICING "A POLITICS
OF DESTABILIZATION AND INFILTRATION."

HE SAID THAT THE POLISARIO GUERRILLAS ON AUGUST 2 SHOT DOWN A
MIRAGE F-1 PLANE ON ITS WAY TO ATTACK MAURITANIA AND THAT THE
"DEBRIS OF THE PLANE OFFERED IRREFUTABLE PROOF AGAINST THE AUTHORS
OF THIS AGGRESSION."

(THE POLISARIO HAS PREVIOUSLY SAID THAT THE PLANE BELONGED TO
THE MOROCCAN AIR FORCE.)

MR. ABDULLAH ALSO ACCUSED SPAIN OF WORKING WITH MOROCCO TO TRY
TO "PILLAGE" NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE WESTERN SAHARA, A FORMER
SPANISH COLONY THAT WAS ANNEXED BY MOROCCO AND THEN DECLARED A
REPUBLIC BY THE POLISARIO.

MORE

EXRO94

AFP-16

POLISARIO 2 LAST (UNITED NATIONS, N.Y.)

MR. ABDULLAH CALLED SPAIN'S POLICIES "A SERIOUS ERROR" THAT
IGNORED THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE WESTERN SAHARAN PEOPLE, AND A
"VIOLATION OF OUR TERRITORIAL WATERS".

HE ALSO CALLED ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO CONTINUE TO
SUPPORT "THE LEGITIMATE EXERCISE OF OUR PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO
SELF-DETERMINATION" AND WARNED MOROCCO AGAINST IGNORING REQUESTS
FROM THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS OVER
THE DISPUTED AREA.

HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THE GUERRILLAS WOULD WIN THE
CONFLICT, SAYING THAT MOROCCO WOULD INEVITABLY GIVE UP AND
"RECOGNIZE THE POLISARIO AS THE SOLE AND LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE (WESTERN) SAHARAN PEOPLE."

AFP

EXRO95

AFP-17

MUGABE.

UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK, AUG. 14 (AFP) - ROBERT MUGABE, PRIME
MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE, WILL ADDRESS THE UNITED NATIONS HERE SHORTLY
AFTER THE COUNTRY IS ADMITTED AS THE 153RD MEMBER OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION ON AUGUST 25 OR 26, A U.N. SPOKESMAN
ANNOUNCED TODAY.

MR. MUGABE IS TO ADDRESS A U.N. SESSION ON ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
WHICH OPENS AUGUST 25, THE SPOKESMAN SAID.

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OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

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TO.
PP ALGIERS/7185RP.
RR PARIS EMB/5801

FM. CANBERRA / FILE 167/10/11 REF 0.AL4054

R E S T R I C T E D

AUSTRALIAN POLICY ON WESTERN SAHARA

AUSTRALIA'S POLICY ON WESTERN SAHARA HAS NOT CHANGED IN THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS AND YOU WILL FIND A COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT ON IT IN THE BRIEF FOR UNGA 34. THE ELEMENTS ARE IN SUMMARY:

A. WE REGARD SELF-DETERMINATION AS A NECESSARY PART OF THE DECOLONIZATION PROCESS OF ALL FORMER COLONIES AND THEREFORE SUPPORT SELF-DETERMINATION IN WESTERN SAHARA.

B. WE RECOGNISE THAT POLISARIO AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SAHARAN PEOPLE DOES HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE WESTERN SAHARAN PROBLEM WE DO NOT REGARD POLISARIO AS THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SAHARAN PEOPLE.

C. WE REGRET THE SUFFERING BROUGHT UPON THE SAHARAN PEOPLE AS A RESULT OF THIS CONFLICT.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ONA

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

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ACTION: PA LBCCA
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LBCCA

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FAREP-S					

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CENTRAL REGISTRATION

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PARIS EMB/176 LISBON/01

INWARD BR ~~AM~~ MESSAGE

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RESTRICTED INWARDS

EVENTS IN ALGERIA, TUNISIA, MAURITANIA, WESTERN SAHARA - JULY 1980ALGERIA

The month was a quiet one, mostly due to the slowing down of all business with the onset of Ramadan. Independence Day (5 July) was celebrated quietly, with no major policy statements. The expected reshuffle of the Government finally occurred on 15 July, but the major surprise was that there was no major surprises. Prime Minister Abdelghani retained his portfolio, despite predictions to the contrary, and former Foreign Minister Bouteflika did not get a portfolio and so must content himself with his seat on the party Politburo. The formerly powerful Party Co-ordinator, Yahiaoui, also retained his seat on the Politburo but was quietly eased out of his pre-eminent post by the creation of a new position which effectively subsumes most of the co-ordinator's functions. While some new faces appeared and four new State Secretariats were created, the changes reflect President Chadli's concern to place more emphasis on meeting popular needs rather than the massive capital projects of his predecessor. His resurrection of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, moribund since an attempted coup by it in 1968, also points to fairly solid support of him by the armed forces. It is clear that the President now feels confident enough to step out from the shadows cast by Boumediene.

2. Talks with France were held (2-4 July) in Paris to discuss bilateral problems, notably that of immigrant workers. Little of substance resulted and we have heard that the talks were not particularly cordial. Probably as a result of this, a foreshadowed visit by French Foreign Minister François Poncet simple did not materialise, but no announcement about it was ever made by the Algerians. The World Bank approved a \$110 million loan for rural road improvement on 14 July.

TUNISIA

3. United Nations Secretary General Waldheim visited Tunis on 6 July to open a UNDP Conference there. During his visit he had talks with Tunisian leaders about the general situation in the Middle East. As an act of clemency preceding his 77th birthday (early August), President Bourguiba amnestied 138 political detainees.

MAURITANIA

4. Several events of note occurred in the "sick man" of Africa during July. On 4 July, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania joined the Arab Common Market, created in 1964.

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Some small but necessary loans were floated, mostly by Arab sources, for development or maintenance projects. Co-operation agreements were entered into with Iraq, notably in the fields of education and fisheries. The Mauritanian Foreign Minister visited Tripoli late in July for unspecified talks which, however, probably centred on Mauritanian co-operation with the Polisario Front and its continued ability to do so as a financially viable state.

6. On 5 July, slavery was officially abolished. While this anachronism might seem to some as merely filling a lacuna in previous laws, it should be pointed out that the process was by no means easy or swift. A majority of Mauritania's population are in fact of the "haratin" - the negroid worker (read "slave") - caste ruled by the Islamic berber minority (the "maures" or "moors".) Their ethnic link to Senegal is a source of constant friction between the two countries. Furthermore the move is unpopular with Mauritanian tribal leaders, and face was only saved, if saved it was, by learned and lengthy discourses by the countries Islamic lawyers who convinced the tribal leaders that in effect "ownership" of the haratins was merely being transferred to the super-tribe i.e. the State!

7. In the most direct development affecting Mauritania since the Algiers peace agreement of August 1979, the Western Sahara war moved on to Mauritanian sand. On 29 July, it was alleged that the Moroccan Air Force bombed military installations in the Mauritanian town of Boulanour. (It was originally claimed that the mining town of La Guerra and the major port of Nouadhibou had been attacked.) Foreign diplomats in Nouakchott were taken to the scene. Mauritania blamed Morocco's territorial pretensions to all of Mauritania and complained to the UN, OAU and non-aligned movement. Morocco denied any involvement.

WESTERN SAHARA

8. Earlier in the month, on 10 July, the Moroccan Air Force pursued Polisario units over Algerian territory. However, it seems clear that this violation was not premeditated and Algeria adopted a low profile.

9. The 17th OAU Summit in Freetown from 1 - 4 July was an important one, for the Western Sahara although the final compromise did not really produce much movement towards a solution. Zimbabwe started the ball rolling by announcing its recognition of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) on 2 July. The SADR also formally submitted an application for membership of the OAU. Although the requisite 26 members wrote to the Secretary General expressing their approval of the SADR's membership, this fact was never officially published during the Summit, mainly because of Morocco's introduction of a procedural point (requiring resolution to be by a two-thirds instead of a simple majority) on admission to membership, and through the threats of Morocco and its allies to withdraw from the OAU if the SADR were admitted. (Morocco followed this up with a further threat on 14 July to discontinue phosphate supplies to those countries recognising

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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the SADR - a very real threat to fertilizer-starved African countries, especially since Morocco produces over 65% of the world's phosphates. The final compromise reached was that the mandate of the "Committee of Wise Men" (the Heads of State of various countries including Dr Siaka Stevens, the current OAU Chairman but presumably no longer including the Liberian President) would be continued. Morocco grudgingly conceded that it would be willing to talk to all parties interested in the dispute, but subsequently has made it clear that this does not include Polisario and that Dr Stevens' chairmanship was not regarded as impartial given Sierra Leone's recent recognition of the SADR.

10. As mentioned in previous reports, the war has turned to the sea, with the arrest of numerous Spanish and Portuguese fishermen off the coasts of the Western Sahara. On 14 July, Moroccan planes attacked Cuban fishing vessels off these coasts, killing the captain of one. On 23 July, the Portuguese prisoners were all released with much fanfare and fraternal back-slapping after negotiations held in the territory between Polisario and an envoy sent especially from Lisbon. A communiqué issued at the same time contained Portugal's recognition of the Polisario as being the sole and legitimate representative of the Sahraoui people and, de facto, to the SADR's right to existence as a sovereign State. The Portuguese Foreign Minister subsequently said that this communiqué went beyond his Government's policy on some points and that Portugal did not recognise the SADR as it did not want to affect its friendship with Morocco. We are unsure as to how much of Portugal's phosphates are supplied by Morocco.

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UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY



Distr.
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8 August 1980

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

WESTERN SAHARA

Working paper prepared by the Secretariat

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1/ Original Record of the Second Committee, Document S/1880, Annex III.
2/ October, 1980, Document S/1880, Annex III.

WESTERN SAHARA

1. GENERAL

1. Western Sahara is situated on the Atlantic coast of north-west Africa opposite the Canary Islands, bounded on the north and north-east by Morocco and Algeria and on the south and east by Mauritania. It has a total area of about 266,000 square kilometres and its seaboard measures 1,062 kilometres. Its land frontiers extend for a total length of 2,045 kilometres, the frontier with Mauritania being 1,570 kilometres long and that with Morocco and Algeria 475 kilometres. The Territory consists of two regions, Saguia el Hamra and Río de Oro, which form an integral part of the great Saharan Desert.

2. The climate of Western Sahara is very dry with enormous differences between nocturnal and diurnal temperatures. There is very little cultivation, except in some low-lying areas in the south which are watered by occasional rainfall.

3. The physical characteristics of this desert region have determined the traditional way of life of the indigenous inhabitants, who are for the most part nomadic and pastoral, moving continuously over extensive areas which transcend international frontiers. Since 1968, however, following the drought which affected the whole Saharan region, a substantial part of the population has settled in and around urban and trading centres.

4. The principal tribes in the Territory are the Erguibat, Ait Lahsen and Ulad Delim, who are to be found also in Mauritania, Morocco and Algeria.

2. BACKGROUND

5. It will be recalled that on 14 November 1975, the Governments of Spain, Morocco and Mauritania agreed upon a Declaration of Principles, also known as the Madrid Agreement, ^{1/} with respect to the Territory of Western Sahara. In accordance with the Declaration, Spain transferred its powers to a temporary administration, comprising the Spanish Governor-General at that time and two Deputy Governors, one nominated by Morocco and the other by Mauritania. In accordance with the terms of that agreement, Spain terminated its presence in the Territory on 26 February 1976. With the withdrawal of the Spanish troops, Moroccan forces moved into the northern and eastern areas of the Territory and Mauritanian forces into parts of the southern area. The forces met with armed confrontation by the forces of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el Hamra y Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), which had announced that it intended to continue the guerrilla war which had begun under the Spanish administration.

^{1/} Official Records of the Security Council, Thirtieth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1975, document S/11880, annex III.

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6. On 14 April 1976, Morocco and Mauritania signed an agreement whereby the frontier between Mauritania and Morocco was defined by the straight line linking the point of intersection of the 24th parallel north and the 13th meridian west. With the frontier thus defined, the northern part of Western Sahara was integrated into Moroccan territory and the southern part into Mauritanian territory. The Algerian Government, which had opposed the Madrid Declaration, accused the Spanish Government of repudiating its obligations with respect to the decolonization of the Territory and of handing over the Territory to Morocco and Mauritania.

7. The Frente POLISARIO declared that the Saharan people considered "the agreement concluded between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania as null and void and as an act of aggression and banditry" and reaffirmed the inalienable right of the Saharan people to self-determination and independence.

8. On 27 February 1976, representatives of the Frente POLISARIO declared the creation of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic. By July 1980, the Republic had reportedly been recognized by 43 countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Cuba, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Yemen, Dominica, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Iran, Jamaica, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Panama, Rwanda, St. Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

3. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

A. Agreement between Mauritania and the Frente POLISARIO

9. Since the change of government in Mauritania in July 1978, the new Government, which had pledged itself to work for peace in the Sahara, has attempted to find a solution to the question of Western Sahara.

10. According to a letter dated 18 August 1979 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritania addressed to the Secretary-General, ^{2/} on 10 August 1979, the Government of Mauritania signed a peace agreement ^{3/} at Algiers with representatives of the Frente POLISARIO, by which Mauritania renounced all territorial and other claims on Western Sahara and stated that it had decided to "withdraw definitively from the unjust Western Sahara war". Mauritania, referring to the Frente POLISARIO as "the representatives of the Saharan people", also agreed to periodic meetings between the two parties to monitor the terms of the withdrawal. The accord was signed by Mr. Ahmed Salem Ould Sidi, the Second-Vice-President of the Military Committee of National Salvation of Mauritania and Mr. Bachir Moustafa Sayed, Deputy Secretary-General of the Frente POLISARIO.

^{2/} A/34/427, S/13503.

^{3/} Ibid., annex I.

11. The Permanent Committee of the Military Committee of National Salvation of Mauritania subsequently endorsed the Algiers accord and declared its "gratification at the happy end of the efforts exerted by Mauritania for more than a year aimed at finding a just and definitive solution of the Western Sahara conflict".

12. The Permanent Committee described the accord as conforming "in every aspect to the aspirations and interests of the Mauritanian people", adding that it should lead to "the consolidation and reinforcement of the peace which is indispensable for the peoples and states of the Maghreb".

13. Morocco, on its part, declared the Algiers accord "null and void" and vowed to continue to hold on to its zone. Prior to the signing of the agreement, King Hassan II was quoted as declaring that Mauritania "had no right to withdraw" from the Sahara, implying further action by Morocco if a Mauritanian withdrawal were to take place.

14. On 12 August 1979, following an announcement by Morocco that it was withdrawing its troops stationed in Mauritania, Moroccan troops which had been stationed at Dakhla (formerly Villa Cisneros) since 1976 took over the administration of the city as well as the rest of the Mauritanian sector of Western Sahara. Morocco reportedly renamed Tiris El Gharbia as "Oued Eddahab" (Río de Oro).

15. In a declaration on 14 August 1979, ^{4/} Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed Khouna Ould Haidala, the Prime Minister of Mauritania, protested the "occupation by force of Dakhla", stating that that action represented an act of aggression against Mauritania's provisional administration, and requested Morocco to "withdraw its troops immediately from Mauritanian territory". The Prime Minister further stated that his Government had decided to withdraw from Tiris El Gharbia as from 15 August 1979 and reaffirmed that it no longer had any territorial claims thereto. He appealed to the international community to help Mauritania defend its independence and territorial integrity and called on the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to assume their responsibilities.

16. The reaction of the Frente POLISARIO to the Moroccan action was expressed in a statement by Mr. Hakim Brahim, "Foreign Minister" of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic. Mr. Brahim reportedly said that POLISARIO would "push its attacks inside Morocco as far and as hard as possible" and proclaimed his movement's determination to fight for "complete sovereignty and territorial integrity".

17. Algeria's position was expressed in a letter dated 16 August 1979 from Mr. Mohamed Seddik Benyahia, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, addressed to the Secretary-General. ^{5/} Mr. Benyahia drew attention to the "serious repercussions" which would arise from Morocco's action. He urged the international community to condemn Morocco's policy and to call for respect for the will of

^{4/} Ibid., annex II. of the Security Council, Thirties of 1975, document 3/11630, annex III.

^{5/} A/34/420, annex.

peoples to live in freedom and peace. Algeria appealed to the United Nations to "assume its full responsibility in this matter" and to "demand the immediate and complete withdrawal of all Moroccan occupation forces from the entire territory of Western Sahara".

18. Morocco, meanwhile, moved to consolidate its position in Western Sahara. Reports indicated that, on 9 August, about 300 tribal leaders went from Dakhla to Rabat for a ceremony during which they pledged their allegiance to King Hassan II. On 15 August, King Hassan announced that he had decided to hold parliamentary elections in "Oued Eddahab". The Moroccan Parliament subsequently met in special session and unanimously approved legislation calling for elections to be held "as soon as possible" and establishing three seats in Parliament for representatives of what was termed Morocco's "thirty-seventh province". In addition, Mr. Chérif Dlimi, formerly Governor of the province of Boujdour (Moroccan Western Sahara), was named Governor of "Oued Eddahab".

19. During a press conference held at Fez on 19 August, King Hassan indicated that Morocco would "go to the limit" to keep Western Sahara, including that part of the Territory to which Mauritania had renounced its claim. The King was reported to have said that the peace agreement between Mauritania and the Frente POLISARIO was "shameful", but with regard to Algeria, the King suggested that chances for negotiation were better than before.

20. Mauritania's Council of Ministers, meeting in special session on 20 August 1979 to consider King Hassan's remarks, reportedly expressed indignation at Morocco's interference in Mauritania's internal affairs and appealed to international opinion to support Mauritania in its resistance against "hegemony and attempts at domination". Subsequently, reports indicated that the Mauritanian Government had revoked its defence pact with Morocco. The pact, which had been concluded on 13 May 1977, provided for the establishment of a joint military committee on defence as well as for regular consultations between the two countries.

B. Efforts towards a negotiated settlement

21. During the second half of 1979 there were reportedly several attempts to bring together various parties to the conflict in order to negotiate a settlement to the question of Western Sahara.

22. On 10 September 1979, President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia invited King Hassan and President Chadli Benjedid of Algeria to meet at Tunis. The invitation was said to have been accepted by Morocco. Algeria, however, was said to have rejected the proposal on the grounds that there was no bilateral conflict between Algeria and Morocco and that it was inconceivable that Algeria should replace the Frente POLISARIO, "the legitimate representatives of the Saharan people", in any discussions on the future of the Territory.

23. On 14 September, the Frente POLISARIO reportedly indicated that it was ready to open peace talks with Morocco at Bamako under the aegis of the OAU Ad Hoc

Committee originally established in 1978 to study the Western Sahara dispute. ^{6/} This position was reiterated by the Frente POLISARIO on 22 September. The proposal was not accepted by Morocco.

24. In early November, the late President William Tolbert of Liberia, then Chairman of OAU, visited Morocco and Algeria where he held talks with King Hassan II and President Benjedid. In the course of his visit to Algeria, he was also reported to have met with Mr. Mohamed Abdelaziz, the Secretary-General of the Frente POLISARIO.

25. During his visit to the North African region, the late President Tolbert announced that the OAU Ad Hoc Committee would meet at Monrovia under his chairmanship to discuss recent developments in Western Sahara.

26. The participants at the meeting, which was held on 4-5 December 1979, included Presidents Moussa Traoré of Mali, Shehu Shagari of Nigeria, Gaafar Mohammed Nimeiri of the Sudan and Julius Nyerere of the United Republic of Tanzania. President Benjedid of Algeria, Foreign Minister Ahmadou Ould Abdallah of Mauritania and Mr. Abdelaziz, the Secretary-General of the Frente POLISARIO, also attended. King Hassan did not attend because of what was described as the "hostile positions of other participants". In a letter addressed to the late President Tolbert, the King reportedly stated that Mali and the United Republic of Tanzania had "overlooked the most fundamental norms of honourable behaviour and impartiality which must characterize the role of arbitrator". Subsequently, in view of Morocco's decision, President Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea announced that he would not attend the meeting because he believed that, without Morocco's presence, the meeting would not achieve its objectives.

27. Following its deliberations, the Ad Hoc Committee drew up a resolution (AHG/AHC/WS/Res.1 (III)) by which it, inter alia: (a) urged Morocco to withdraw its troops from Western Sahara and its administration from that part of the Territory which had been evacuated by Mauritania; (b) urged all parties immediately to effect a cease-fire in the Territory and recommended the setting up of an OAU peace-keeping force for purposes of monitoring the cease-fire; (c) urged Morocco to co-operate fully with the work of the Ad Hoc Committee; (d) called upon the international community not to take any action that would impair the work of the Ad Hoc Committee in the discharge of its responsibilities; (e) requested the Secretary-General of OAU immediately to conduct studies, with the co-operation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of the technical details of decision AHG/Dec.11⁴ (XVI) Rev.1 (see para. 30 below) on Western Sahara relative to holding a referendum in the Territory; and (f) charged the current Chairman of OAU to convey the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee to King Hassan II and to report back to it at its next meeting.

28. Reports from Morocco indicated that the Moroccan Government was prepared to consider the call by OAU for a cease-fire as a positive act since, in its view, the recommendations for a cease-fire were addressed to "those who attack Morocco and artificially maintain tension in the area".

^{6/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/34/23/Rev.1), Vol. II, chap. X, annex, para. 9.

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29. Previously, King Hassan II was reported to have proposed that the nations of the Saharan region convene a summit conference on economic problems. In a message sent in August 1979 to the Chairman of OAU, King Hassan II was said to have stated that differences over the future of Western Sahara were artificial and that States in and bordering on the great North African desert should concentrate (instead on the "economic emancipation" of the area.

4. CONSIDERATION BY THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

30. During the sixteenth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU, held at Monrovia from 17 to 20 July 1979, the Assembly adopted a decision 7/ in which it called for: the preparation of a proper atmosphere for peace in the area through a general and immediate cease-fire; the exercise of the right of self-determination by the people of Western Sahara in a general and free referendum enabling them to choose either total independence or maintenance of the status quo; the convening of a meeting of all parties concerned, including representatives of Western Sahara, to request their co-operation for the implementation of the OAU decision; and the establishment of a special committee of six member States of OAU (Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan and United Republic of Tanzania), under the chairmanship of Liberia, to work out the modalities and to supervise the organization of a referendum with the co-operation of the United Nations on the basis of one person, one vote. As reported above (see paras. 25-27), the Committee met at Monrovia in December 1979 and put forth a number of recommendations in this regard.

31. In a message dated 8 August 1979 addressed to the Secretary-General, 8/ by Mr. M'Hamed Boucetta, Morocco's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, referring to the OAU decision, said that his country did not consider itself bound in any way by the results of the meeting because of the "procedural and substantive flaw that vitiated the procedure followed during the sixteenth summit meeting and distorted its deliberations".

32. At its seventeenth ordinary session, held at Freetown from 1 to 4 July 1980, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted a decision on Western Sahara (AHG/Dec.118 (XVII)), the operative part of which reads as follows:

"The Assembly of Heads of State and Government ...

"(i) Takes note of the report of the third session of the Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State on Western Sahara;

"(ii) Agrees that the Committee under the chairmanship of the current Chairman, Dr. Siaka Stevens, should continue its work with a view to reconciling the parties to the conflict and seeking a peaceful and lasting solution thereto;

7/ A/34/552, annex II, AHG/Dec.114 (XVI).

8/ A/34/421, annex.

"(iii) Welcomes the willingness of the Kingdom of Morocco to engage in discussions with all interested parties and to participate fully in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee; and

"(iv) Decides that the Ad Hoc Committee shall convene in Freetown, Sierra Leone, within the next three months."

5. CONSIDERATION BY THE CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

33. At the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Havana from 3 to 9 September 1979, the Conference issued a Political Declaration which included statements on the question of Western Sahara. 9/ Among other things, the Conference expressed its deep concern at the situation prevailing in Western Sahara "because the decolonization process has not been carried to its conclusion" and recalled the decisions of the non-aligned countries and the United Nations and OAU resolutions reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence. It also welcomed the agreement between Mauritania and the Frente POLISARIO as well as Mauritania's decision to withdraw its forces from Western Saharan territory (see para. 10 above) and deplored the "extension of the armed occupation by Morocco" of the Mauritanian sector; finally, the Conference expressed the hope that all parties involved would co-operate in implementing the recommendations of the OAU Ad Hoc Committee in order to arrive at a just solution to the question of Western Sahara.

6.1 CONSIDERATION BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

34. On 21 November 1979, the General Assembly adopted resolution 34/37 on the question of Western Sahara. By this resolution it, inter alia, reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence; noted with satisfaction the decision on the question adopted at the sixteenth session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government and the Political Declaration of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries (see paras. 30 and 33 above); welcomed the peace agreement concluded between Mauritania and the Frente POLISARIO; deplored the aggravation of the situation resulting from the continued occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco and the extension of that occupation to territory evacuated by Mauritania; urged Morocco to join the peace process; recommended that the Frente POLISARIO participate freely in any search for a just, lasting and definitive political solution to the question; requested the Special Committee to continue to consider the situation as a priority question; requested the Administrative Secretary-General of OAU to keep the Secretary-General of the United Nations informed of the progress achieved in the implementation of the relevant OAU decisions; and invited the Secretary-General to follow the situation closely and submit a report on the question of Western Sahara to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

9/ A/34/542, annex, sect. I, paras. 96-98.

7. MILITARY SITUATION

35. Following the signing of its peace agreement with Mauritania, in August 1979, the Frente POLISARIO stepped up its attacks on Moroccan positions both in Western Sahara and in Morocco.

36. Reports indicated repeated attacks by forces of the Frente POLISARIO on Bir-Enzaran (Western Sahara), Guelta Zemmour (Western Sahara), Lebourirate (southern Morocco), Lemseied (Western Sahara), Smara (Western Sahara) and Zag (southern Morocco). An attack was reportedly also carried out at Akka, situated 160 kilometres south of Agadir inside Morocco. Official Moroccan communiqués have confirmed that these attacks occurred; however, there are conflicting reports from the two sides on the number of casualties and the damage inflicted by either side.

37. In any event, the conflict appears to have entered a more severe phase. Instead of making only hit-and-run raids on Moroccan desert positions, the Frente POLISARIO appears to be fielding much larger forces. Following the attack on Bir-Enzaran in August 1979, a Moroccan communiqué indicated that between 2,500 and 3,000 forces of the Frente POLISARIO backed by 500 vehicles had taken part in the battle.

38. Morocco, for its part, has also intensified its military commitment in Western Sahara. On 3 November 1979, Morocco reportedly launched a large-scale counter-offensive against the Frente POLISARIO. The operation, called "Operation Ouhoud", began at Bou Craa and was said to have swept eastward with the aim of regaining terrain infiltrated by the Frente POLISARIO in the Smara-Haouza-El Farsiva area. Sources indicated that the force of 6,000 men was supported by artillery, multiple rocket launchers, helicopters, tanks, personnel carriers and air force planes.

39. A second Moroccan force was reportedly put into operation on 30 January 1980. This force, nicknamed "Badr", was said to be operating in the province of Saguinet-el-Hamra and the Oued Draa valley. Subsequently, in early February, a third force, nicknamed "Zallagha", was put into operation.

40. In March 1980, forces of the Frente POLISARIO claimed that they had attacked the Zallagha force in the vicinity of Lebourirate and inflicted heavy casualties. Moroccan sources reportedly acknowledged the fighting in the area but said that the Moroccan army had forced the Frente POLISARIO to retreat. On 17 March, in a speech to government and military leaders, King Hassan reportedly called on Moroccans to "sacrifice themselves" in Western Sahara.

8. MILITARY AID AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

41. On 22 October 1979 President Jimmy Carter of the United States of America announced that he had decided to seek approval from the United States Congress for the sale of arms to Morocco for use against the Frente POLISARIO. Mr. Carter also called for an effort to persuade King Hassan to accept a solution to the conflict in Western Sahara.

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42. Reports indicate that to permit the sale of equipment to Morocco, including armed reconnaissance planes and helicopter gunships, an alteration would have to be made in the 1960 military agreement between Morocco and the United States. The 1960 agreement limits the use of American-supplied arms to defence within the borders of Morocco. Speaking to a sub-committee of the House of Representatives in July 1979, Mr. James Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State, affirmed that "Morocco is no longer fighting to pacify a region it has annexed ... It is also defending itself within its own territory against external attack".

43. In addition, on 2 September 1979, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt announced that his Government was ready to supply military aid to Morocco.

44. France, meanwhile, has announced that it has sent approximately 200 French troops to Nouadhibou, Mauritania, to help Mauritania protect its borders against possible incursions by Morocco or the Frente POLISARIO. The decision reportedly resulted in part from the fact that, contrary to an announcement made on 4 September 1979 by the Prime Minister of Morocco that his country was withdrawing its forces from Mauritania, only a part of those forces had been withdrawn.

45. In a letter dated 5 December 1979 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/13718, annex), the Permanent Representative of Mauritania stated that, after having unsuccessfully explored every possible means of settling the question amicably, his Government had decided to submit a complaint to the Security Council and to request it to find the most appropriate ways and means of settling the crisis. Subsequently, in a letter dated 31 December 1979 (S/13718), the representative of Mauritania informed the President of the Security Council that on 26 December 1979 the final contingent of Moroccan troops remaining in Mauritania had been withdrawn.

INWARD CABLEGRAM
935/28/20.LG7516 JCNI
TOR 2245 02.08.80

0.LG7516 1145 2.8.80 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/6476RP.
RR ACCRA/400 ALGIERS/26 NAIROBI/639
RR PARIS EMB/146 UN NEW YORK/148

FM. LAGOS / FILE 242/45

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

WESTERN SAHARA

MOROCCAN CROWN PRINCE SIDI VISITED LAGOS ON 29-30 JULY TO CONVEY A MESSAGE FROM KING HASSAN TO PRESIDENT SHAGARI ASSURING NIGERIA THAT MOROCCO WOULD COOPERATE WITH THE OAU IN SEEKING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE WESTERN SAHARAN CONFLICT.

2. ABDELHAQ, CHARGE, MOROCCAN EMBASSY, TOLD US THAT THE VISIT WAS PART OF A TOUR AROUND AFRICAN COUNTRIES INCLUDING SENEGAL, IVORY COAST AND CAMEROUN, WHICH (HE SAID) SYMPATHISED WITH MOROCCO'S POSITION ON WESTERN SAHARA. MOROCCO APPRECIATED NIGERIA'S "NEUTRALITY" ON THIS QUESTION AND WAS GRATEFUL FOR NIGERIAN SPONSORSHIP OF THE COMPROMISE OAU RESOLUTION AT THE FREETOWN SUMMIT. THIS HAD SERVED TO AVOID OAU RECOGNITION OF THE "SAHARAN ARAB DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (POLISARIO).

3. THE NIGERIAN-SPONSORED RESOLUTION URGED THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON WESTERN SAHARA TO CONTINUE ITS WORK UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF PRESIDENT SIAKA STEVENS OF SIERRA LEONE. ABDELHAQ SAID THAT MOROCCO CONTINUED TO HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT STEVENS' CHAIRMANSHIP, IN VIEW OF SIERRA LEONE'S RECOGNITION OF SADR. HOWEVER HE CONFIRMED THAT SIDI HAD TOLD SHAGARI THAT MOROCCO WOULD ATTEND THE NEXT MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE. MOROCCO WOULD PREFER THE VENUE TO BE OUTSIDE SIERRA LEONE, POSSIBLY IN SENEGAL WHICH OCCUPIED ONE OF THE VICE-CHAIRMAN POSITIONS. ALSO IT WOULD INSIST ON RESTRICTING PARTICIPATION TO STATES AND THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF WESTERN SAHARA. THE LATTER GROUP CONSISTED OF THE LOCAL AND REGIONAL BODIES SET UP UNDER MOROCCAN SPONSORSHIP AND, HE ASSERTED, WOULD EXCLUDE POLISARIO.

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.L67516

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ONAPRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
JIO

RESTRICTED

ACTION: AME

JAF
JAE

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(EANZ)		ANZ	EUR
FAS(DN)	NUC	DEF	DPR		FAS(IOAME)	IO
FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)		FAS(MFS)		FAREP-M	
FAREP-P	FAREP-S		DIR-ADAB			

CAIRO JEDDAH LONDON MADRID MOSCOW WASHINGTON

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

O.CH905925 AMBR

O.CH905925 1740 25.7.80 UNC

TO.
RR PARIS EMB/5339

935/28/2

RP.
BB ALGIERS/5238

FM. CANBERRA / FILE 931/10/2

U N C L A S S I F I E D

UN WOMENS CONFERENCE SAHARA

BEGINS:

O.CP3838 2100 24.7.80 UNC

TO.
PP CANBERRA/2961

FM. COPENHAGEN /

U N C L A S S I F I E D

UN WOMENS CONFERENCE - SAHARA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT ON SAHRAWI WOMEN SPONSORED BY ALGERIA ANGOLA, BURUNDI, CAPE VERDE, CUBA, LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA, MADAGASCAR, MOZAMBIQUE, NICARAGUA, VIET NAM.

BEGINS:

REAFFIRMING THE PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND PARTICULARLY THE RIGHT OF ALL PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION,

RECALLING GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) OF 14 DECEMBER 1960 CONTAINING THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES,

MINDFUL OF THE PROFOUND CONCERN OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES ABOUT THE DECOLONIZATION OF THE WESTERN SAHARA AND THE RIGHT OF ITS PEOPLE TO SELF-DETERMINATION,

SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION OF THE PEOPLE OF THE WESTERN

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

2-O.CH905925

SAHARA, AND ESPECIALLY SAHRAWI REFUGEE WOMEN, RESULTING FROM THE CONTINUING OCCUPATION OF THEIR TERRITORY BY MOROCCO,

CONSIDERING THAT SAHRAWI REFUGEE WOMEN ARE FORCED TO LIVE UNDER DIFFICULT CONDITIONS BECAUSE OF THAT OCCUPATION,

1. EXPRESSES ITS SOLIDARITY WITH AND SUPPORT FOR THE JUST STRUGGLE OF THE SAHRAWI PEOPLE, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF ITS SOLE REPRESENTATIVE THE FRONTE POPULAR FOR THE LIBERATION OF SAGUIA EL HAMRA AND RIO DE ORO (FRENTE POLISARIO), FOR SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE.,
2. EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT THE EFFORTS MADE IN THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE REALIZATION OF THE INALIENABLE NATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE OF THE WESTERN SAHARA.,
3. ALSO EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT ANY SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF THE WESTERN SAHARA WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO ALLEVIATE THE PARTICULARLY DISTRESSING LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE SAHRAWI WOMEN REFUGEES.,
4. CALLS UPON WOMEN THROUGHOUT THE WORLD TO REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS AT THE NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS TO HELP THE SAHRAWI WOMEN TO REGAIN THEIR RIGHTS AND DIGNITY.,
5. INVITES THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES TO INCLUDE IN HIS ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES PRACTICAL MEASURES FOR IMPROVING THE LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE SAHRAWI WOMEN REFUGEES AND THEIR CHILDREN.,
6. APPEALS TO THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED TO INITIATE ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES FOR SAHRAWI WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN IN THE FIELDS OF EDUCATION, TRAINING AND HEALTH.

ENDS.

2. NOT YET DISCUSSED IN WEOG BUT OPERATIVE 1 IS CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE. GRATEFUL ADVICE.

ENDS.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DEP HOME AFF

130

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

3-O.CH905925

ACTION: 10

06AA

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

O.CH905927 BOMA

O.CH905927 1742 25.7.80 CLA FIRST

TO.
PP COPENHAGEN/8633RP.
RR UN NEW YORK/2262 PARIS EMB/5333
BB ALGIERS/5237

FM. CANBERRA / FILE 935/28/2 REF O.CP3838

R E S T R I C T E D
UN WOMENS CONFERENCE - WESTERN SAHARA

AS YOU HAVE NOTED OP. PARA 1 IN ITS PRESENT FORM IS UNACCEPTABLE TO US, AND UNLESS THIS PARA IS AMENDED AUSTRALIA WILL BE OBLIGED TO ABSTAIN ON THE RESOLUTION.

2. OUR PRINCIPAL DIFFICULTY RELATES TO THE USE OF THE "SOLE" TERMINOLOGY. AT UNGA 34 WE SUPPORTED RES. 34/37 WHICH DESCRIBED THE POLISARIO AS "THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF WESTERN SAHARA", BUT QUALIFYING OUR POSITION ON THIS ASPECT IN AN EXPLANATION BY STRESSING THAT OUR VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION WAS TO BE SEEN AS A REAFFIRMATION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF DETERMINATION FOR THE PEOPLE OF WESTERN SAHARA AS A WHOLE.

3. OUR OTHER DIFFICULTY RELATES TO EXPRESSING "SOLIDARITY AND SUPPORT" WE CAN ACCEPT THIS ONLY IF THE FOLLOWING QUALIFICATION (OR SOMETHING ALONG THE SAME LINES) IS ADDED AT THE END OF THE PARAGRAPH.

"..., AS ENVISAGED IN THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE OAU". IF NECESSARY, YOU COULD POINT OUT THAT THIS WAS A COMPROMISE FORMULATION AGREED ON IN OP. PARA 1 OF RES. 34/37.

4. IF THESE CHANGES CAN BE EFFECTED YOU MAY SUPPORT THE DRAFT MAKING A BRIEF EXPLANATION OF VOTE, THE TERMS OF WHICH SHOULD BE CLEARED WITH CANBERRA.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

2-O.CH905927

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DEP HOME AFF

DEP ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEP EDUCATION
DEP INDSTL RLTNS (M)
DEP HEALTH
DEP IMM ETH AFF
DEP P M AND CABINET
DEP SOCIAL SEC
DEP EMP YTH AFF (C)
OFFICE OF WOMENS AFFAIRS

RESTRICTED

ESTD 9/10/68

ACTION: IO OGAA

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(EANZ)	EUR	FAS(IOAME)		AME	FAS(LT)	
GLT	IL	DIR-ADAB	FAS(BP)		FAS(PTO)	
IOL						

GENEVA OTTAWA

935/28/27

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.CP3838 BOMA
TOR 0818 25.07.80

O.CP3838 2100 24.7.80 UNC

TO.
PP CANBERRA/2961

FM. COPENHAGEN /

U N C L A S S I F I E D

UN WOMENS CONFERENCE - SAHARA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT ON SAHRAWI WOMEN SPONSORED BY ALGERIA, ANGOLA, BURUNDI, CAPE VERDE, CUBA, LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA, MADAGASCAR, MOZAMBIQUE, NICARAGUA, VIET NAM.

BEGINS:

REAFFIRMING THE PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND PARTICULARLY THE RIGHT OF ALL PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION,

RECALLING GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) OF 14 DECEMBER 1960 CONTAINING THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES,

MINDFUL OF THE PROFOUND CONCERN OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES ABOUT THE DECOLONIZATION OF THE WESTERN SAHARA AND THE RIGHT OF ITS PEOPLE TO SELF-DETERMINATION,

SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION OF THE PEOPLE OF THE WESTERN SAHARA, AND ESPECIALLY SAHRAWI REFUGEE WOMEN, RESULTING FROM THE CONTINUING OCCUPATION OF THEIR TERRITORY BY MOROCCO,

CONSIDERING THAT SAHRAWI REFUGEE WOMEN ARE FORCED TO LIVE UNDER DIFFICULT CONDITIONS BECAUSE OF THAT OCCUPATION,

1. EXPRESSES ITS SOLIDARITY WITH AND SUPPORT FOR THE JUST STRUGGLE OF THE SAHRAWI PEOPLE, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF ITS SOLE REPRESENTATIVE THE FRONTE POPULAR FOR THE LIBERATION OF SAGUIA EL HAMRA AND RIO DE ORO (FRENTE POLISARIO), FOR SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE.,

2. EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT THE EFFORTS MADE IN THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE REALIZATION OF THE INALIENABLE NATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE OF THE WESTERN SAHARA.,

3. ALSO EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT ANY SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF THE WESTERN SAHARA WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO ALLEVIATE THE PARTICULARLY

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

240 CP3838

DISTRESSING LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE SAHRAWI WOMEN REFUGEES.,

4. CALLS UPON WOMEN THROUGHOUT THE WORLD TO REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS AT THE NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS TO HELP THE SAHRAWI WOMEN TO REGAIN THEIR RIGHTS AND DIGNITY.,

5. INVITES THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES TO INCLUDE IN HIS ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES PRACTICAL MEASURES FOR IMPROVING THE LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE SAHRAWI WOMEN REFUGEES AND THEIR CHILDREN.,

6. APPEALS TO THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED TO INITIATE ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES FOR SAHRAWI WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN IN THE FIELDS OF EDUCATION, TRAINING AND HEALTH.

ENDS.

2. NOT YET DISCUSSED IN WEOG BUT OPERATIVE 1 IS CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE. GRATEFUL ADVICE.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DEP HOME AFF T/TDEP ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEP INDSTL RLTNS (M)
DEP IMM ETH AFF
DEP P M AND CABINET
DEP EMP YTH AFF (C)

ACTION: IO OGAA

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(EANZ)	EUR	FAS(IOAME)		AME	FAS(LT)	
GLT	IL	DIR-ADAB	FAS(BP)		FAS(PTO)	
IOL						

GENEVA OTTAWA UN NEW YORK

125-
93/28/2

INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.NA10876 AMBR
TOR 2157 15.07.80

O.NA10876 1100 15.7.80 CLA

TO.

RR CANBERRA/9872 ALGIERS/30 PARIS EMB/216
RR CAIRO/249 DAR ES SALAAM/701 WASHINGTON/407

RP.

BB LAGOS/201 ACCRA/193 SALISBURY/2

FM. NAIROBI / FILE 235/1 / REF O.NA10842

R E S T R I C T E D

OAU : WESTERN SAHARA

THE DEBATE AT THE OAU SUMMIT IN FREETOWN ON THE WESTERN SAHARA WAS LONG AND HEATED. THE EVENTUAL RESULT WAS A COMPROMISE WHICH OFFERS LITTLE PROSPECT OF BEING ABLE TO RESOLVE THE DEEP DIVISION BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES TO THE DISPUTE. (RESTRICTED);

2. FOR MOROCCO, THE OUTCOME OF THE OAU DEBATE ON WESTERN SAHARA COULD GIVE LITTLE CAUSE FOR COMPLAINT. IN THE FACE OF THE VIEW OF THE MAJORITY THAT THE SAHARAN ARAB DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (SADR) BE ADMITTED IMMEDIATELY AS A MEMBER STATE, MOROCCO AND ITS SUPPORTERS MANAGED TO SIDE-TRACK THE OAU INTO YET ANOTHER COMPROMISE. YET, AT AN EARLIER STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE, MOROCCO COULD HAVE HOPED THAT THE CRITICAL FIGURE OF 26 RECOGNITIONS MAY NOT HAVE BEEN REACHED. UNTIL THE SECOND DAY OF THE SUMMIT ITSELF, THE NUMBER OF RECOGNITIONS OF THE SADR REMAINED STALLED AT THE FIGURE OF 23, WHICH HAS EXISTED SINCE APRIL. FURTHERMORE, ONLY 18 OF THOSE 23 HAD SUPPORTED THE POLISARIO APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION DURING THE SIERRA LEONE MEETING. POLISARIO'S LETTER SEEKING ADMISSION HAD BEEN HELD BACK BY SECGEN KODJO, WHO APPARENTLY BELIEVED THAT CIRCULATING IT WOULD RUIN PROSPECTS FOR A COMPROMISE OVER THE ISSUE. AS WE REPORTED IN O.NA10842, 18 MEMBER STATES NEVERTHELESS FORMALLY WROTE TO KODJO SUPPORTING THE APPLICATION.

3. PRIOR TO MUGABE'S SPEECH, REPORTED IN OUR REFTEL, MOZAMBIQUE PRESIDENT SAMORA MACHEL HAD MADE A VERY STRONG SPEECH IN FAVOUR OF POLISARIO, IN WHICH HE ATTACKED MOROCCO FOR ITS DISREGARD FOR OAU AND UN PRINCIPLES. THIS MAY HAVE HAD THE EFFECT OF STIFFENING THE RESOLVE OF MEMBER STATES WHO HAD WAVERED OVER WRITING THEIR LETTERS OF SUPPORT OR RECOGNISING THE SADR. THE EFFECT OF MACHEL'S SPEECH WAS COMPOUNDED BY A REPLY FROM THE MOROCCAN PRIME MINISTER WHICH CAME OVER AS NOTHING MORE THAN A PETULANT AND CHILDISH PERSONAL ATTACK ON MACHEL.

4. KODJO'S ANNOUNCEMENT, AT THE START OF THE FORMAL DEBATE ON THE

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-O.NA10876

WESTERN SAHARA, THAT HE HAD 26 LETTERS SUPPORTING POLISARIO'S APPLICATION, WAS APPARENTLY A SURPRISE TO THE MOROCCANS. SHORTLY BEFORE, THEY HAD CLAIMED TO US THAT SIERRA LEONE, LESOTHO, RWANDA, BURUNDI, GHANA AND ZIMBABWE STILL HAD NOT WRITTEN TO KODJO AND THAT THE NUMBER OF RECOGNITIONS OF THE SADR REMAINED AT 24. THEY WERE NOT THEREFORE AWARE THAT ALL OF THESE, AND MALI AND CHAD IN ADDITION, HAD LODGED LETTERS CALLING FOR THE ADMISSION OF THE SADR IMMEDIATELY.

5. KODJO'S ANNOUNCEMENT FORCED MOROCCO INTO ITS SECOND LINE OF STRATEGY. IT ROSE IMMEDIATELY TO ASK THE QUESTION: "DOES THE ENTITY KNOWN AS THE SADR CONSTITUTE AN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN COUNTRY UNDER ARTICLE 28 OF THE OAU CHARTER?". MOROCCO CLAIMED THAT AN AFFIRMATIVE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION REQUIRED A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY SINCE IT WAS A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION OF THE OAU CHARTER. THIS STARTED A LENGTHY AND CONFUSED DEBATE IN WHICH THE LEGAL POINTS SURROUNDING MOROCCO'S APPROACH WERE QUICKLY FORGOTTEN. THE QUESTION IS WITHOUT PRECEDENT IN OAU HISTORY AND MAY HAVE SERVED AS A CAUSE FOR CONCERN AMONG SOME OF THE 26 SUPPORTERS OF THE SADR, BUT WE DOUBT THAT AS A TACTIC IT ALONE COULD HAVE PREVENTED RECOGNITION. AN OAU SECRETARIAT MEMBER, FRANCIS X. NJENGA (THE ERSTWHILE HEAD OF KENYA'S MFA LEGAL DIVISION) TOLD US CANDIDLY THAT THE LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS WOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE POLITICAL INTERESTS OF THE SIMPLE MAJORITY - THUS, "HE WHO HAS THE MAJORITY SETS THE RULES."

6. BEFORE MOROCCO'S LEGAL PLOY COULD BREAK DOWN COMPLETELY, ITS SUPPORTERS INTRODUCED NEW TACTICS INTO THE DEBATE. STATEMENTS FROM SENEGAL, IVORY COAST, GUINEA, SOMALIA AND EGYPT (AND PROBABLY OTHERS) SOUGHT TO EMPHASISE TO THE SADR SUPPORTERS THE GRAVITY OF THEIR INTENDED ACTION. THE STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN MANY CASES VEILED THREATS TO WITHDRAW FROM THE OAU. WHILE IT WAS GENERALLY UNCLEAR WHETHER THIS MEANT WITHDRAWAL FROM THE CURRENT DEBATE, FROM THE SIERRA LEONE MEETING OR FROM THE ORGANISATION AS A WHOLE, THE PROSPECT THAT IT MIGHT BE THE LAST WAS APPARENTLY ENOUGH TO CAUSE SOME SADR SUPPORTERS TO REFER FOR THE FIRST TIME TO THE NEED TO SEEK A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. THE CONTINUED CONTINENT-WIDE MEMBERSHIP OF THE ORGANISATION APPEARED TO BE MORE IMPORTANT IN THEIR MINDS THAN THE QUESTION OF POLISARIO'S SHORT TERM STATUS. SOME OF THE STAUNCHER POLISARIO SUPPORTERS REFERRED TO THE TACTICS AS BLACKMAIL, BUT THE DAMAGE HAD BEEN DONE. (WE UNDERSTAND THAT UP TO 8 COUNTRIES MADE THE WALK-OUT THREAT BUT NONE OF OUR DELEGATE CONTACTS COULD RECALL TO US WHICH THEY WERE. PRESS REPORTS PRECISELY LISTING EIGHT COUNTRIES ARE IN OUR VIEW INCORRECT.)

7. IT WAS AT THIS TIME OF UNCERTAINTY THAT SENEGAL'S PRESIDENT SENGHOR ROSE TO OFFER A "NEW METHOD OF APPROACH TO THE QUESTION" IN ORDER TO FIND A SOLUTION. HIS PROPOSAL WAS, BRIEFLY, THAT SIAKA STEVENS BE GIVEN RESPONSIBILITY TO ENCOURAGE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE "PARTIES CONCERNED" AND THAT "DISCREET CONTACTS" BE

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RESTRICTED

INWARD CABLEGRAM

3-0.NA10876

INITIATED BY HIM WITH POLISARIO, AOSARIO, MAURITANIA, ALGERIA AND MOROCCO. HE FURTHER SUGGESTED THAT THE AD HOC COMMITTEE CONTINUE TO WORK AND TO COORDINATE WITH STEVENS, WITH A VIEW TO PREPARING A REPORT FOR SUBMISSION TO AN EXTRAORDINARY SUMMIT. THERE WAS IN FACT LITTLE "NEW" ABOUT SENGHOR'S PROPOSAL AND, AS THE DEBATE CONTINUED, LITTLE FURTHER REFERENCE WAS MADE TO IT. HOWEVER, WHEN EVENTUALLY A REFERENCE WAS MADE TO NEGOTIATION, AND IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT IT HAD ALWAYS BEEN MOROCCO THAT HAD REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE, SENGHOR ANNOUNCED THAT MOROCCO WOULD, HE WAS SURE, NOW CHANGE ITS MIND. THIS CAUSED SOME BEDLAM, WITH ALL DELEGATES LOOKING TO MOROCCO TO CLARIFY ITS POSITION. FOR SOME TIME, HOWEVER, MOROCCO SAID NOTHING. EVENTUALLY, HOWEVER, AFTER SOME HASTY DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE SENEGALESE AND MOROCCAN DELEGATIONS, MOROCCO ANNOUNCED THAT IT WOULD ENTER NEGOTIATIONS WITH "ALL INTERESTED PARTIES AS DECIDED BY THE AD HOC COMMITTEE." (WE UNDERSTAND THAT AT NO STAGE DID MOROCCO REFER EXPLICITLY TO POLISARIO) THIS LED TO THE FINAL COMPROMISE BEING WORKED OUT - WE HAVE GIVEN DETAILS IN OUR REFTEL.

8. AS WITH SO MANY OAU RESOLUTIONS, THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE WESTERN SAHARA DEBATE WAS IMMEDIATELY SUBJECTED TO A VARIETY OF DIFFERENT AND LARGELY INCOMPATIBLE INTERPRETATIONS. MOROCCO SAW IT AS AN "INDEFINITE POSTPONEMENT" OF SADR MEMBERSHIP SINCE THE TIME-FRAME "WITHIN THREE MONTHS" REFERRED ONLY TO THE FIRST MEETING OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE. THE SADR SUPPORTERS SAW THE COMPROMISE AS SIMPLY ALLOWING MOROCCO A LAST OPPORTUNITY TO SEE REASON AND WITHDRAW PEACEFULLY. THEY STRONGLY REJECT THE IDEA THAT THE POSTPONEMENT IS INDEFINITE. WE WERE TOLD THAT KODOJ HAS ALREADY SIGNED A LETTER ADVISING MEMBERS THAT, UNDER THE OAU CHARTER, THE SADR HAS MET THE NECESSARY ENTRY QUALIFICATIONS. HE IS APPARENTLY HOLDING THIS LETTER UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE 26 SADR SUPPORTERS DECIDE THAT ALL OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEGOTIATION HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED, WHEREUPON THEY WILL CALL FOR ITS CIRCULATION. SIGNIFICANTLY, NO DELEGATE TO WHOM WE SPOKE SAW ANY PROSPECT OF THE COMPROMISE ACTUALLY ACHIEVING A NEGOTIATED END TO THE CONFLICT.

9. IT MAY BE OF INTEREST TO GIVE SOME INDICATION OF THE COUNTRIES ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE DEBATE. THE LIST IS INCOMPLETE AS IT RELIES ON THE MEMORIES OF DELEGATES EMERGING FROM THE CLOSED DEBATE; THERE ARE ALSO INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE VERSIONS GIVEN TO US. HOWEVER, ON THE PRO-POLISARIO SIDE, THOSE MOST ACTIVE APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN ALGERIA, MOZAMBIQUE, ANGOLA, MADAGASCAR AND TANZANIA. LIBYA WAS VERY QUIET, REFLECTING PERHAPS SOME CONCERN OVER THE EXTENT THAT SUCCESS WOULD STRENGTHEN ALGERIA. ANOTHER COUNTRY THAT WAS SURPRISINGLY QUIET WAS ETHIOPIA AND WE BELIEVE THAT MOROCCO HAD MADE CLEAR THE PARALLELS IT COULD MAKE BETWEEN WESTERN SAHARA AND ERITREA.

10. ON THE PRO-MOROCCAN SIDE, SENEGAL WAS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

4-0.NA10876

CONTRIBUTOR. WE HAD ATTRIBUTED THIS LARGELY TO FRENCH INFLUENCE BUT THE HIGH COMMISSION IN ACCRA SUGGESTED TO US, WHILE IN TRANSIT THERE, A MOTIVE OF MORE DIRECT INTEREST TO SÉNEGAL - THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ALGERIAN-BACKED SADR WOULD, IN GIVING ALGERIA AN ATLANTIC OUTLET, ENABLE THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SIGNIFICANT PORT WHICH COULD CHALLENGE THE PLANNED EXPANDED FREE PORT OF DAKAR. BESIDES SÉNEGAL, THE MOST SIGNIFICANT SUPPORTERS OF MOROCCO WERE OTHER FRANCOPHONES, WITH SEKOU TOURE ESPECIALLY WORTHY OF MENTION FOR HIS TYPICALLY PASSIONATE CONTRIBUTIONS: 'IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DENY MOROCCO RIGHT TO THE UNITY OF ALL ITS TERRITORIES.' EGYPT WE BELIEVE, MADE SOME USEFUL CONTRIBUTIONS, A RESULT PRESUMABLY OF ITS DEAL WITH MOROCCO OVER THE CAMP DAVID ACCORD DEBATE.

11. ONE ASPECT OF THE WHOLE SUBJECT ON WHICH WE WERE UNABLE TO GET A CLEAR READING WAS THE ALGERIAN REACTION TO THE RESULT. WE SHOULD NOT NECESSARILY ASSUME THAT THE ALGERIANS WOULD REGARD THE FAILURE TO SET THE SADR INTO THE OAU AT THIS STAGE AS A SETBACK; THE MAJORITY FOR SADR MEMBERSHIP IS APPARENTLY INTACT AND THE AGREEMENT NOT TO PUSH FOR IMMEDIATE MEMBERSHIP COULD BE SEEN AS DEMONSTRATING THE DESIRE FOR ALL AVENUES OF NEGOTIATION TO BE EXHAUSTED BEFORE THE OAU IS COMMITTED TO CONFRONTATION WITH MOROCCO. THERE IS ANOTHER ASPECT THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED: AS A RECOGNISED SOVEREIGN STATE, THE SADR COULD PRESUMABLY INVITE OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE TO HELP FIGHT THE 'INVADERS' - THE MOROCCANS. THIS COULD WELL COMMIT ALGERIA TO A DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH MOROCCO, A PROSPECT THAT ALGERIA MAY NOT RELISH.

12. IT IS HARD TO FORESEE MUCH PROSPECT OF THE OAU'S NEW PROPOSALS FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON THE WESTERN SAHARA SUCCEEDING. THE ONLY REALLY NEW ELEMENT IS MOROCCO'S SEEING WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, WE DOUBT THAT GETTING MOROCCO AND POLISARIO TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE TOGETHER IS GOING TO BE EASY: POLISARIO IS UNLIKELY TO CONSIDER THE RATHER VAGUE AOSARIO'S CLAIM TO EQUAL STATUS WITH POLISARIO AS A MEANS OF HOLDING UP THE WORKING OF THE COMMITTEE. EVEN IF NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE COMMENCED BEFORE THE PATIENCE OF THE SADR SUPPORTERS WEARS OUT, THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES - AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, THEIR BELIEVE THAT THEY CAN WIN MILITARILY - MAKE IT HARD TO ENVISAGE A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE BEING REACHED.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

121

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

5-0.NA10876

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ONA

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
JIO

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

ACTION: AME

JCAA
JAF

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(EANZ)		ANZ	EUR
FAS(DN)	DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)		IO	
FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)		FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M		
FAREP-P	FAREP-S		DIR-ADAB			

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

120

935728/2

0.GE45489 NASH
TOR 0659 13.07.80

0.GE45489 1700 12.7.80 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/1579
FM. GENEVA /

R E S T R I C T E D

ECOSOC : SECOND REGULAR SESSION : AGENDA ITEM 18 : IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEDIUM-TERM AND LONG-TERM RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION PROGRAMME IN THE SUDANO-SAHELIAN REGION

A DRAFT RESOLUTION, AVAILABLE ON 11 JULY, ON THIS ITEM WAS INTRODUCED INT THE THIRD COMMITTEE ON 11 JULY, THE CHAIRMAN PROPOSED ADOPTING THIS BY CONSENSUS BUT POSTPONED CONSIDERATION OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION UNTIL MONDAY 14 JULY, FOLLOWING INTERVENTIONS BY THE USA AND USSR.

2. YOUR ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO OPERATIVE PARA 5. THE USSR REQUESTED CLARIFICATION OF THE REFERENCE " TO ENHANCE THE CAPACITY OF THE UN SUDANO-SAHELIAN OFFICE".

3. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ADVICE BY 14 JULY THAT WE COULD ACCEPT ADOPTION OF A SIMILAR TEXT BY CONSENSUS, IF OPERATIVE PARA 5 IS CLARIFIED.

4. THE TEXT, COSPONSORED BY ALGERIA, LESOTHO, NIGERIA, SENEGAL AND ZAMBIA IS AS FOLLOWS:

BEGINS:

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL,

RECALLING THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, PARTICULARLY ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 34/16 OF 9 NOVEMBER 1979 AND COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1979/51 OF 2 AUGUST 1979,

RECALLING FURTHER DECISION 80/35 OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME -1 ON THE SUBJECT,

HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEDIUM-TERM AND LONG-TERM RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION PROGRAMME IN THE SUDANO-SAHELIAN REGION, -2

1. TAKES NOTE WITH SATISFACTION OF THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEDIUM-TERM AND LONG-TERM RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION PROGRAMME IN THE

ESTRICTED

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.GE45489

SUDANO-SAHELIAN REGION:

2. EXPRESSES ITS PROFOUND GRATITUDE TO THE GOVERNMENTS, AGENCIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM, INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS THAT HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOVERY, REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES IN THE SAHEL:

3. STRONGLY URGES THAT ALL GOVERNMENTS MAKE SPECIAL EFFORTS TO INCREASE THE RESOURCES OF THE UNITED NATIONS SUDANO-SAHELIAN OFFICE SO AS TO ENABLE IT TO RESPOND MORE FULLY TO THE PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE STATES MEMBERS OF THE PERMANENT INTER-STATE COMMITTEE ON DROUGHT CONTROL IN THE SAHEL:

4. FURTHER URGES ALL UNITED NATIONS ORGANS, AGENCIES AND PROGRAMMES, ESPECIALLY THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, THE WORLD BANK THE UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION, THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME TO INCREASE THEIR ASSISTANCE THROUGH JOINT UNDERTAKINGS WITH THE UNITED NATIONS SUDANO-SAHELIAN OFFICE, IN RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FROM THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE SUDANO-SAHELIAN COUNTRIES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR RECOVER, REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES:

5. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE EXECUTIVE HEADS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANS, AGENCIES AND PROGRAMMES CONCERNED, PARTICULARLY THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, THE WORLD BANK, THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT, THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, THE UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION, TO ENHANCE THE CAPACITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS SUDANO-SAHELIAN OFFICE TO RESPOND MORE ADEQUATELY TO THE PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATES MEMBERS OF THE PERMANENT INTER-STATE COMMITTEE ON DROUGHT CONTROL IN THE SAHEL:

6. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION TO THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL AT ITS SECOND REGULAR SESSION OF 1981.

NOTE : -1 DENOTES SEE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, 1980, SUPPLEMENT NO .12 (E/1980/42), CHAP. XI.

-2 DENOTES A/35/176

ENDS.

ESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

3-0.GE45489

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

DEP FINANCE
DEP HEALTH
DEP INDY COMM
DEP P M AND CABINET
DEP PRIMARY IND
DEP TDE AND RSCS
DEP TRANSPORT
DEP TREASURY

RESTRICTED

ACTION: IO OGAJ
EO OGAHA
PDC T/T OGAJ
IOL T/T OGAHA

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	STE	EX	MCO	
PA	FAS(IOAME)	AME	FAS(ECO)		EP	OEE
DIR-ADAB	FAS(BP)	PAAP	FAS(PTO)			

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

117
935128/2
9/6/19O.NA10842 NASH
TOR 1739 09.07.80

AMENDED COPY

O.NA10842 0945 9.7.80 UNC

TO.

RR CANBERRA/9840 DAR ES SALAAM/696 LAGOS/508
 RR ACCRA/239 ALGIERS/26 CAIRO/243
 RR PRETORIA/207 SALISBURY/50 LONDON/823
 RR WASHINGTON/402 PARIS EMB/212 UN NEW YORK/498

FM. NAIROBI / FILE 235/1 /

*M. Nairi
W. Sahara brief
will need re-
wording*
CA

U N C L A S S I F I E D

OAU SUMMIT

WE HAVE ALREADY REPORTED BY CABLE ON SOME ISSUES AT THE FREETOWN SUMMIT WHICH HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF CABLED QUERIES. THIS CABLE SUMMARISES THE MAIN RESULTS OF THE MEETING, WHICH WAS ATTENDED BY FIRST SECRETARY (ZOLLER) FROM 26 JUNE TO 4 JULY. SUBSEQUENT CABLES WILL PROVIDE MORE DETAIL AND BACKGROUND ON MAJOR ISSUES.

2. THE WESTERN SAHARA APART, THE SUMMIT WAS GENERALLY QUIET AND, UNUSUALLY, FINISHED WELL WITHIN ITS TIME. THIS WAS ALSO THE CASE WITH THE PRECEDING MINISTERIAL COUNCIL. FOLLOWING SO SOON AFTER THE LAGOS EXTRAORDINARY SUMMIT, THERE WAS AN ANTI-CLIMACTIC ATMOSPHERE AND THE LOW ATTENDANCE BY HEADS OF STATE (15, PLUS TWO PRIME MINISTERS WHOSE HEADS OF STATE ARE TITULAR) MAY BE LARGELY ATTRIBUTED TO THIS.

WESTERN SAHARA (UNDERLINED)

3. IN THE COURSE OF THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL, THE BASIC QUESTION WAS WHETHER THE RASD WOULD GET THE NECESSARY 26 SUPPORTERS. THE SECRETARY GENERAL RECEIVED A LETTER FORMALLY ADVISING HIM THAT THE RASD WISHED TO BECOME A MEMBER. HIS PROCEDURE SHOULD THEN HAVE BEEN TO CIRCULATE THE LETTER AND SEEK RESPONSES FROM MEMBER STATES. THIS, FOR VARIOUS REASONS, HE DID NOT DO. THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH SUPPORTED THE RASD THEREFORE RESPONDED WITH LETTERS ADVISING THAT THEY WERE AWARE THAT AN APPLICATION HAD BEEN RECEIVED, THAT THEY HAD NOT RECEIVED A COPY DUE TO WHAT THEY ASSUMED TO BE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS AND THAT THEY NEVERTHELESS SUPPORTED THE APPLICATION. ALTHOUGH 23 COUNTRIES HAD PREVIOUSLY DECLARED THEIR RECOGNITION OF THE RASD, BY THE TIME THE SUMMIT STARTED ONLY 18 HAD SENT LETTERS.

4. IN A SPEECH IN THE OPEN SESSION OF THE SUMMIT, ZIMBABWE PRIME

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.NA10842

MINISTER MUGABE ANNOUNCED THAT HIS COUNTRY HAD RECOGNISED THE RASD, MAKING THE NUMBER OF RECOGNITIONS 24. AT THE START OF THE CLOSED SESSION DEBATE, SECRETARY GENERAL KODJO ANNOUNCED THAT 26 LETTERS HAD BEEN RECEIVED. MOROCCO IMMEDIATELY LAUNCHED ITS COMPLEX CONSTITUTIONAL CASE THAT THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE RASD WAS AN 'INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN AFRICAN STATE' UNDER ARTICLE 28 OF THE CHARTER WAS ONE OF INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CHARTER, REQUIRING A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY. THERE ENSUED A LONG AND BITTER DEBATE, WITH PRESIDENT SENGHOR OF SENEGAL PARTICULARLY PROMINENT THROUGH HIS EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A COMPROMISE BASED ON FURTHER NEGOTIATION. ALTHOUGH THE INTENSITY OF THE PRO-MOROCCO LOBBY MAY HAVE HAD SOME EFFECT ON THE RASD SUPPORTERS, WE DOUBT THAT RECOGNITION COULD HAVE BEEN HEADED OFF HAD NOT MOROCCO PLAYED, WITH GOOD TIME AND EFFECT, ITS ONE TRUMP CARD - ITS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT IT WOULD BE WILLING TO TALK DIRECTLY WITH POLISARIO. THIS CONTRASTED MARKEDLY WITH MOROCCO'S POSITION IN MONROVIA THAT THE SAHARA WAS AN INTERNAL MATTER AND ITS WITHDRAWAL FROM THAT MEETING IN SUPPORT OF ITS POSITION. FOR THOSE OF THE RASD SUPPORTERS WHO WERE UNHAPPY AT THE PROSPECT OF CLOSING ANY AVENUE FOR OAU MEDIATION IN THE DISPUTE, AS WELL AS THE SEVERAL COUNTRIES ON THE BRINK OF RECOGNITION, MOROCCO'S CONCESSION PROVIDED A GOOD BASIS FOR A COMPROMISE. THE FINAL DECISION WAS TO AGREE THAT THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN SAHARA SHOULD MEET WITHIN 3 MONTHS TO CONTINUE ITS WORK ON RECONCILIATION. THE COMMITTEE IS TO DECIDE WHICH 'INTERESTED PARTIES' ARE TO BE INCLUDED IN NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH IS LIKELY TO BE EXTREMELY PROBLEMATICAL. MOROCCO FOR EXAMPLE CLAIMS THAT ITS OWN 'ALTERNATIVE' TO POLISARIO, THE AOSARIO, SHOULD BE INCLUDED. WE SHALL DISCUSS IN ANOTHER CABLE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION AND THE INTERPRETATION OF IT BY THE TWO SIDES.

MIDDLE EAST (UNDERLINED)

5. THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION WAS THE MOST CONTENTIOUS OF THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL. THE DEBATE WAS LONG AND ACRIMONIOUS BUT THE END RESULT WAS MUCH AS IN MONROVIA. THE FORMULA OF CONDEMNING 'SEPARATE AND PARTIAL' TREATIES WAS REPEATED IN A MANNER WHICH, AS IN MONROVIA, ALLOWED EGYPT TO CLAIM IT DID NOT APPLY TO THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT.

SOUTHERN AFRICA (UNDERLINED)

6. WITHOUT ZIMBABWE, THE SOUTHERN AFRICA DEBATE - FOR SO LONG THE FOCAL POINT OF AFRICAN UNITY - LACKED THE VIGOUR OF PAST YEARS. THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN 'INVASION' OF ANGOLA PROVIDED THE OPPORTUNITY FOR STRONG WORDS AND FULSOME EXPRESSIONS OF SOLIDARITY WITH ANGOLA. THE NAMIBIA RESOLUTION AT ONE STAGE CONTAINED A RESPONSE TO THE 'FAILURE' OF THE CONTACT GROUP BUT THIS WAS DELETED. THE 'SO-CALLED' NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN NAMIBIA WAS PREDICTABLY CONDEMNED

INWARD CABLEGRAM

3-0.NA10842

AND, OVERALL, THE FINAL OUTCOME WAS MUCH THE SAME AS IN MONROVIA.

7. ON SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF, THE EMPHASIS WAS MAINLY ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. A DECLARATION WAS MADE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT, DECLARING THAT SUCH INVESTMENTS 'HELP TO BOLSTER THE APARTHEID REGIME AND ENCOURAGE ITS INTRANSIGENCE AND DEFIANCE OF WORLD OPINION' AND CALLING FOR WESTERN COUNTRIES TO WITHDRAW THEIR INVESTMENTS. MUCH PRESS ATTENTION WAS GIVEN TO A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A BOYCOTT OF AIRLINES FLYING TO AND FROM SOUTH AFRICA. HOWEVER, SUCH A CALL IS NOT NEW AND THE RESOLUTION ITSELF IS NOT PARTICULARLY STRONG IN ITS CALL, REFLECTING THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF SEVERAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN MAINTAINING THEIR OWN AIR LINKS. IN THE GENERAL SANCTIONS RESOLUTION, EMPHASIS WAS PLACED IN THE NEED FOR AN OIL EMBARGO AND, AS A FIRST STEP, THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE WAS DIRECTED TO EXAMINE MEANS FOR OVERCOMING THE LIKELY EFFECTS OF SUCH AN EMBARGO ON SOUTH AFRICA'S NEIGHBOURS.

8. DURING HIS SPEECH TO THE SUMMIT, PRIME MINISTER MUGABE ANNOUNCED THAT ZIMBABWE WOULD SEVER DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND GAVE DETAILS OF ALLEGED SOUTH AFRICAN INTERFERENCE IN ZIMBABWE'S AFFAIRS. HE ALSO CLAIMED THAT 'A SYSTEMATIC, CLANDESTINE RECRUITMENT CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN TAKING PLACE IN OUR COUNTRY FOR FIGHTERS TO DEFEND APARTHEID IN NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA.' HE ALLEGED THAT 5,000 PEOPLE RECRUITED IN ZIMBABWE ARE IN SOUTH AFRICA, 'MANY OF WHOM ARE UNDERGOING MILITARY TRAINING.' HOWEVER, NEITHER IN HIS SPEECH NOR IN A SUBSEQUENT PRESS CONFERENCE DID MUGABE REFER TO ARMED STRUGGLE IN SOUTH AFRICA. IN HIS SPEECH HE SAID SIMPLY THAT 'THE ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE BY ZIMBABWE HAS BROADENED THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN FREEDOM FRONTIER AND INCREASED INFLUENCE AND PRESSURE UPON THE SOUTH AFRICAN RACIST REGIME TO EFFECT THE NECESSARY DEMOCRATIC CHANGES IN SOUTH AFRICA AS WELL AS RESOLVE THE NAMIBIAN QUESTION ...'.

CHAD (UNDERLINED)

9. IN THE DEBATE ON CHAD THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL WAS FACED BY SEVERAL PROBLEMS, NOTABLE KTEBMPFQURE OF ITS PREVIOUS EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A CEASEFIRE, LET ALONE A LASTING SOLUTION, ITS INABILITY TO PUT TOGETHER A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE AND THE EXTENT OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. ALTHOUGH SOME MEMBER STATES REGARDED THE LAGOS AGREEMENT AS DEAD, NIGERIA FOUGHT HARD FOR OAU FAITH IN IT TO BE MAINTAINED. NIGERIA ALSO URGED THAT A FURTHER ATTEMPT BE MADE TO PRODUCE AN OAU PEACEKEEPING FORCE. LOOKING AT THE QUESTION OF WHAT WOULD BE DONE IF THIS ATTEMPT FAILED, THE COUNCIL DECIDED ON A VERY AMBIGUOUS PLAN OF ACTION : IT DECLARED THAT 'IN THE EVENT OF FAILURE BY THE OAU TO RAISE THE NECESSARY FUNDS FOR THE PEACEKEEPING FORCE BY ITS OWN EFFORT AFTER A PERIOD OF TWO MONTHS, THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL WILL BE REQUESTED, THROUGH THE AFRICAN GROUP, FOR ASSISTANCE, PARTICULARLY THE

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

4-O.NA10842

NECESSARY FINANCIAL MEANS, TO ENABLE PEACE TO BE RESTORED IN CHAD''. THIS WORDING LEAVES IT OPEN FOR THE U.N. TO BE ASKED FOR MONEY OR FOR A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE. ALTHOUGH IT WAS EXPECTED THAT THE SUMMIT MIGHT MAKE THE RESOLUTION MORE EXPLICIT, THIS WAS NOT DONE. THE ONLY CHANGE MADE BY THE SUMMIT WAS TO REDUCE THE TIME FOR THE OAU TO ATTEMPT TO RAISE FUNDS FROM TWO TO ONE MONTH. RESERVATIONS ON THE RESOLUTION WERE RAISED BY LIBYA, ANGOLA AND CHAD ITSELF.

INDIAN OCEAN (UNDERLINED)

10. THE INDIAN OCEAN RECEIVED MORE ATTENTION IN SIERRA LEONE THAN AT PREVIOUS OAU MEETINGS. A RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY MADAGASCAR INTER ALIA '' CONDEMNS THE ESCALATION AND EXPANSION OF THE MILITARY PRESENCE OF THE MAJOR POWERS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN...'' AND ''DEMANDS THE REMOVAL OF THE BASES AND OTHER MILITARY INSTALLATIONS BELONGING TO THE BIG POWERS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND CALLS ON THEM TO REFRAIN FROM ESTABLISHING NEW ONES''. A RESERVATION WAS ENTERED BY DJIBOUTI+++.++ MAURITIUS, IN THE SUMMIT, CALLED FOR THE RETURN TO IT OF DIEGO GARCIA AND A RESOLUTION WAS PASSED NOTING THAT DIEGO GARCIA WAS NOT CEDED TO BRITAIN FOR MILITARY PURPOSES, AND CALLING FOR ITS RETURN TO MAURITIUS. COPIES OF ALL RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS WILL BE FORWARDED BY BAG.

++ AMENDMENT PARA 10

AC. AMENDED TEXT

RECD

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ONA

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
JIO

PWT
IS TO
137

RESTRICTEDPP1633
JACB

O.AL3975 0900 7.7.80 CLA

BB CANBERRA/200 MADRID/50 PARIS EMB/175
BB TRIPOLI/05 WASHINGTON/17 NAIROBI/05

FM. ALGIERS / FILE 801/2

935/28/2

R E S T R I C T E D

COVINGRAM: EVENTS IN ALGERIA, TUNISIA, WESTERN SAHARA - JUNE 1980Algeria

Events in June were dominated by the Extraordinary Congress of the ruling National Liberation Front (15 - 19 June) and its immediate effects. The Congress was held initially to approve the major lines to be incorporated into the next Five Year Plan as well as to regulate the Party's principal organs. The theme that emerged as a link between both these functions of the Congress was "the right man in the right place". Excessive bureaucratization and concentration of monolithic state enterprises ignoring current social priorities were criticised. Heavy industry received less emphasis, while medium to light industry, including reference to the private sector, housing, water supply and urban and rural infrastructure will all receive greater attention. Strangely enough agriculture did not figure to any great extent in the final resolutions or economic allocations, but this is seen as being an area where organisational change rather than massive injections of finance will have most effect.

2. The Congress also gave President Chadli power to restructure the Party's executive body - the Political Bureau - which he then proceeded to do. On 29 June the Central Committee endorsed the new Politburo, which has been reduced from seventeen to seven, including the President ex officio. Not only has Chadli now got a majority of supporters on this powerful body, but he has successfully isolated the leaders of the two major factions in the Party, the conservative Rabah Bitat and the Islamic socialist radical, Mohammed Yahiaoui. The major surprise, however, was the retention in the Politburo of Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the former "playboy" Foreign Minister who had been thought to have fallen completely from power after the death of Boumedienne. A full Cabinet reshuffle is now expected, with Bouteflika possibly being made Prime Minister. These events clearly indicate that President Chadli has now effectively assumed full powers as well as established a firm political base within the Party.

3. In a further move to defuse the cultural problems involving Berbers, the 24 persons facing formal charges arising out of the riots in Tizi Ouzou in April have now been provisionally released. The situation in Algiers had already become calm with the return to class of students at major colleges on 5 June.

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RESTRICTED

4. On the international level, the OPEC Ministerial Meeting which opened in Algiers on 9 June produced what was called an agreed price structure but which in reality was merely a recognition that oil comes in different qualities and that member countries can use this fact to justify price variations. The price ceiling of \$37 per barrel has already been met by Algeria, with effect from 1 July. Energy Minister Nabi also succeeded in gaining further endorsement for Algeria's policy of obtaining parity between oil and gas prices. In this respect, talks between Algeria and France and the United States over Algerian demands for large increases in existing contract prices for liquid natural gas remain deadlocked.

5. Foreign Minister Benyahia paid official visits to Britain and Spain from 1 June. The Middle East and Western Sahara problems figured prominently in discussions.

6. Algeria participated in the Rejectionist Front meeting in Tripoli on 22 June which declared full support for Libya in the face of Egyptian troop concentrations on the Libyan border.

Tunisia

7. Relations between Tunisia and Libya began to improve slightly as the new Tunisian Government settled into office. Flights between Tripoli and Tunis were resumed. Both countries also deposited dossiers on their continental shelf dispute with the International Court of Justice. Libya's claim to part of the hydro-carbon-rich continental shelf which overlaps the Tunisian claim has been a source of friction since 1977 and has held up wider exploitation by Tunisia of offshore gas fields.

8. On the 25th anniversary of Victory Day (decision of the French to withdraw from Tunisia), President Bourguiba amnestied 26 political prisoners, mostly students associated with left wing groups.

Western Sahara

9. June was an important month for the Polisario Front mainly because of the concentration on the issue of membership during preparations for the 17th OAU Summit which commenced on 1 July in Freetown. The Preparatory Ministerial Meeting was faced with an application by the "Saharan Arab Democratic Republic" (SADR) to join the OAU on 23 June. The rules of that body provide for a simple majority being needed to approve membership. This would amount to 26 votes for the SADR to enter. (24 African countries formally recognize the SADR). Predictably, Morocco threatened to withdraw from the OAU if the SADR were admitted and attempted also to raise procedural points, requiring resolution by a two-thirds majority vote, to further confuse the issue. Also predictable was the upsurge of Polisario activity throughout the month, to demonstrate its control over the territory before the OAU Summit. Major attacks were mounted against Guelta, a major phosphate mining town in the territory, and Akka in southern Morocco itself. The battle for the Sahara took a new turn, with Polisario attacking and destroying numerous fishing boats, mainly Spanish and Portuguese, fishing in what Polisario declares to be territorial waters of the SADR. In the case of the Portuguese fishermen, the Front has made it clear that they will only be released after Portugal has recognized the SADR.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

10. Meanwhile, rumours began to circulate that negotiations between Algeria and Morocco were going on secretly in Geneva. Similar rumours flowed from the presence of Saudi Prince Fahd in Rabat early in the month, and from the visit by Tunisian Prime Minister M'Zali on 12 - 13 June. Tunisia has formally offered to mediate in the Sahara problem. Iran, which earlier in the year recognised the SADR, announced, on 22 June, that it was establishing full diplomatic relations with the SADR.

RESTRICTED

2-0.AL3975

ACTION: AME

JEA

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	EX	PA	FAS(SEP)
FAS(NSA)	FAS(EANZ)		FAS(DN)	NUC	DEF
DPR	FAS(IOAME)	IO	FAS(CIC)		FAS(ECO)
EO	EP	OEE	FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)	
FAREP-M	FAREP-P		FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB	
FAS(BP)	PPR	PAAP	SEAP		FAS(PTO)
PDC	IOL				

ACCRA AMMAN ANKARA BELGRADE BONN BRUSSELS CAIRO
DAR ES SALAAM JEDDAH LAGOS LONDON MALTA MOSCOW NEW DELHI
NICOSIA PEKING PRETORIA TEHRAN TEL AVIV THE HAGUE UN NEW YORK
VIENNA

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

109
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O.NA10773 BOMA
TOR 1826 26.06.80

O.NA10773 1020 26.06.80 UNC

TO.
RR CANBERRA/9779

RP.
RR PARIS EMB/210 ALGIERS/25 UN NEW YORK/493
RR LAGOS/502 ACCRA/238

FM. NAIROBI / FILE 235/1 /

U N C L A S S I F I E D

OAU : WESTERN SAHARA

POLISARIO HAS FORMALLY APPLIED AT THE OAU MINISTERIAL COUNCIL IN SIERRA LEONE FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE ORGANISATION. POLISARIO ' 'FOREIGN MINISTER' ' HAKKIM HAS SAID THAT TWENTY THREE COUNTRIES IN THE OAU ALREADY RECOGNISE THE SAHARAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND THAT ' 'SEVERAL OTHER COUNTRIES' ' HAVE INDICATED THEY WILL SUPPORT A RESOLUTION APPROVING POLISARIO'S APPLICATION.

2. THERE HAS BEEN NO INDICATION YET OF THE FORM THE DEBATE ON THIS ISSUE WILL TAKE.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.NA10773

ACTION: AME

JCAA

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(EANZ)		FAS(DN)	
DEF	FAS(IOAME)	IO	FAS(ECO)		FAS(LT)	
FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M		FAREP-P		FAREP-S	

CAIRO DAR ES SALAAM LONDON MOSCOW PEKING PRETORIA TRIPOLI
WASHINGTON

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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TOR 2207 19.06.80

0.NA10736 1500 19.06.80 CLA

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RR WASHINGTON/394 PARIS EMB/208 ALGIERS/24
BB LAGOS/198 ACCRA/190

FM. NAIROBI / FILE 235/1 /

C O N F I D E N T I A L

WESTERN SAHARA

WE WERE TOLD ON 17 JUNE BY HOFFMAN (COUNSELLOR, U.S. EMBASSY, NAIROBI) THAT SOME AMERICAN EMBASSIES IN AFRICA HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS TO THEIR HOST GOVERNMENTS CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF THE WESTERN SAHARA AT THE FORTHCOMING O.A.U. SUMMIT. HOFFMAN TOLD US THE REPRESENTATIONS WERE TO THE EFFECT THAT PRECIPITATE ACTION IN RECOGNISING THE SAHARAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC WOULD LEAD TO INSTABILITY IN THE REGION AND WOULD NOT BE A LONG TERM PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THE TERRITORY'S STATUS.

2. THE KENYAN REACTION TO THESE REPRESENTATIONS HAD BEEN RATHER NEGATIVE. ALTHOUGH KENYA SO FAR HAS NOT RECOGNISED THE SAHARAN REPUBLIC, THE AMERICANS WERE TOLD THAT IT WOULD FOLLOW A CONSENSUS OR A SIGNIFICANT MAJORITY SUPPORT FOR SUCH RECOGNITION IN THE OAU. WHEN IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT THIS WOULD LEAD TO MOROCCO LEAVING THE OAU, THE KENYANS SAID ONLY THAT ANY MEMBER WAS 'FREE TO LEAVE'. THIS ATTITUDE, COMING FROM A RELATIVELY CONSERVATIVE MEMBER OF THE OAU, SUGGESTS THAT THE BALANCE OF OAU OPINION MAY BE NOW SHIFTING TO THE EXTENT THAT RECOGNITION OF THE SAHARAN REPUBLIC RATHER THAN THE SEARCH FOR A NON-COMMITAL COMPROMISE MAY BE THE NORM.

3. WE DISCUSSED WITH HOFFMAN THE AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR MOROCCO OVER THE WESTERN SAHARA AND ITS SEEING PREPAREDNESS TO BACK KING HASSAN IN THE FACE OF STRONG AFRICAN OPPOSITION. HOFFMAN ACKNOWLEDGED THIS, BUT SUGGESTED A FURTHER MOTIVE FOR THE CURRENT AMERICAN EFFORTS. HE BELIEVED THAT IF THE REACTION RECEIVED BY AMERICAN EMBASSIES THROUGHOUT AFRICA WAS OVERWHELMINGLY NEGATIVE, THE U.S. MIGHT THEN PUT IT TO HASSAN THAT HIS POSITION WAS HOPELESS. HOFFMAN, WHO HAS SERVED IN MOROCCO, WAS NOT, HOWEVER, OPTIMISTIC THAT HASSAN WOULD BE RECEPTIVE TO ANY ADVICE, EVEN FROM A COUNTRY PROVIDING SO MUCH OF HIS ARMS. THE OBSESSION WITH THE SAHARA WAS, ACCORDING TO HOFFMAN, COMPARABLE TO THAT OF SIAD BARRE WITH SOMALI CLAIMS TO THE OGADEN. AS WELL AS BEING A MAJOR POINT OF NATIONAL POLICY, IT HAD BECOME A FUNDAMENTAL FACTOR IN MAINTAINING NATIONAL UNITY.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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0.AL03803 1500 5.5.80 CLA

TO.
BB CANBERRA/118 PARIS EMB/173 DAMASCUS/68
BB WASHINGTON/16 NAIROBI/04 TEHRAN/10

FM. ALGIERS / FILE 801/2

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MONTLY SAVINGRAM : ALGERIA, TUNISIA, MAURITANIA, WESTERN SAHARA
APRIL 1980

(TAKE IN TEXT 0.AL03803)

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

FOREIGN MINISTER	DEP SPL TDE REP
DEP DEFENCE	DEP TDE AND RSCS
DEP FINANCE	DEP TRANSPORT
DEP IMM ETH AFF	DEP TREASURY
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ACTION: AME

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CIP	FAS(ECO)	EO	EP	OEE	FAS(LT)	
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MONTHLY SAVINGRAM: ALGERIA, TUNISIA, MAURITANIA, WESTERN SAHARA
 APRIL 1980

Algeria

Domestically, Algeria went through its most serious and violent upheaval since independence (1962). Minor incidents which began in March over suppression of the Berber language in favour of Arabic grew into massive student demonstrations in Algiers and the principal town of the Berber-speaking Kabylie region, Tizi Ouzou. Government buildings were attacked and looted, public and private vehicles burned, and there were unconfirmed rumours that at least 32 deaths occurred. Many arrests were made and summary penalties of up to eight years in prison handed out to ringleaders for acts ranging from destruction of the national flag to rebellion. By the end of April, a tense calm had settled in the Kabylie, with the government pouring in supplies and even going so far as to create a Chair of Berber studies at Tizi Ouzou University (which, however, remains closed) and re-opening a similar Chair at Algiers University which had been suppressed in 1972. The Government has predictably blamed the events on a foreign, imperialist plot fomented chiefly in France.

2. The United States Under-Secretary of State for Energy (Goldman) visited Algiers from 8 - 10 April for discussions on Algeria's refusal to meet its commitments to deliver natural gas to the American company, El Paso. The talks produced no results and were to resume in Washington in early May. Algeria, which had previously negotiated a price of \$US1.95 per million BTU with El Paso, is now seeking to impose a price of \$6.13 per million BTU not only on El Paso but also on other purchasers including Gaz de France which is currently paying over \$3 per million BTU.

3. Internationally, Algeria participated in the OAU Economic Summit in Lagos, the Inter-Parliamentary Union meeting in Oslo and the Steadfastness and Resistance Front meeting in Tripoli (13 - 14 April). During the latter meeting, President Chadli accepted the role of Chairman of a joint military committee to be set up by the Front countries, the modalities of which remain unclear.

4. The Algerian media kept up a predictably hostile campaign against United States policy on Iran, and in particular the abortive rescue mission. Algeria agreed on 10 April to protect Iran's interests in the United States after the rupture in diplomatic relations between the two countries.

5. Principal visitors to Algeria during the month were President Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone (20-23 April), the Cuban Foreign Minister (Isodoro Malmierca), the Chinese Vice Premier Minister, Munhua Chen, a

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Nicaraguan delegation led by Defence Minister Ortega and Ayatollah Khalkhali, the former head of the Iranian Revolutionary Tribunal.

Tunisia

6. Events in Tunisia were dominated by a major Cabinet reshuffle announced by President Bourguiba on 23 and 24 April. The principal appointment was that of Mohammed M'Zali as the country's new Prime Minister, replacing Hedi Nouira who has been incapacitated by a stroke since February. M'Zali, formerly Education, Youth and Sports Minister is regarded as being both liberal and popular. He is a senior Vice President of the International Olympic Committee. The major surprise in the reshuffle was the removal of the unpopular but powerful Mohammed Sayah as Director of the ruling Socialist Destourian Party, who has, however, been given a less sensitive portfolio (Housing & Equipment).

Mauritania

8. Mauritania too saw a significant reshuffle of its military rulers. Both the powerful Minister of the Interior and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces were relieved of their functions. These changes were accompanied by replacements of many senior officers of the army and national police.

Western Sahara

9. While reports of military actions were relatively sparse during the month, all was not quiet on the Western front. The Tripoli meeting of the Front of Steadfastness and Resistance declared unanimously that it recognized the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and encouraged other Arab states to do so. In practice, this meant that Syria and Libya were added to the countries recognizing the SADR. There has been some confusion as to whether the PLO felt itself bound by this decision of the Front, with the PLO representative in Morocco denying that it did, and the PLO representative in Algiers saying that the PLO was clearly and voluntarily bound.

10. On 28 April, Swaziland became the 40th country to recognize the SADR. It thus also became the 23rd state member of the Organisation of African Unity to do so. Only three more members of the OAU will be required to recognize the SADR for it to gain membership of the pan-African body. An SADR delegation was invited to attend Zimbabwe's independence ceremonies.

11. Obviously feeling itself increasingly hemmed in, Morocco has reacted to events by breaking off diplomatic relations with Cuba because of its recognition of the SADR in January, and with Libya for its more recent recognition. King Hassan is, however, moving more cautiously in relation to Syria and has so far merely recalled his Ambassador to Damascus "for consultations".

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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MOROCCO/WESTERN SAHARA: VISIT OF KING HASSAN TO FRANCE

KING HASSAN'S VISIT TO FRANCE HAS BEEN EXTENDED AND HAS LED TO FURTHER PRESS ATTENTION ++ TO HIS ACTIVITIES ++ ON BEHALF OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. FOLLOWING A CALL ON PRESIDENT Giscard ON 24 MARCH HE CALLED ON EGYPT TO RENOUNCE THE WEST BANK/GAZA AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS AND RESUME ITS RIGHTFUL PLACE IN THE ARAB WORLD. ON THE WESTERN SAHARA DISPUTE HE REITERATED HIS FORMULA THAT 'ONE FIGHTS ONLY TO NEGOTIATE, NOT FOR THE SAKE OF FIGHTING' AND ADDED 'WHEN THE MOMENT COMES THE HISTORIC ROLE OF FRANCE FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION BETWEEN PEOPLES WILL BE DEMONSTRATED IN THE MOST ELOQUENT FASHION'.

2. IT IS PERHAPS A POINTER TOWARDS SOME RENEWED FRENCH SUPPORT FOR MOROCCO'S POSITION ON THE WESTERN SAHARA DISPUTE THAT A ''LE MONDE'' ARTICLE OF 30-31 MARCH WHICH CLEARLY REFLECTED OFFICIAL BACKGROUNDING MENTIONED FRANCE'S LONGSTANDING OPPOSITION TO THE CREATION OF ''MICRO-STATES'' (INCLUDING BY IMPLICATION AN INDEPENDENT WESTERN SAHARA). IN CONVERSATION ON 3 APRIL MOLINARI (MOROCCO SECTION, FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY) NOTED THAT LIBYA IN FACT ALSO OPPOSED THE CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT WESTERN SAHARAN STATE, THUS FINDING ITSELF IN A CONTRADICTORY POSITION GIVEN ITS PRACTICAL SUPPORT FOR POLISARIO.

3. MOLINARI STRESSED THE ''PRIVATE'' NATURE OF HASSAN'S VISIT, WHICH HE IS USING AS A BASE FOR VISITS TO OTHER EUROPEAN CAPITALS IN HIS ROLE AS CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. (THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, HABIB CHATTI, CALLED ON FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER FRANCOIS-PONCET ON 24 MARCH, SUBSEQUENTLY PRAISING FRANCE'S SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIAN SELF DETERMINATION AND CALLING ON IT TO HELP RESOLVE THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM). HASSAN VISITED ROME ON 2 APRIL IN HIS ISLAMIC CONFERENCE ROLE, CALLING ON

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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BOTH THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE POPE.

4. MOLINARI CONSIDERED THAT THE ROLE HASSAN IS PLAYING AS ISLAMIC CONFERENCE CHAIRMAN, PRESSING EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS ON PLO RECOGNITION AND ON PROGRESS ON THE QUESTION ON THE STATUS OF THE JERUSALEM, SUGGESTS THAT MOROCCO IS NOT ENTIRELY ISOLATED INTERNATIONALLY: HE PARTICULARLY NOTED THE CONTINUING, SUPPORT OF IRAQ FOR MOROCCO'S CASE ALONG WITH EGYPT, TUNISIA, SAUDI ARABIA AND - MORE INTERMITTENTLY - SYRIA - (SAUDI ARABIA IS PROVIDING CONTINUING MAJOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO MOROCCO'S WAR EFFORT, WHILE IRAQ HAS ARRANGED A SCHEME FOR REDUCING MOROCCO'S OIL IMPORT BILL). MOLINARI COMMENTED THAT MOROCCO HAS BEEN MUCH LESS SUCCESSFUL IN EFFORTS TO IMPROVE ITS STANDING AMONG THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

5. MOLINARI SAID HE KNEW NOTHING OF THE CONTENT, IF ANY, OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN GISCARD AND HASSAN ON THE POSSIBLE SHAPE OF A SETTLEMENT OF THE WESTERN SAHARA DISPUTE. THE "LE MONDE" ARTICLE MENTIONED ABOVE REPORTS ASSESSMENTS BY FRENCH AND OTHER WESTERN OBSERVERS THAT THE ENTHUSIASM OF THE MOROCCAN POPULATION FOR THE WESTERN SAHARA WAR IS WEAKENING.

++AMENDMENT++

AC. FM CORR: INSERTED 3 WORDS IN PARA 1 - RE LDCC 325 FM PARIS.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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ACTION: EUR JBAL
AME JBAM

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(EANZ)	FAS(DN)		
NUC	NPD	NS	DEF	FAS(IOAME)	IO	
FAS(ECO)		EO	EP	OEE	FAS(LT)	
FAS(MFS)		FAREP-M		FAREP-P	FAREP-S	

AMMAN ANKARA ATHENS BAGHDAD BEIRUT BERNE BONN BRUSSELS
COPENHAGEN DAMASCUS DUBLIN GENEVA JEDDAH LISBON LONDON
MADRID MALTA MOSCOW NICOSIA ROME STOCKHOLM TEHRAN TEL AVIV
THE HAGUE TRIPOLI UN NEW YORK VIENNA WASHINGTON

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM 935/28/2

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R E S T R I C T E D

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WESTERN SAHARA: VISIT TO FRANCE BY KING HASSAN OF MOROCCO

KING HASSAN ARRIVED IN FRANCE ON 24 MARCH FOR A
"WORKING VISIT" OF SEVERAL DAYS WHICH WILL INCLUDE
DISCUSSIONS OF THE WESTERN SAHARA SITUATION. ACCORDING TO THE
PRESS VISITS TO THE FRG AND THE UNITED KINGDOM ARE ALSO
PLANNED.

2. THE VISIT TAKES PLACE AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF REPORTS
OF RENEWED MOROCCAN REVERSES AT THE HANDS OF POLISARIO,
AND HASSAN IS EXPECTED TO SEEK INCREASED WESTERN ARMS.

3. HASSAN IS ALSO EXPECTED, IN HIS ROLE AS CURRENT
CHAIRMAN OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, TO TAKE UP MIDDLE EAST
ISSUES INCLUDING RELATIONS WITH THE PLO AND THE STATUS OF
JERUSALEM.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(EANZ)	FAS(DN)	
NUC	NPD	NS	DEF	FAS(IOAME)	IO
FAS(ECO)	EO	EP	OEE	FAS(LT)	
FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M		FAREP-P	FAREP-S	

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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DATE. 18 March 1980

INFORMATION. New York U.N.
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AlgiersIN REPLY
QUOTE

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CODE

TO. CANBERRA : F.A.

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TO FILE.

FM. GENEVA

CLASSIFICATION. RESTRICTED

FM. FILE.

POST
SEQUENCE
NUMBER

2653

SUBJECT. CHR 36 : ITEM 9

929/34/9

THE RIGHT OF PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND ITS
APPLICATION TO PEOPLES UNDER COLONIAL OR ALIEN DOMINATION
OR FOREIGN OCCUPATION

PART C - WESTERN SAHARA

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

Report of the Australian Delegation

The question of Western Sahara was brought before the Commission for the first time in 1979 and two draft resolutions were tabled (by Algeria and Morocco) under item 12, the item on Violations of Human Rights in any Part of the World. By agreement at the time the drafts were not put to the vote and consideration of them was deferred to CHR36. The issue is one which regularly surfaces in the General Assembly where the Australian position is one of cautious support for Algerian proposals aimed at securing a free expression of the opinion of the people themselves about their future.

2. At CHR 36, to the surprise of most delegates, Algeria decided to transfer consideration of the question from item 12 to item 9, so as to bring it squarely into the self-determination debate. In some ways the issues resembled those of Afghanistan, it being alleged by Algeria that Moroccan military occupation of Western Sahara constituted foreign domination and alien occupation, thus violating the fundamental right of the people of the territory to determine their own future. Algeria itself told other delegates that it had decided before the session began to transfer the issue to item 9 and that its doing so had had nothing to do with the on-going debate about Afghanistan including the question of whether item 9 was the appropriate item for such a discussion. The Australian view was that as the question to be resolved in Western Sahara is basically one which centres on the discovery of the wishes of the people themselves, item 9 was indeed appropriate.

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3. Only a few speakers in the debate addressed themselves to the Western Sahara question (the debate was held within the framework of the self-determination debate in general and most speakers concentrated either on Afghanistan, Palestine or issues of general philosophy). There was a short exchange on the draft resolution prepared by Algeria (E/CN.4/L.1489) in which it appeared possible that Morocco would inspire a procedural move, probably to be launched by Senegal, aimed at deferring the question to next year. But, probably because of the Moroccan assessment that such a move would fail and also because it was difficult to move the deferral of a draft whose main purpose, on its face, was to generate a substantive discussion only at CHR 37, no move was made.

4. The draft resolution was accordingly adopted after a series of paragraph votes had been taken. The only change in the draft was Algerian acceptance of an oral amendment moved by Australia suggesting the deletion of a preambular paragraph recalling the Declaration against Torture: we moved this amendment at the request of several delegations in order to maintain the draft as one concerned solely with the question of self-determination and to remove implications flowing from the paragraph that Morocco was engaged in the systematic torture of the inhabitants of the territory.

5. The voting was as follows:

Preambular paragraphs 10 and 11: Sustained 20 - 1 (Senegal) - 18 (Australia, Greece, WEOG).

Pakistani proposal to delete parts of OP 1: Rejected 3 (Canada, Netherlands, Uruguay) - 19 (Greece) - 16 (Australia, Pakistan, WEOG).

Operative paragraph 2: Sustained 26 (Australia, Greece) - 1 (Senegal) - 12 (WEOG).

L.1489 - Adopted 25 (Australia - 1 - 13).


6. Morocco and Iraq did not participate in the voting. The Australian explanation of vote is attached hereto.

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7. The upshot of consideration of the question this year is that the Commission will "follow closely the recommendations of the OAU and the General Assembly on the issue" and consider the question again next year under the item on self-determination.

8. Algeria was, as it was after the favourable Australian vote on General Assembly resolution 34/37, particularly happy to have Australian support for its general position. The Delegation believes that the principles motivating Australian support for self-determination for the people of Western Sahara are sound and that it should be possible for Australia to continue to support moderately worded resolutions on the subject.

At the same time, it may be desirable for us to make more of our wish to see a negotiated settlement of the question, especially as it does no good to the Commission or indeed to anybody else to see this issue continue to fester.


C.L. Lamb
for the Delegation

DOCUMENTS:

OAU Decision - - AHG/Dec.114(XVI) Rev.
General Assembly resolution 34/37
E/CN.4/L.1489 - Algerian draft resolution
Commission resolution 4 (XXXVI)

94 9c/4

ITEM 9 - SELF DETERMINATION

L.1489 - WESTERN SAHARA

Short Statement before the Commencement
of Voting. 15 February, 1980

Mr Chairman,

I have requested the floor to ask the co-sponsors of the draft resolution in L.1489 if they would be prepared to make a small change to the draft. The change is one which, I believe, would be of assistance to delegations because it would give the draft a more coherent concentration on the issue of self-determination.

It is our hope that the co-sponsors will be able to agree to delete preambular paragraph 5, the paragraph concerned with the Declaration on Torture. We hope that the co-sponsors will agree with us that deletion of this paragraph would improve the draft and make it more relevant to the facts now at issue between the parties.

ITEM 9 - SELF DETERMINATIONL.1489 - EXPLANATION OF VOTE AFTER THE VOTE

15 February, 1980

Mr Chairman,

Australia voted in favour of the resolution just adopted and set out in document L.1489. Our vote is intended as a reaffirmation of Australia's long-standing support for self-determination in Western Sahara, a process which Australia sincerely believes should take place in an atmosphere of peaceful negotiation between the parties involved.

The adoption of the resolution means that this question will be discussed again next year. We hope that Morocco and indeed all the parties involved will seize the opportunities available in the coming year to reach agreement on the self-determination process to be followed. In reaching agreement, we would hope that the parties will be able to put aside their current rivalries and negotiate in the best interests of the people of Western Sahara. We have voted for this resolution in the expectation that it will not impede the negotiating process, and we particularly express the hope that the final preambular paragraph should not be interpreted as prejudging or indeed in any way prejudicing the rights of all parties to take part fully in negotiations. The self-determination process, to be complete, must allow the people to express themselves on all the options for the future available to

4 (XXVI). The right of peoples to self-determination and its application to peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation

The Commission on Human Rights,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international instruments relating to human rights,

Recalling the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 1514 (XV), dated 14 December 1960,

Conscious of its responsibility to promote and encourage observance of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all,

Bearing in mind the profound concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries regarding the decolonization of Western Sahara and the right of the people of that Territory to self-determination and independence,

Considering the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly on the question of Western Sahara and more particularly resolution 34/37, adopted on 21 November 1979,

Emphasizing the importance of the reports prepared by the Special Rapporteurs of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities concerning, respectively, "The historical and current development of the right to self-determination" (E/CN.4/Sub.2/404) and "Implementation of United Nations resolutions relating to the right of peoples under colonial and alien domination to self-determination" (E/CN.4/Sub.2/405),

Recalling decision A/HG/DEC.114 (XVI) Rev.1 taken by the sixteenth Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, held at Monrovia from 17 to 20 July 1979,

Taking into account the work of the ad hoc Committee of Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity, which met at Monrovia from 4 to 5 December 1979,

Greatly concerned at the occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco and the violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms resulting from that occupation,

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the recommendations of the Organization of African Unity and the General Assembly of the United Nations concerning

4/ Adopted at the 1542nd meeting, on 15 February 1980, by a roll-call vote of 25 in favour, 1 against and 13 abstentions. See chap. ...

exercise by the people of Western Sahara of the right to self-determination and independence, the sole means of putting an end to the violation of the fundamental rights of the Sarrawi people resulting from the foreign occupation of its territory and of restoring the dignity of that people,

2. Decides to follow closely the developments in this situation in the light of the recommendations of the Organization of African Unity and the General Assembly of the United Nations and to consider the question of Western Sahara within the framework of the item entitled "The right of peoples to self-determination and its application to peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation" at its thirty-seventh session, as a matter of high priority.

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R E S T R I C T E D

WESTERN SAHARA - MOROCCAN POSITION

FOLLOWING HIS VISIT TO DAKHLA, HIS FIRST INTO WESTERN SAHARA SINCE THE 1975 GREEN MARCH (M.PA3614 OF 12 MARCH REFERS) KING HASSAN GAVE AN INTERVIEW TO FRENCH RADIO ON 7 MARCH IN WHICH HE TOOK A FIRM LINE ON MOROCCO'S INTENTION TO RETAIN ITS CONTROL OVER ALL OF WESTERN SAHARA. NOTHING IN HIS STATEMENTS DIFFERED FROM THE STANCE MOROCCO HAS BEEN TAKING OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, OR OFFERED GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM ABOUT POSSIBLE MOVES TOWARDS THE SORT OF SETTLEMENT DISCUSSED IN M.PA3255, PARAS 23-26.

2. HE DENIED THAT THE CONTINUING WAR WAS BEARING HEAVILY ON MOROCCO'S ECONOMY BUT REFUSED TO SAY HOW MUCH THE WAR WAS COSTING (''LE MONDE'' QUOTES AMERICAN ESTIMATES OF US DLRS 1 TO 2 BILLION PER DAY). HASSAN CONCEDED THAT THE POLISARIO, EQUIPPED WITH SOVIET EQUIPMENT BETTER ADAPTED TO DESERT WARFARE, HAD SOMETHING OF AN ADVANTAGE OVER MOROCCAN TROOPS. AT THE SAME TIME HE PAID TRIBUTE TO THE VALUE OF THE MIRAGE F1 FIGHTERS OF THE MOROCCAN AIR FORCE (''TEN TIMES BETTER THAN THE F5'')

3. HASSAN LET IT BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE ARE NO CURRENT CONTACTS BETWEEN MOROCCO AND ALGERIA, AND HE REITERATED MOROCCAN OPPOSITION TO ANY IDEA OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH POLISARIO. ASKED TO COMMENT ON THE SADR'S STRONG CHANCES OF BEING ELECTED TO OAU MEMBERSHIP HE SAID THAT IN THAT CASE MOROCCO WOULD LEAVE THE ORGANISATION, ADDING ''I WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST - IF IT CONTINUES AS IT IS NOW, EVERYONE WILL LEAVE IT''.

4. THERE WAS LITTLE IN HASSAN'S STATEMENTS TO SUGGEST ANY NEW SENSITIVITY TO INTERNATIONAL OPINION. HE SAID THAT ''ONE ONLY MAKES WAR IN ORDER, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, TO NEGOTIATE''. ASKED HOWEVER

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ABOUT THE OBJECTIVE OF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS HE GAVE WHAT LE MONDE POLITELY DESCRIBES AS A SIBYLLINE RESPONSE: 'ONLY TWO OF US KNOW - MY CONSCIENCE AND ME'. ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A MOROCCAN-POLISARIO ENTITY (I.E. INCLUDED SOME WESTERN SAHARA TERRITORY) HASSAN POINTED OUT THAT HE HAD ALWAYS SAID POLISARIO 'IS MAURITANIAN' - THIS REFERS TO THE IDEA HE HAS PREVIOUSLY STATED (SEE PARA B OF M.PA3112) THAT POLISARIO SHOULD FIND A HOME WITHIN MAURITANIA.

5. HASSAN CALLED ON THE STATES OF NORTH WEST AFRICA AND AFRICA GENERALLY TO RESIST THE TEMPTATION OF THE LIBYAN POT OF GOLD - 'OR RATHER ITS POTS OF OIL'. HE UNDERTOOK TO GIVE MILITARY AID TO TUNISIA IF IT WERE ATTACKED. THESE REMARKS REFLECT HASSAN'S THEME THAT LIBYA, WHICH SUPPORTS POLISARIO, IS SEEKING TO DESTABILISE THE WHOLE REGION.

6. FOLLOWING REPORTS OF RECENT POLISARIO ATTACKS WITHIN SOUTHERN MOROCCO (M.PA3614) LE MONDE OF 15 MARCH REPORTS A SIGNIFICANT POLISARIO SUCCESS ON 9-11 MARCH IN THE ASSA REGION OF WESTERN SAHARA. THE SLIGHT EDGE MOROCCO HAS HAD IN RECENT MONTHS IN THE FIGHTING SEEMS AT PRESENT TO BE IN QUESTION.

MIDDLE EAST

7. DESPITE HIS IMAGE AS A MODERATE ON THE MIDDLE EAST DISPUTE (AND REPORTS THAT HE PLAYED SOME ROLE IN THE EGYPT-ISRAEL PEACE ++ AGREEMENT) ++ HASSAN SAID THAT THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS HAD NO CHANCE OF SUCCESS. HE PRAISED PRESIDENT Giscard's CALLS FOR PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION, COMMENTING THAT THEY MIGHT PAVE THE WAY FOR RE-CONVENING THE GENEVA CONFERENCE.

8. FOLLOWING RECENT MEETINGS WITH IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN, HE PREDICTED THAT AN UPDATING OF SECURITY COUNCIL 242 TO RECOGNIZE PALESTINIAN RIGHTS WOULD PERMIT IRAQ TO ENDORSE 242, AND RESUME RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

++ AMENDMENT ++

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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AC. WORD 'GOVERNMENT' ALTERED TO 'AGREEMENT' IN PARA 7.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
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ACTION: AME

JAM
JBAM
JCAA

DDO

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	FAS(EANZ)		ANZ	EUR
FAS(DN)	NUC	NPD	NS	DEF	FAS(IOAME)
IO	FAS(ECO)	EO	EP	OEE	FAS(LT)
IL	FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M		FAREP-P	FAREP-S

ACCRA	AMMAN	BEIRUT	BONN	BRUSSELS	DAMASCUS	DAR ES SALAAM	
GENEVA	JEDDAH	LAGOS	London	MOSCOW	NAIROBI	PEKING	PRETORIA
TEHRAN	TRIPOLI	UN	NEW YORK	WASHINGTON			

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FILE COPY

DATE. 12 March 1980

INFORMATION.

DOCUMENT
REFERENCE

MCHD 66439

SUBJECT
CATEGORY
CODE

CLASSIFICATION.

UNCLASSIFIED

FM. FILE.

TO. ALGIERS

REF. M AL 1174 TO FILE.

FM.

CANBERRA

935/28/2

906/34/14

SUBJECT. UNGA 34: WESTERN SAHARA

A copy of the delegation report on item 18 -
Western Sahara, has been sent directly to you by the
Mission in New York (M.UN4327).

(R. Morris)
UN Political Section

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD BB MESSAGE

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TO.
BB CANBERRA/196 WASHINGTON/14 TEHRAN/09
BB TRIPOLI/03 NEW DELHI/01

FM. ALGIERS / FILE 801/2

R E S T R I C T E D

MONTHLY SAVINGRAM FEBRUARY 1980 - ALGERIA, TUNISIA, WESTERN SAHARA

0.AL3635 ATTACHED

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

FOREIGN MINISTER	DEP SPL TDE REP
DEP DEFENCE	DEP TDE AND RSCS
DEP FINANCE	DEP TRANSPORT
DEP IMM ETH AFF	DEP TREASURY
DEP INDY COMM	ONA
DEP NAT DEV + ENERGY	JIO
DEP P M AND CABINET	ASIO (M)
DEP PRIMARY IND	

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD BB MESSAGE

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2-0.AL3635

ACTION: AME JEA

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	EX	PA	FAS(SEP)
SEA	PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	SA	FAS(EANZ)
ANZ	EUR	FAS(DN)	NUC	NPD	NS
DEF	FAS(IOAME)	IO	FAS(CIC)	ICR	
CIP	FAS(ECO)	EO	EP	OEE	FAS(LT)
GLT	IL	FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M	FAREP-P	
FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB	FAS(BP)	PPR	PAAP	
SEAP	FAS(PTO)	PDC	IOL		

ACCRA ANKARA BELGRADE BONN BRUSSELS CAIRO DAR ES SALAAM
JEDDAH LAGOS LONDON MADRID MALTA MOSCOW NAIROBI NICOSIA
PARIS EMB PEKING PRETORIA TEL AVIV THE HAGUE UN NEW YORK
VIENNA

REF ID: A6572

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TO.
 BB CANBERRA/196 WASHINGTON/14 TEHRAN/09
 BB TRIPOLI/03 NEW DELHI/01
 FM. ALGIERS / FILE 801/2

R E S T R I C T E D**MONTHLY SAVINGRAM FEBRUARY 1980 - ALGERIA, TUNISIA, WESTERN SAHARA****Algeria**

President Chadli celebrated his first year in office by a visit to the eastern capital, Constantine, from 7 to 8 February, where he inaugurated a number of projects. February also saw considerable emphasis placed on the arabisation of the administration. A draft time table (subject to review by the Central Committee) was published, which set 1985 as the target date for total arabisation, but with all functions of the public service dealing directly with the public to convert to Arabic by 1982. There were signs of haste in preparations for this, with party officials sent to hold meetings round the country: it is clear that the leadership decided in January to act quickly on Arabic partly in response to signs of unrest in student and other circles.

2. Venezuelan President Herera Campins visited Algeria from 4 to 6 February. The visit was treated as an important one by the Algerians, evidently to underline the increasing co-operation between the two countries in questions of energy policy and "third world" development. There was little of significance, however, in the communique issued at the end of the visit. Herera's arrival coincided with the announcement that Algeria would increase the price of its oil from \$US30 to \$US34.21 per barrel (plus a \$3 surcharge on western countries). Mali's President, Moussa Traore, also made a brief visit on 11 February, during which he discussed with President Chadli the results of visits he had just made to Iraq and Syria.

3. Algeria's Ambassador to the United Nations in New York, Mohamed Bedjaoui, was appointed a member of the Commission into the crimes of the Pahlavi regime in Iran. Bedjaoui, a jurist and former Minister for Justice, is well respected internationally, and his appointment is symbolic of the constant support Algeria has given to the Iranian Revolution.

4. Foreign Minister Benyahia visited India officially between 26 and 29 February during which time he had talks with Mrs Ghandi and President Reddy. The visit was in the context of the position of both countries as leaders of the non-aligned world. The situation in the Middle East, Iran and Afghanistan was discussed and in relation to the latter, the two sides agreed that Afghanistan's fate should be decided by its own people and that they didn't agree with the Western proposition that Afghanistan should be formally made neutral.

Tunisia

5. Events in the Maghreb during the month tended to be focussed on the aftermath of the attack by guerillas on the central Tunisian town of Gafsa during the night of 26/27 January. Early Tunisian

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accusations of Algerian participation in the raid were turned onto Libya after the interrogation of captured guerillas. Libya denied the allegations and countercharged that France had invaded Tunisia by sending in security "advisers", and two transport aircraft and two helicopters for logistic support at the request of the Tunisian Government. Tunisia brought a complaint against Libya before the OAU on 13 February, but received cold comfort when the OAU Council of Ministers merely condemned in general terms all foreign intervention in the affairs of States. A subsequent Ministerial meeting of the Arab League Foreign Ministers, postponed from 16 to 27 February, reaffirmed the principle of the League supporting the right of States members to their sovereignty and to respect for the "regime in place". A committee of conciliation was set up, consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Iraq, Kuwait and Syria, plus a representative of the League, to induce the two parties to find a peaceful solution. On the eve of the League meeting, the Tunisian Prime Minister, Hedi Nouira, suffered a heart attack, apparently brought on by the strain of recent events, and was hospitalized in Paris.

6. Following Algeria's early denial of involvement in the Gafsa raid, the Tunisian Information Minister visited President Chadli, and apparently brought with him evidence that in fact part of the guerilla group had flown from Tripoli to Algiers via Rome, in the guise of a football team, then took public transport to the Tunisian frontier where they crossed over legally and thence made their way to Gafsa. The Tunisian Government, in all subsequent pronouncements, has taken the official line that it is satisfied that the Algerian Government was in no way involved. However, there have been some indications that some senior members of the Algerian administration may have helped the guerillas in a "private" capacity. The Tunisians have also been upset by the lack of Algerian sympathy for their position, manifested by a number of statements, including those of President Chadli, implicitly critical of France's involvement in the affair. The new Algerian Interior Minister, Benhamouda, visited Tripoli on 17 February: it is most unlikely that the purpose of his visit, as claimed by the Libyan news agency, was to discuss political union between Algeria and Libya. The situation in Tunisia still remains tense and the Government moved to suspend courses at a number of educational institutions on 24 February as a result of student strikes relating to the affair.

Western Sahara

7. The Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) celebrated its fourth anniversary on 27 February with a suitable diplomatic victory. Iran became the 36th nation to recognise it. Polisario Front attacks on Moroccan positions continued, though these appear to have been relatively small scale. Algeria's and Polisario's media campaign against the confirmation of American military supplies to Morocco received a fillip with a visit by Andrew Young to Algeria (9 - 12 February) during which he made the now traditional visit to Saharan refugee camps. In subsequent statements he has criticised American policy on arms supplies. On the day he left, the head of the State Department's North Africa bureau Carleton Coone, arrived in Algiers on what turned out to be a rather badly managed visit. (While expressing willingness to talk to the Polisario Front, he decided not to visit the refugee camps. The Polisario pointed out with some reason that he had not displayed such restraint when he had visited Moroccan-occupied sites in the Western Sahara during prior visit to Morocco, and they refused to talk to him at all). Algeria

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also gained another victory when the U.N. Commission on Human Rights voted strongly (including Australia) in favour of a resolution on the right of the Saharan people to self-determination.

8. Mauritania's definitive withdrawal from the conflict and the consequent rapprochement with Algiers was symbolized by the presentation of the credentials on 19 February by the first Mauritanian ambassador to Algeria since relations between the two countries were broken five years ago as a result of Mauritania's decision to share the Western Sahara with Morocco after Spain's withdrawal.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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INFORMATION.

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QUOTE

M.UN 4327

REGISTRY
CODE

TO.

CANBERRA

REF. M.

TO FILE.

906/34/4

FM. NEW YORK U.N.

935/28/2

FM. FILE. 103/3/4; 412/1

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SEQUENCE
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3832

SUBJECT. UNGA 34 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 - WESTERN SAHARA

The question of Western Sahara was one of the major items debated in the Fourth Committee. At UNGA 34 a resolution initiated by Algeria was adopted. The resolution, which was adopted by a convincing majority, underlined Morocco's isolated position.

Background

2. It will be recalled that at UNGA 33 both Algeria and Morocco had drafted resolutions on Western Sahara which had been adopted by Plenary. The Algerian resolution, in reaffirming the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence, had specified that the decolonisation of that Territory was the responsibility of the United Nations. The Moroccan resolution, on the other hand, made no reference to self-determination but declared that the OAU should "take prompt action to find a just and equitable settlement of the question of Western Sahara".

3. In July 1979 the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU met in Monrovia and adopted a resolution which reaffirmed the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence by means of a general referendum and recommended that the parties to the conflict should have recourse to political channels in seeking a solution to the problems of Western Sahara. These decisions were based on advice of the OAU's Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State (known as the Committee of Wise Men). Morocco rejected these recommendations and King Hassan openly criticised the OAU. Indeed, acceptance by Morocco of the OAU decisions would have been tantamount to recognising the claims of the Polisario Front as a legitimate representative of the Western Saharan people.

4. Soon after the Monrovia meeting Mauritania and the Polisario Front concluded a peace agreement on

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10 August, 1979 whereby Mauritania renounced all claims to that part of Western Sahara formerly under its control and declared it would withdraw from the war there. Morocco responded to this agreement by annexing the territory vacated by Mauritania. This move left it further isolated, especially among African countries.

The Debate

5. The principals in the conflict - Algeria, Morocco and the Polisario Front - all made vigorous statements in defence of their positions, although Morocco did endeavour to block consideration of the question and to deny the right of any petitioner (i.e. Polisario) to a hearing.

6. Algeria, in advancing the claims of the Polisario Front as the sole and legitimate representative of the people of Western Sahara, attacked Morocco for pursuing a policy of expansionism. Morocco had responded to the willingness of the Polisario Front to end the war by increasing its supply of armaments, expanding its territorial annexation, and calling upon a super power (i.e. the United States) to guarantee its military support. This, however, ignored the fact that there was "growing international sympathy for the just struggle of the Saharan people". Algeria asserted that there were now 34 African, Latin American and Asian States which recognised the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic and hence the claims of the Polisario Front as the sole and legitimate representative of the Saharan people. In order to defuse the situation Algeria urged the United Nations to appeal promptly to Morocco to enter into negotiations with the Polisario Front.

7. The Polisario Front's statement complemented the Algerian one. It charged King Hassan with turning his back on peace and opting for "the path of violence". Morocco's military aggression was "clear proof" of its intransigence. Polisario, while it was determined to fight to defend its independence, stood ready to co-operate with the United Nations to seek a just and legal solution.

8. Morocco, in justifying its actions, declared that but for the "hegemonic caprices of a neighbouring State" (i.e. Algeria) the co-operation between Morocco and Mauritania, as reflected in the agreement both countries had signed on 14 April 1976, might have been extended to all of Western Sahara. The Polisario Front was actually a mercenary band formed by Algeria in the guise of a national liberation movement. Accordingly, the agreement which had been signed between Mauritania and the Polisario Front in August 1979 had no legal value because the latter had no legal personality and no representational standing internationally.

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The Resolution

9. Algeria circulated a draft resolution on the question of Western Sahara which strongly condemned Morocco and gave full support to the Polisario Front. Operative paragraph 5 of the resolution named Morocco and deeply deplored "the aggravation the situation resulting from the continued occupation of Western Sahara". Operative paragraph 7 referred to the Polisario Front as "the sole and legitimate representative of the people of Western Sahara".

10. While the Algerian draft, as it stood, had firm support among many Third World countries, there were a number of Western countries (especially the Nordics, Austria and us) which were sympathetic to the thrust of the resolution but had reservations about some of the language in several operative paragraphs. Australia, for example, was uneasy about operative paragraph 1 (a reference to the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Western Sahara as provided in the Charter of the United Nations) and operative paragraphs 5, 6 and 7.

11. Because Algeria was seeking to attract wide support for its resolution it was prepared to consider amendments to the text in the light of objections which we and a number of Western countries raised. Consequently a revised draft was circulated (A/C.4/34/L.2/Rev.1) which incorporated the following modifications :-

- (a) Operative paragraph 1 was amplified and re-arranged so that the legitimacy of the struggle of the Western Sahara people was linked to relevant United Nations and OAU resolutions rather than to the United Nations Charter;
- (b) Operative paragraph 6 was toned down so that it urged Morocco to join in the peace process and to terminate its occupation of Western Sahara;
- (c) Operative paragraph 7 removed the reference to the Polisario Front as "the sole and legitimate representative" of the Western Sahara people and replaced it with "the representative".

12. The revised draft resolution was cosponsored by 40 countries : Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Babados, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Congo, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Iran, Jamaica, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mexico, Mozambique, Nicaragua

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Panama, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierre Leone, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Vietnam, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

The Vote

13. The vote in the Fourth Committee was 83 (Australia, Austria, Finland, Sweden) - 5 - 43. The few votes against reflected Morocco's relatively isolated position - its only supporters were Guatemala, Gabon, Saudi Arabia and Zaire - while the number of abstentions indicated, to some extent, reservations which quite a few countries had concerning such a strongly condemnatory resolution.

14. Algeria, which was extremely active in marshalling support for the resolution was disappointed, to some extent, that there were not more votes in favour of the resolution. Morocco, however, although perceiving its relatively isolated position, was active in capitals (especially among Western countries) in putting its point of view and this contributed to the size of the abstention vote. While it had thought of putting forward an alternative draft resolution Morocco decided against this, in the end, because of lack of supporters.

15. Australia gave an explanation of vote after the vote stating that our support for the resolution had been based on our long-standing support for self-determination in Western Sahara.

Plenary

16. On 21 November, 1979 Plenary adopted the resolution by a vote of 85 (Australia) 6 - 41. Equatorial Guinea and Central African Republic were additional supporters of Morocco while Zaire abstained.

Conclusion

17. While the resolution constituted a censure of Morocco's actions and, for that reason, was a success for Algeria and the Polisario Front it is doubtful whether the result will have contributed much to getting the parties to the conflict to negotiate.

Comment on Brief

18. We found the briefing on this item was satisfactory in that it took account of recent developments in making an assessment of the situation in Western Sahara. The brief anticipated the likely hardening of Algeria's position and the increasing isolation of Morocco. Communication with Canberra during the debate helped to supplement the briefing and clarify the position Australia should take.

Kenneth Chan
(Kenneth Chan)
for the Delegation

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Documents

A/34/23/Add.3, Chap. X - Report of Committee of 24

A/C.4/34/L.2 - Algerian draft resolution

A/RES/34/37 - Resolution adopted

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STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR H.D. ANDERSON, 2 NOVEMBER 1979

UNGA 34 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 : WESTERN SAHARA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF EXPLANATION OF VOTE BY THE AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR ON THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED IN THE FOURTH COMMITTEE ON 2 NOVEMBER ON ITEM 18 : THE QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA:

"MR CHAIRMAN,

THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION JUST ADOPTED. IT DID SO ON THE BASIS OF AUSTRALIA'S LONG-STANDING SUPPORT FOR SELF-DETERMINATION IN WESTERN SAHARA, AND HAVING REGARD ALSO TO THE DECISION TAKEN ON THIS MATTER BY THE ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AT ITS 16TH ORDINARY SESSION.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO EMPHASISE THAT WE REGARD OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 AS A WHOLE AS BEING GOVERNED BY THE REQUIREMENT TO ACT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CHARTER. THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT SINCERELY HOPES THAT THE CONFLICT WILL BE SOLVED BY PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS AND IT URGES ALL PARTIES TO PURSUE THAT COURSE. WE HAVE SOME RESERVATIONS ON THE WORDING OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 5 AND TRUST THAT IT WILL NOT BE PREJUDICIAL TO SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS.

WHILE WE RECOGNISE THE MAJOR ROLE WHICH POLISARIO, AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF WESTERN SAHARA ENGAGED IN THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE NEEDS TO PLAY IN THE PEACE PROCESS, OUR VOTE IS A REAFFIRMATION OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE PEOPLE OF WESTERN SAHARA AS A WHOLE.

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UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY



Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/34/37
4 December 1979

Thirty-fourth session

Agenda item 18

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/On the report of the Fourth Committee (A/34/638/Add.1)

34/37. Question of Western Sahara

The General Assembly,

Having considered in depth the question of Western Sahara,

Recalling the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Having considered the relevant chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1/

Having heard the statements made on the subject of Western Sahara, including the statement of the representative of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro, 2/

Bearing in mind the profound concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries regarding the decolonization of Western Sahara and the right of the people of that Territory to self-determination,

Recalling its resolution 33/27 of 1 December 1978 on co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity,

1/ A/34/23/Add.3, chap. X.

2/ A/C.4/34/SR.14, paras. 50-59, and A/C.4/34/SR.15, paras. 3-17. For the full text of the statement, see A/C.4/34/L.4.

Taking note of the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its sixteenth ordinary session, held at Monrovia from 17 to 20 July 1979, 3/ by which the Assembly adopted the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Organization of African Unity on the question of Western Sahara,

Also taking note of the peace agreement concluded at Algiers on 10 August 1979 between Mauritania and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro 4/ and the decision of Mauritania to withdraw its forces from Western Sahara, 5/

Aware of the profound concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries at the aggravation of the situation prevailing in Western Sahara because of the continuation and extension of the occupation of that Territory,

Recalling the part of the Political Declaration adopted by the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana from 3 to 9 September 1979, relating to Western Sahara, 6/

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the charter of the Organization of African Unity and the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of that right, as envisaged in the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity;

2. Takes note with satisfaction of the decision concerning Western Sahara taken by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its sixteenth ordinary session; 3/

3. Also takes note with satisfaction of the part of the Political Declaration adopted by the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries relating to Western Sahara;

4. Welcomes the peace agreement concluded between Mauritania and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro and considers that this agreement constitutes an important contribution to the process of achieving peace and a definitive, just and lasting settlement of the question of Western Sahara;

3/ A/34/552, annex II, decision AHG/Dec.114 (XVI).

4/ A/34/427-S/13503, annex I. For the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fourth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1979.

5/ A/34/427-S/13503, annex II. For the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fourth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1979.

6/ A/34/542, annex, sect. I, paras. 96-98.

5. Deeply deplores the aggravation of the situation resulting from the continued occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco and the extension of that occupation to the territory recently evacuated by Mauritania;

6. Urges Morocco to join in the peace process and to terminate the occupation of the Territory of Western Sahara;

7. Recommends to that end that the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro, the representative of the people of Western Sahara, should participate fully in any search for a just, lasting and definitive political solution of the question of Western Sahara, in accordance with the resolutions and declarations of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries;

8. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to continue to consider the situation in Western Sahara as a priority question and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;

9. Requests the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity to keep the Secretary-General of the United Nations informed of the progress achieved with regard to the implementation of the decisions of the Organization of African Unity concerning Western Sahara;

10. Invites the Secretary-General to follow closely the situation in Western Sahara and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

75th plenary meeting

21 November 1979

Having considered the relevant chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1/

Having noted the statements made on the subject of Western Sahara, including the statement of the representative of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagua el-Hamra y Río de Oro, 2/

Recalling the profound concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries regarding the decolonization of Western Sahara and the right of the people of that Territory to self-determination,

Recalling its resolution 33/21 of 1 December 1978 on co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity,

1/ A/34/23/Add.3, chancery.

2/ A/34/34/38.1, paras. 50-51, and A/C.4/34/38.15, paras. 3-17. For the full text of the statement, see A/C.4/34/38.1.

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



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LIMITED

A/C.4/34/L.2
24 October 1979
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

Thirty-fourth session

FOURTH COMMITTEE

Agenda item 18

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi,
Cape Verde, Congo, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Equatorial
Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana,
Jamaica, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar,
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Panama, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao
Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Trinidad and Tobago,
Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam and Zambia:

draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Having considered thoroughly the question of Western Sahara,

Recalling the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence in conformity with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Having considered the relevant chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1/

Having heard the statements made on the subject of Western Sahara, including the statement by the representative of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO),

Bearing in mind the profound concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries regarding the decolonization of Western Sahara and the right of the people of that Territory to self-determination,

1/ A/34/23/Add.3, chap. X.

Recalling its resolution 33/27 of 1 December 1978 regarding co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity,

Taking note of the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its sixteenth ordinary session, held at Monrovia from 17 to 20 July 1979, 2/ and endorsing the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Organization of African Unity on the question of Western Sahara,

Also taking note of the peace agreement concluded between Mauritania and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro on 10 August 1979 3/ and the decision of Mauritania to withdraw its forces from Western Sahara, 4/

Aware of the profound concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries at the aggravation of the situation prevailing in Western Sahara because of the continuation and extension of the occupation of that Territory, ARABAS MIRENEN TO POITAS

Recalling the paragraphs dealing with the question of Western Sahara in the Political Declaration adopted by the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana from 3 to 9 September 1979, 5/

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence and the legitimacy of its struggle to secure the enjoyment of that right as provided in the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

2. Takes note with satisfaction of the decision on the question of Western Sahara adopted by the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its sixteenth ordinary session held at Monrovia;

3. Also takes note with satisfaction of the relevant declaration of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries regarding the question of Western Sahara;

4. Welcomes the peace agreement concluded between Mauritania and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro and considers that this agreement constitutes an important contribution to the peace process with a view to a definitive, just and lasting settlement of the question of Western Sahara;

2/ A/34/552, annex III, decision AHG/Dec.114 (XVI).

3/ A/34/427-S/13503, annex I.

4/ Ibid., annex II.

5/ A/34/542, annex, sect. I, paras. 96 to 98.

5. Deeply deplores the aggravation of the situation resulting from the continuation of the occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco and the extension of this occupation to the territory recently evacuated by Mauritania;

6. Demands the withdrawal of the occupation forces and respect for the territorial integrity of Western Sahara and the sovereignty of its people in order to ensure the complete and speedy implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

7. Recommends that the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro, the sole and legitimate representative of the people of Western Sahara, should participate fully in any search for a just, lasting and definitive political solution of the question of Western Sahara, in conformity with the resolutions and recommendations of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries;

8. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to continue to consider the situation in Western Sahara as a priority question and to report on this subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;

9. Requests the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity to keep the Secretary-General of the United Nations informed of the progress achieved with regard to the implementation of the decisions of the Organization of African Unity concerning Western Sahara;

10. Invites the Secretary-General to follow closely the situation in Western Sahara and to submit a report on the question of Western Sahara to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

referred thoroughly the question of Western Sahara.

independence and the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence in conformity with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and its resolutions and in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

having considered the relevant chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;

Having heard the statements made on the subject of Western Sahara, including the statement by the representative of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO),

Bearing in mind the profound concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries regarding the decolonization of Western Sahara and the right of the people of that territory to self-determination,

Y	AFGHANISTAN	A	GERMANY, F.R.	Y	LAO P.D.R.	Y	AFGHANISTAN	Y	AFGHANISTAN	Y	AFGHANISTAN	Y
Y	ALBANIA	A	CHINA	Y	GHANA	Y	PAKISTAN	Y	PAKISTAN	Y	PAKISTAN	Y
Y	ALGERIA	A	COLOMBIA	Y	GREECE	Y	PANAMA	Y	PANAMA	Y	PANAMA	Y
Y	ANGOLA	A	COMOROS	Y	GRENADE	Y	PAPUA N GUINEA	Y	PAPUA N GUINEA	Y	PAPUA N GUINEA	Y
Y	ARGENTINA	A	CONGO	N	GUATEMALA	Y	PARAGUAY	Y	PARAGUAY	Y	PARAGUAY	Y
Y	AUSTRALIA	A	COSTA RICA	Y	GUINEA	Y	PERU	Y	PERU	Y	PERU	Y
Y	AUSTRIA	A	CUBA	Y	GUINEA-BISSAU	Y	PHILIPPINES	Y	PHILIPPINES	Y	PHILIPPINES	Y
Y	BAHAMAS	A	CYPRUS	Y	GUYANA	Y	PORTUGAL	Y	PORTUGAL	Y	PORTUGAL	Y
Y	BAHRAIN	A	CZECHOSLOVAKIA	Y	HAITI	Y	QATAR	Y	QATAR	Y	QATAR	Y
Y	BARBADES	A	DEM. KAMPUCHEA	Y	HONDURAS	Y	ROMANIA	Y	ROMANIA	Y	ROMANIA	Y
Y	BARBADOS	A	DEM. YEMEN	Y	HUNGARY	Y	RUANDA	Y	RUANDA	Y	RUANDA	Y
Y	BELGIUM	A	DENMARK	A	ICELAND	Y	MALAYSIA	Y	MALDIVES	Y	MALDIVES	Y
Y	BENIN	A	DJIBOUTI	Y	INDIA	Y	MALTA	Y	MALTA	Y	MALTA	Y
Y	BHUTAN	A	DOMINICA	Y	INDONESIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y
Y	BOLIVIA	A	DOMINICAN REP.	Y	IRAN	Y	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y
Y	BOTSWANA	A	ECUADOR	Y	IRAQ	Y	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y
Y	BRAZIL	A	Egypt	A	IRELAND	N	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y
Y	BULGARIA	A	EL SALVADOR	Y	ISRAEL	Y	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y
Y	CAIBURNA	A	ECUAT. GUINEA	A	ITALY	Y	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y
Y	BURUNDI	A	ETHIOPIA	A	IVORY COAST	Y	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y
Y	BYELORUSSIAN SSR	Y	FIJI	A	JAMAICA	Y	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y
Y	CANADA	A	FINLAND	A	JAPAN	Y	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y
Y	CAPE VERDE	A	FRANCE	N	JORDAN	Y	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y
Y	CENTR. AFRIC. REP.	N	GABON	Y	KENYA	Y	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y
A	CHAD	A	GAMBIA	A	KUWAIT	A	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y
A	GERMAN D.R.	Y	GERMAN D.R.	A	NORWAY	A	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y	MARITANIA	Y

DAY-MONTH: 02-11	AGENDA ITEMS: 000 - 018	VOTE NO:00	ROLL CALL	> RECORDED	NON RECORDED
ADOPTED	0 8 3 YES	0 0 5 NO	0 4 3 ABSTAIN		
GENERAL ASSEMBLY	THIRTY-FOURTH REGULAR SESSION	PLINARY MEETING	23rd MEETING OF...FOURTH COMMITTEE		
VOTE SUBJECT:	DRAFT RESOLUTION A/ C.4/34/L.2/Rev.1				
VOTE TIME: 17:47	QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA				

72

NON RECORDED

0 8 3 YES

0 0 5 NO

0 4 3 ABSTAIN

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

THIRTY-FOURTH REGULAR SESSION

21/11/79 11: 1

PLENARY MEETING MEETING NO. 75 VOTE NO. 2 ITEM NO. 18 -

SUBJECT: QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

A/34/638/ADD.1 DRAFT RESOLUTION IV

RECORDED VOTE

YES 85 NO 6 ABSTAIN 41 RESOLUTION 34/37

Y AFGHANISTAN	DOMINICA	Y LAO P.D.R.	Y SAMOA
Y ALBANIA	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	A LEBANON	Y SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
Y ALGERIA	Y ECUADOR	Y LESOTHO	N SAUDI ARABIA
Y ANGOLA	A EGYPT	Y LIBERIA	SENEGAL
Y ARGENTINA	Y EL SALVADOR	Y LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA	Y SEYCHELLES
Y AUSTRALIA	N EQUATORIAL GUINEA	A LUXEMBOURG	SIERRA LEONE
Y AUSTRIA	Y ETHIOPIA	Y MADAGASCAR	Y SINGAPORE
Y BAHAMAS	Y FIJI	Y MALAWI	SOLOMON ISLANDS
A BAHRAIN	Y FINLAND	A MALAYSIA	SOMALIA
A BANGLADESH	A FRANCE	MALDIVES	SOUTH AFRICA
Y BARBADOS	N GABON	Y MALI	A SPAIN
A BELGIUM	GAMBIA	Y MALTA	Y SRI LANKA
Y BENIN	Y GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REP.	Y MAURITANIA	Y SUDAN
Y BHUTAN	A GERMANY, FEDERAL REP. OF	MAURITIUS	Y SURINAME
Y BOLIVIA	Y GHANA	Y MEXICO	Y SWAZILAND
Y BOTSWANA	Y GREECE	Y MONGOLIA	Y SWEDEN
Y BRAZIL	Y GRENADA	N MOROCCO	Y SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
Y BULGARIA	N GUATEMALA	Y MOZAMBIQUE	A THAILAND
A BURMA	GUINEA	Y NEPAL	Y TOGO
Y BURUNDI	Y GUINEA-BISSAU	A NETHERLANDS	Y TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
Y BYELORUSSIAN S.S.R.	Y GUYANA	A NEW ZEALAND	A TUNISIA
A CANADA	Y HAITI	Y NICARAGUA	A TURKEY
Y CAPE VERDE	Y HONDURAS	Y NIGER	Y UGANDA
N CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	Y HUNGARY	Y NIGERIA	Y UKRAINIAN S.S.R.
A CHAD	A ICELAND	A NORWAY	Y UNION OF SOVIET SOC. REP.
A CHILE	Y INDIA	Y OMAN	A UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
CHINA	A INDONESIA	Y PAKISTAN	A UNITED KINGDOM
A COLOMBIA	Y IRAN	Y PANAMA	A UNITED REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON
COMOROS	IRAQ	Y PAPUA NEW GUINEA	Y UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
Y CONGO	A IRELAND	A PARAGUAY	A UNITED STATES
Y COSTA RICA	A ISRAEL	Y PERU	Y UPPER VOLTA
Y CUBA	A ITALY	A PHILIPPINES	A URUGUAY
Y CYPRUS	A IVORY COAST	Y POLAND	Y VENEZUELA
Y CZECHOSLOVAKIA	Y JAMAICA	A PORTUGAL	Y VIET NAM
DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA	A JAPAN	A QATAR	A YEMEN
Y DEMOCRATIC YEMEN	A JORDAN	ROMANIA	Y YUGOSLAVIA
A DENMARK	Y KENYA	Y RWANDA	A ZATRE
DJIBOUTI	KUWAIT	Y SAINT LUCIA	Y ZAMBIA

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INFORMATION

CENTRAL REGISTRY
F.A.

FEB 27 10 10 AM '80

INWOODS

IN REPLY
QUOTE

M.A.L 1174

DATE 19 Feb. 1980

REGISTRY
CODE

TO

CANBERRA

REF

TO FILE

FM

ALGIERS

FM. FILE

862/98/1


POST
SEQUENCE
NUMBER

760

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT UNGA 34 - WESTERN SAHARA

We would be grateful if you could send us a copy of the Delegation Report on Fourth Committee Item 18 on the Western Sahara.



(K. Berry)
Second Secretary

Ans. letter
13 March

John Morris (UNP)
has sent me a memo to
Algers advising them that
a copy was sent to them
directly from VNY. A copy is
attached for our own information.
Cca:

John Morris
24882348
UNP

Mr. Doebs
Is this us?
NCL 29/2

RESTRICTED

70

CENTRAL REGISTRY
U.N. F.A.R.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

DATE: 12 February 1980

INFORMATION. FEB 20 10 53 AM '80
PARIS EMBASSY
ALGIERS
UN NEW YORKIN REPLY
QUOTE

M. NA2484

REGISTRY
CODE

TO.

CANBERRA - DFA

REF. M.

TO FILE

FM. NAIROBI

CLASSIFICATION. RESTRICTED

FM. FILE.

235/1

POST
SEQUENCE
NUMBER

1731

SUBJECT: OAU: WESTERN SAHARA

Polisario "Foreign Minister" Hakkim has made his customary appearance at the OAU, lobbying delegates to gain support for the Democratic Arab Republic of the Sahara (SADR). There were some indications that he was hopeful of having the matter raised at the Ministerial Council; however, we were told unequivocally by Dr Onu (Assistant Secretary-General, Political and Declaration) that the matter is now with the Summit and could be passed back down to Ministers.

2. We were told by a member of the Moroccan delegation in Addis that Polisario had sought to be heard by the Liberation Committee at its meeting in Dar Es Salaam from 21 to 25 January, or at least to have the subject discussed. The matter was reportedly ruled out of order since the Heads of State have taken over the responsibility for the question of the Western Sahara. We have noted that the report of the Dar meeting makes no reference whatever to the Western Sahara suggesting that this information, which comes from a rather non-detached source, is at least partly correct.

3. At a press conference on 8 February, Hakkim gave a typically flowery speech reviewing the "developments" in the struggle. He described the U.N. resolution on the Sahara as a "clear international demonstration of solidarity with the legitimacy of the struggle of the Sahraoui people" and an affirmation that Polisario is the representative of the Sahraoui people. He dwelt at length on the "dangerous internationalisation" of the war caused by the U.S. "intervention". He claimed that 20 African countries now recognise the SADR (35 in all the world) and that it will only be a short time before the additional five needed to make a majority in the OAU are obtained. It will then be possible for the SADR to be voted a member government of the OAU.


RESTRICTED

Mr. Morris

4. Hakkim, in his claims regarding international support, appears not to be concerned with distinguishing between those countries which support Polisario as a liberation movement and those which recognise the SADR. We understand from the Spanish Embassy in Addis Ababa, which has been following the issue more closely than most, that several of the 20 have either not made clear which it is they support (by making such general phrases as "we support the just struggle of the Sahraoui people") or have referred only to Polisario. Even among these which ostensibly support the SADR we suspect there may be some who would think again before extending their recognition to the stage of voting to admit to full government status in the OAU what is at best a government-in-exile. To do so could set a precedent which may in the future affect other African countries with sections of their territory held by secessionists or opponents pledged to the takeover of the entire country.

...

5. Attached is a list, obtained from the OAU, of those African countries which have declared their support for the SADR and/or Polisario.


(Peter Zoller)
First Secretary

LIST OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES RECOGNISING SADR/FOLISARIO

ALGERIA	LESOTHO
ANGOLA	MADAGASCAR
BENIN	MOZAMBIQUE
BURUNDI	RWANDA
CONGO	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
CAPE VERDE	SEYCHELLES
EQUITORIAL GUINEA	TANZANIA
ETHIOPIA	TOGO
GHANA	UGANDA
GUINEA-BISSAU	ZAMBIA

COUNTRIES BELIEVED TO BE CONSIDERING RECOGNITION

LIBYA
MAURITANIA
SUDAN

935/28/2
27

INWARD CABLEGRAM

0.PA73413 ACHO
TOR 0728 09.02.80

0.PA73413 2000 8.2.80 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/1527RP.
RR GENEVA/1672 ALGIERS/543 UN NEW YORK/913

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 226/3/7 REF 0.GE42114

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CHR 36 : ITEM 9 WESTERN SAHARA

WE HOPE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO GIVE MOROCCO SOME UNOSTENTATIOUS SUPPORT, IN RELATION AT LEAST TO THE PROCEDURAL ISSUE.

2. YOU WILL RECALL THAT THE MOROCCANS WERE UPSET BY OUR SUPPORT FOR THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION AT UNGA 34 AND AGUED, WITH SOME VALIDITY WE FEEL, THAT WE MIGHT AT LEAST HAVE ABSTAINED. ABSTENTION ON THE SUBSTANTIVE RESOLUTIONS, DEPENDING ON THEIR TERMS, MAY ALSO MERIT CONSIDERATION. WE ARE UNAWARE OF ANY GROUNDS FOR BELIEVING THAT SIGNIFICANT VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS OCCUR IN THE WESTERN SAHARA. MOROCCO'S RECORD IS NO WORSE, AND POSSIBLY BETTER, THAN THAT OF ITS NEIGHBOURS. THE ONLY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN IN RELATION TO A FEW POLITICAL PRISONERS IN MOROCCO. IT IS ALSO RELEVANT THAT THE MOROCCANS HAVE PROVIDED SOME HELP TO WESTERN INTERESTS IN RECENT TIMES.

3. THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS TOLD US THAT THEY PROPOSE TO ABSTAIN ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION UNDER ITEM 12 AND WILL PROBABLY ALSO ABSTAIN ON THE PROCEDURAL MOTION, ALTHOUGH THEIR POSITION ON THIS HAS NOT BEEN FINALLY DECIDED. HE COMMENTED THAT THEIR VOTING INTENTIONS WERE CONSISTENT WITH THEIR POSITION OF NEUTRALITY IN THE WESTERN SAHARA DISPUTE.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
DEP ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

M. Morris
10/2

M. Shulman
Please let me see
draft responses on this
topic

LMA
10/2

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.PA73413

ACTION: IO OGAC
DDO

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	STE
PA	LA	FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	FAS(WES)	
ANZ	EUR	AME	FAS(DEF)	DP	DC
FAS(ECO)		FAS(LT)	GLT	IL	FAS(MFS)
FAREP-M		FAREP-P	FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB	
FAS(BP)		FAS(PTO)	PDC	IOL	

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

93572872

INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.UN17047 JCNI
TOR 0434 04.01.80

O.UN17047 1130 3.1.80 UNC

TO.
RR CANBERRA/6327RP.
RR PARIS EMB/748 ALGIERS/86

FM. UN NEW YORK / FILE 609/28

U N C L A S S I F I E D

SAHARA

ON 31 DECEMBER THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF MAURITANIA WROTE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL REFERRING TO A COMPLAINT HE HAD SENT TO THE LATTER ON 5 DECEMBER CONCERNING THE PRESENCE OF MOROCCAN FORCES "WITHIN MAURITANIA'S INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED FRONTIERS" AND STATING THAT THE MOROCCAN CONTINGENT "HAS NOW COMPLETELY WITHDRAWN FROM OUR COUNTRY". THE LETTER CONTINUES :

"MY GOVERNMENT WELCOMES THIS HAPPY OUTCOME, SECURED THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL AND PARTICULARLY THOSE OF FRIENDLY COUNTRIES. WE TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION AND THANKS TO THEM.

BY THIS WITHDRAWAL THE KINGDOM OF MOROCCO IS RESPONDING IN A POSITIVE MANNER TO OUR FREQUENTLY REITERATED DETERMINATION TO LIVE IN PEACE, FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION WITH ALL OUR NEIGHBOURS. BY ITS ACTION MOROCCO IS ALSO RESPECTING OUR WISH TO OBSERVE STRICT NEUTRALITY IN THE CONFLICT BESETTING THE REGION.

I WOULD REQUEST THAT YOU ARRANGE FOR THE TEXT OF MY LETTER OF 5 DECEMBER AND THE PRESENT LETTER TO BE ISSUED AS A SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT."

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.UN17047

ACTION: AME

JAE

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	FAS(SEP)
FAS(NSA)	FAS(WES)	ANZ	EUR	FAS(DEF)	
DP	DC	FAS(NUC)	FAS(IOC)	IO	
FAS(PCR)	INF	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)	
FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB		

9357812



UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

S/13718
31 December 1979
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 31 DECEMBER 1979 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF MAURITANIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On 5 December 1979, on instructions from my Government, I sent you a complaint concerning the presence of Moroccan forces within Mauritania's internationally recognized frontiers despite the many and insistent requests made to the Moroccan authorities with a view to securing the withdrawal of those forces. In that letter my Government, in a spirit of conciliation and appeasement, indicated that for the time being it would not press its request for an urgent meeting of the Security Council and was leaving it to that body to find the most appropriate ways and means of settling the crisis.

I am happy to be able to inform you today that the Moroccan contingent has now completely withdrawn from our country.

My Government welcomes this happy outcome, secured through the efforts of all the members of the Council and particularly those of friendly countries. We take this opportunity to express our appreciation and thanks to them.

By this withdrawal the Kingdom of Morocco is responding in a positive manner to our frequently reiterated determination to live in peace, friendship and co-operation with all our neighbours. By its action Morocco is also respecting our wish to observe strict neutrality in the conflict besetting the region.

I would request that you arrange for the text of my letter of 5 December and the present letter to be issued as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Sid'Ahmed Ould TAYA
Permanent Representative

I acknowledge receipt of your message stating your intention to evacuate as quickly as possible the Moroccan contingent stationed at Bir-Magaria, whose repatriation has been repeatedly requested by us since 11 August 1979. I am giving instructions to the national armed forces to facilitate its repatriation and, if necessary, to withdraw the Moroccan detachment to the frontier of our national territory. We do not deem it appropriate to send a delegation to Morocco to deal with this problem. We attach particular importance to the departure of the Moroccan contingent from Bir-Magaria as soon as possible, since its

PS

Letter dated 5 December 1979 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritania to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Re: Complaint concerning the presence of a contingent of the Moroccan Army in Mauritania

I have the honour, on the instructions of my Government, to inform you of the following:

After numerous urgent representations by the Mauritanian authorities and despite the repeated promises of the Moroccan authorities, the Kingdom of Morocco is maintaining a contingent of its army at Bir-Mogrein in the north of our country, inside our internationally recognized frontiers.

To facilitate a better understanding of the situation, I should like briefly to sum up the history of this question.

At the time when Mauritania and Morocco were at war in the Sahara, the two countries signed a defence agreement. That agreement made provision for the dispatch of Moroccan troops to defend certain vital centres, such as Atar-Akjoujt, Noudhibou, Zouerat and Bir-Mogrein.

These troops thus remained in Mauritania until the agreement of 5 August between my country and POLISARIO was signed (the text of this agreement was distributed as Security Council document S/13503 of 20 August 1979). Following the signing of that agreement, the Military Committee of National Salvation decided at its meeting of 22-23 August 1979 to denounce all defence agreements with Morocco. At the same time Morocco declared, through its most authoritative spokesmen, its willingness to withdraw its troops from the national territory as soon as possible - and did so, with the exception of the contingent stationed at Bir-Mogrein. The most recent of the many urgent representations to which I referred earlier was that made by the Mauritanian Prime Minister, Lieutenant-Colonel Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidallah, to his Moroccan counterpart on 24 November 1979.

I quote:

"I acknowledge receipt of your message stating your intention to evacuate as quickly as possible the Moroccan contingent stationed at Bir-Mogrein, whose repatriation has been repeatedly requested by us since 11 August 1979. I am giving instructions to the national armed forces to facilitate its repatriation and, if necessary, to escort the Moroccan detachment to the frontier of our national territory. We do not deem it appropriate to send a delegation to Morocco to deal with this problem. We attach particular importance to the departure of the Moroccan contingent from Bir-Mogrein as soon as possible, since its

presence there at this time constitutes an infringement of our national sovereignty and could jeopardize the good relations that we wish to maintain with Morocco."

We have also had recourse to mediation by friendly and neighbouring countries, but to no avail.

Accordingly, it is only after having unsuccessfully explored every possible means of settling this question amicably that my Government has decided to submit a complaint to the Security Council.

For the time being my Government, being anxious to settle matters peaceably, is not asking for an urgent meeting of the Security Council. In submitting this complaint to the Council we are leaving it to that body to find the most appropriate ways and means of settling this crisis. My country does, however, reserve the right to request at a later date the convening of the Council as a matter of urgency if the circumstances so require.

(Signed) Sid'Ahmed Ould TAYA

Permanent Representative

RE.40A

RESTRICTED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

FILE COPY

DATE. 17 December 79

INFORMATION.

DOCUMENT
REFERENCE

MOH058969

REGISTRY
CODEPARIS EMB
UN NEW YORK
NAIROBI

TO.

LAGOS

REF.

M
XX O.LG6596

TO FILE.

FM.

CANBERRA

FM. FILE.

935/28/2

CLASSIFICATION.

RESTRICTED

SUBJECT.

WESTERN SAHARA

Thank you for your useful reporting on the Nigerian attitude to the Western Sahara dispute contained in O.LG6596.

2. Please ensure that you repeat future cables on this subject to UN New York, Nairobi and Paris Embassy - in addition to Madrid, Algiers, Accra and such other posts as you think would want to see a particular message on Western Sahara.

For UN New York, Paris Emb., Nairobi

.... 3. Attached is a copy of O.LG6596.

Paul Smith

(Paul Smith)
UN Political Section

RESTRICTED

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

93572812

O.LG6596 BOMA
TOR 0315 15.12.79

O.LG6596 1030 13.12.79 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/5669

RP.
RR ACCRA/324 ALGIERS/16 CAIRO/22
RR DAR ES SALAAM/179 MADRID/12 WASHINGTON/103
FM. LAGOS / FILE 221/5/45 REF O.LG65435

RESTRICTE D

NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY : WESTERN SAHARA

IT IS APPROPRIATE THAT SHAGARI'S FIRST FOREIGN VISIT AS PRESIDENT WAS TO MONROVIA, THE CURRENT OAU CAPITAL, FOR A MEETING OF AFRICANS TO SEEK A SOLUTION TO AN AFRICAN PROBLEM. IT STANDS AS A SIGN OF THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO AFRICA AND OF CONTINUITY IN NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY. PRESS COMMENT ON IT HAS BEEN FAVOURABLE.

2. BEING REPRESENTED ON THE OAU AD HOC COMMITTEE ON WESTERN SAHARA, AND OF DECLARED IMPARTIALITY, NIGERIA HAS TENDED TO MAKE ONLY MUTED CRITICISM OF MOROCCO AND HAS SOUGHT TO MAINTAIN AMICABLE RELATIONS WITH ALL PARTIES (ON 2 OCTOBER SHAGARI SENT 'FRATERNAL GREETINGS' TO HASSAN, WHO HAD SENT HIM A SPECIAL MESSAGE).

3. SHAGARI'S ADDRESS TO THE CLOSING SESSION OF THE MONROVIA MEETING ON 5 DECEMBER LARGELY ECHOED THE OPENING REMARKS OF PRESIDENT TOLBERT AND THE COMMITTEE'S CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE BETWEEN MOROCCO AND POLISARIO, A MOROCCAN WITHDRAWAL, AN OAU PEACE-KEEPING FORCE TO MAINTAIN THE CEASEFIRE AND A REFERENDUM ORGANISED BY THE OAU OR THE UN. HE SAID THAT THE PRESENCE OF ANY TROOPS OUTSIDE THE SPHERE OF THE OAU WAS INIMICAL TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MAGREB SUB-REGION AND A HANDICAP TO THE COMMITTEE'S EFFORTS, AND HE APPEALED TO ALL PARTIES TO AVOID ACTION THAT COULD LEGITIMATIZE THE PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN POWERS IN THIS AFRICAN PROBLEM. HE EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE ABSENCE OF GUINEA AND MOROCCO BUT REFERRED FAVOURABLY TO THE DELEGATIONS OF POLISARIO, ALGERIA AND MAURITANIA. APPARENTLY WITH OFFICIAL PROMPTING, HIS MISSION WAS DESCRIBED IN THE PRESS AS A 'HUGE SUCCESS', ALTHOUGH SHAGARI ADMITTED THAT BECAUSE OF MOROCCO'S POSITION THERE COULD BE NO IMMEDIATE PEACE AND HE EXPRESSED REGRET THAT POLISARIO DID NOT APPEAR TOO ANXIOUS TO ACCEPT THE CEASEFIRE CALL. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE COMMITTEE WOULD MEET AGAIN SOON AFTER IT HAD SENT A SPECIAL DELEGATION TO MOROCCO.

4. WE SOUGHT COMMENT FROM FAFOWORA (DEPUTY DIRECTOR, AFRICA

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.LG6596

DEPARTMENT) WHO AGREED THAT THE MISSION WAS HARDLY A HUGE SUCCESS, AND CONSIDERED THAT SHAGARI WOULD HAVE DONE BETTER TO AVOID IT. ASKED WHETHER THE NON-OAU TROOPS MENTIONED BY SHAGARI WERE CUBANS SAID TO BE IN THE TERRITORY, FAFOWORA SAID THAT THE FRENCH WERE ALSO INVOLVED. HE WENT ON TO CRITICISE THE AMERICAN AND EGYPTIAN ARMS SUPPLIES TO MOROCCO. 5. ON EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT IN GENERAL, NIGERIA'S POSITION SHOWS NO CHANGE FROM OIASANJO'S STATEMENT AT THE KHARTOUM OAU SUMMIT THAT SOVIET-CUBAN ASSISTANCE WAS APPRECIATED BUT THAT THEY SHOULD NOT OVERSTAY THEIR WELCOME. IN THIS CASE THE CUBANS ARE NOT WELCOME, EVIDENTLY BECAUSE IT IS STILL HOPED TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM WITHOUT THEIR ASSISTANCE (AS WAS NOT POSSIBLE IN THE CASE OF ANGOLA). FAFOWORA ALSO COMMENTED REASONABLY THAT OBASANJO'S GENERALISATION THAT WESTERN ACTION PROVIDED THE CONDITIONS FOR SOVIET-CUBAN INVOLVEMENT COULD BE APPLIED TO WESTERN SAHARA.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

ACTION: AME JBAF
DDO

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	FAS(SEP)
FAS(NSA)	FAS(WES)	EUR	FAS(DEF)	DP	
DC	FAS(NUC)	FAS(IOC)	IO	FAS(PCR)	
INF	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M	
FAREP-P	FAREP-S				

JEDDAH LONDON MOSCOW NAIROBI PARIS EMB PRETORIA

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

0.PA71689 DBKE
TOR 1155 11.12.79

0.PA71689 1910 10.12.79 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/092RP.
RR ALGIERS/532 UN NEW YORK/875 WASHINGTON/1576
RR NAIROBI/151
BB CAIRO/83 JEDDAH/41

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 226/3/7

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

WESTERN SAHARA

WHEN JONES SAW HALIM (HEAD, AFRICA AND ASIA DIVISION, MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTRY) IN RABAT ON 6 DECEMBER, HALIM SAID THAT HE WISHED TO EXPRESS MOROCCO'S DISAPPOINTMENT AT AUSTRALIA'S VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION ON WESTERN SAHARA AT UNGA. MOROCCO THOUGHT THAT AUSTRALIA MIGHT HAVE AT LEAST TAKEN A "FAIR" POSITION AND ABSTAINED.

2. JONES EXPLAINED THAT OUR POSITION WAS BASED ON OUR DESIRE TO SEE BOTH SIDES SEEK A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND ON OUR SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION. HALIM RESPONDED THAT MOROCCO, TOO, WAS IN FAVOUR OF SELF-DETERMINATION BUT THERE HAD BEEN MUCH MORE IN THE RESOLUTION THAN A SIMPLE RE-AFFIRMATION OF THIS PRINCIPLE. MOROCCO, HE SAID, NOTED WITH SOME BITTERNESS THAT AUSTRALIA HAD NONETHELESS VOTED IN FAVOUR WHILE THE UNITED STATES AND A NUMBER OF MAJOR WESTERN COUNTRIES, WHICH WERE ALSO IN FAVOUR OF SELF-DETERMINATION, HAD AVOIDED THE "TRAP" SET BY THE RESOLUTION.

3. HALIM THEN WENT ON TO EXPLAIN MOROCCO'S REFUSAL TO ATTEND THE MONROVIA MEETING WITH THE OAU "COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN". THE REASONS WERE -

*typical
moroccan
suspicion
causes*

- KING HASSAN'S PRIOR PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING OF THE HEADS OF ALL THE STATES SURROUNDING THE WESTERN SAHARA WAS STILL OUTSTANDING AND MOROCCO FELT THAT SUCH AN APPROACH OFFERED THE BEST CHANCE OF FINDING A SOLUTION:
- TWO OF THE COMMITTEE, TANZANIA AND MALI, WERE ALREADY COMMITTED TO SUPPORT FOR THE POLISARIO - IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO BE BOTH A PARTY AND AN ARBITER:
- MOROCCO HAD SAID ALL ALONG THAT IT WOULD NOT DEAL WITH THE POLISARIO, YET THE POLISARIO HAD BEEN INVITED.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM 2-O.PA71689

4. THE MEETING, HALIM SAID, WOULD PROBABLY PRODUCE SOME STATEMENT OR RESOLUTION BUT THIS WOULD HAVE NO SIGNIFICANCE - MANY SUCH STATEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE IN THE PAST BUT THEY WERE IRRELEVANT IF THEY WERE NOT BASED UPON A REALISTIC FOUNDATION. MOROCCO WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE ON AN INTERNATIONAL PLANE UNTIL THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY FOR AN IMPARTIAL CONSIDERATION WERE ASSEMBLED.

5. HALIM UNDERLINED THE UNITY OF PURPOSE OF THE MOROCCAN PEOPLE ABOUT THE WESTERN SAHARA AND EMPHASISED THAT THIS WAS A GENUINE EXPRESSION OF POPULAR WILL - MOROCCO, HE ARGUED, WAS AN OPEN SOCIETY, NOT A POLICE STATE OR A MILITARY DICTATORSHIP, AND THERE WERE PLENTY OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR DIFFERING OPINIONS TO MANIFEST THEMSELVES.

6. OTHER POINTS OF INTEREST ARISING DURING JONES' VISIT IN RELATION TO WESTERN SAHARA WERE -

- TEMPORARILY AT LEAST, THE MILITARY SITUATION IS BELIEVED TO BE TURNING IN THE MOROCCANS' FAVOUR. THE MOROCCANS' CONCENTRATION INTO FEWER AND LARGER GARRISONS, WITH THE CONSEQUENT QNCREASE IN THE SCALE OF ENGAGEMENTS AND THE POSSIBILITIES SO OFFERED FOR THE USE OF AIR POWER HAS FAVOURED THEM. THEIR FREE-RANGING UHUD OPERATION HAS BEEN OF SYMBOLIC SIGNIFICANCE AND HAS PERHAPS PUT THE POLISARIO ON THE DEFENSIVE IN SOME PLACES. THE MOROCCANS ARE SPEAKING OF PUTTING TWO MORE UNITS INTO THE FIELD TO CARRY OUT SIMILAR OPERATIONS.

- THE UNITED STATES' ARMS DELIVERIES - IF APPROVED BY CONGRESS - WILL HAVE ESSENTIALLY PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE AND ARE NOT EXPECTED TO MAKE A MAJOR DIFFERENCE TO THE FIGHTING WITH THE POLISARIO. THE DECISION TO APPROVE THE SALES WAS INTENDED AS A SIGN OF UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR THE KING AND TO STRENGTHEN HIS POSITION IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS. ZSD TO HAVE CONGRESS LOOKING OVER HIS SHOULDER MAY ALSO BRING SOME PRESSURE UPON THE KING TO PUT UP A BETTER SHOWING IN INTERNATIONAL HANDLING OF THE WESTERN SAHARA ISSUE.

- THE RECENTLY-APPEARED PRO-MOROCCAN AOSARIO GUERILLA MOVEMENT IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED BY FOREIGN OBSERVERS IN MOROCCO TO BE LITTLE MORE THAN A PUBLIC RELATIONS INVENTION. IT APPEARS THAT AT LEAST TWO OF THE THREE CLAIMED AOSARIO ATTACKS DID NOT IN FACT TAKE PLACE.

- THE MOROCCANS SEEM TO BE ADOPTING A FAIRLY GENTLE APPROACH TOWARDS ALGERIA: THEIR CRITICISM OF THE ALGERIANS IS MUTED AND REFERENCES TO ''OUR ALGERIAN BROTHERS'' ARE FREQUENT. THIS IS APPARENTLY DESIGNED TO AVOID MAKING IT ANY MORE DIFFICULT FOR CHADLI TO MOVE IN DUE COURSE TOWARDS SOME KIND OF COMPROMISE

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

3-0.PA71689

INWARD CABLEGRAM

WITH THE MOROCCANS (BUT HE IS NOT EXPECTED TO BE ABLE TO MOVE AT ALL QUICKLY). THERE ARE ALSO RUMOURS IN MOROCCO OF POSSIBLE TENSIONS BETWEEN POLISARIO AND THE ALGERIANS - THE ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF LIBYA WITH THE POLISARIO IS SAID TO BE A MATTER OF CONCERN FOR THE ALGERIANS. IN TUNING DIFFERENTLY THEIR REFERENCES TO THE ALGERIANS AND TO THE POLISARIO, THE MOROCCANS SEEM TO BE HOPING TO AGGRAVATE ANY DIFFERENCES. (SEE ALSO MPA 3112, PARA 8).

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
 FOREIGN MINISTER
 MIN+DEP DEFENCE
 DEP P M AND CABINET
 ONA
 JIO

ACTION: AME JBAE
 IO OGBAAAAA

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	FAS (SEP)
FAS (NSA)	FAS (WES)	EUR	FAS (DEF)		DP
DC	FAS (NUC)	FAS (IOC)	FAS (PCR)		INF
FAS (ECO)	FAS (LT)	IL	FAS (MFS)		FAREP-M
FAREP-P	FAREP-S				

ACCRA LAGOS LONDON MADRID TRIPOLI

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UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY



Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/34/37
4 December 1979

Thirty-fourth session

Agenda item 18

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

On the report of the Fourth Committee (A/34/638/Add.1) /

34/37. Question of Western Sahara

The General Assembly,

Having considered in depth the question of Western Sahara,

Recalling the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Having considered the relevant chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1/

Having heard the statements made on the subject of Western Sahara, including the statement of the representative of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro, 2/

Bearing in mind the profound concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries regarding the decolonization of Western Sahara and the right of the people of that Territory to self-determination,

Recalling its resolution 33/27 of 1 December 1978 on co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity,

1/ A/34/23/Add.3, chap. X.

2/ A/C.4/34/SR.14, paras. 50-59, and A/C.4/34/SR.15, paras. 3-17. For the full text of the statement, see A/C.4/34/L.4.

Taking note of the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its sixteenth ordinary session, held at Monrovia from 17 to 20 July 1979, 3/ by which the Assembly adopted the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Organization of African Unity on the question of Western Sahara,

Also taking note of the peace agreement concluded at Algiers on 10 August 1979 between Mauritania and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro 4/ and the decision of Mauritania to withdraw its forces from Western Sahara, 5/

Aware of the profound concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries at the aggravation of the situation prevailing in Western Sahara because of the continuation and extension of the occupation of that Territory,

Recalling the part of the Political Declaration adopted by the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana from 3 to 9 September 1979, relating to Western Sahara, 6/

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the charter of the Organization of African Unity and the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of that right, as envisaged in the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity;

2. Takes note with satisfaction of the decision concerning Western Sahara taken by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its sixteenth ordinary session; 3/

3. Also takes note with satisfaction of the part of the Political Declaration adopted by the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries relating to Western Sahara;

4. Welcomes the peace agreement concluded between Mauritania and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro and considers that this agreement constitutes an important contribution to the process of achieving peace and a definitive, just and lasting settlement of the question of Western Sahara;

3/ A/34/552, annex II, decision AHG/Dec.114 (XVI).

4/ A/34/427-S/13503, annex I. For the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fourth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1979.

5/ A/34/427-S/13503, annex II. For the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fourth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1979.

6/ A/34/542, annex, sect. I, paras. 96-98.

5. Deeply deplores the aggravation of the situation resulting from the continued occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco and the extension of that occupation to the territory recently evacuated by Mauritania;

6. Urges Morocco to join in the peace process and to terminate the occupation of the Territory of Western Sahara;

7. Recommends to that end that the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro, the representative of the people of Western Sahara, should participate fully in any search for a just, lasting and definitive political solution of the question of Western Sahara, in accordance with the resolutions and declarations of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries;

8. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to continue to consider the situation in Western Sahara as a priority question and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;

9. Requests the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity to keep the Secretary-General of the United Nations informed of the progress achieved with regard to the implementation of the decisions of the Organization of African Unity concerning Western Sahara;

10. Invites the Secretary-General to follow closely the situation in Western Sahara and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

75th plenary meeting
21 November 1979

→ ~~ME~~ - we should copy Reserv file → 1. ~~DETA~~ - to see please
U.Y. 6.1.2 2. R/S UNPOL - for filing. 55

DATE. 4.12.79

INFORMATION.

NAIROBI,
LAGOS,
ACCRA
ALGIERS
MADRID
PARIS EMB.

DOCUMENT REFERENCE

MCH057726

REGISTRY CODE

TO.

LONDON

REF.

M LH5632

TO FILE.

840/98/1
840/13/1

FM.

CANBERRA

FM. FILE.

935/28/2

CLASSIFICATION.

RESTRICTED

SUBJECT.

WESTERN SAHARA

We attach for Paris a copy of London's M.LH5632 and its attachments (including a copy of a letter from the Moroccan Embassy in London, asking that Australia not support at UNGA 34 an Algerian draft resolution on the Western Sahara).

2. The Fourth Committee on 2 November adopted the Algerian draft resolution by 83 votes in favour (including Australia) - 5 against (Gabon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Zaire, Guatemala) - 43 abstentions. Of the Western Group, Austria, Finland, Greece, and Sweden also voted in favour.

3. In Plenary, the pattern was much the same: 85(Australia) - 6 - 41. Of the previous "no" votes, Zaire moved to abstain. The Central African Republic and Equatorial Guinea voted against; the CAR had actually voted in favour in the Fourth Committee and Equatorial Guinea had not voted at all.

4. The Guatemalan vote against doubtless reflects Guatemala's position towards Belize.

5. The draft resolution contained stronger language than the Algerian resolution did in 1978 at UNGA 33. For example, actions by Morocco were "deeply deplored"; this was the first time that Morocco had been adversely named in a U.N. resolution on Western Sahara.

6. That ^{the} Moroccans did not this year put forward a draft resolution of their own reflected Morocco's presently isolated diplomatic position on the Western Sahara, notably the fact that the OAU at its 1979 Annual Summit called for an act of self-determination in which the Western Sahara would have a choice between total independence or maintenance of the status quo. The OAU had previously been unwilling to go so far towards the Algerian position, largely due to Moroccan pressure and the OAU's concern to try to avoid a confrontation with Morocco.

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2.

7. The OAU Secretariat in Addis Ababa has told us that the OAU welcomed the Australian vote and that our vote had accorded with the OAU's assessment of the situation in Western Sahara.

8. The Australian delegation explained its vote at the Fourth Committee stage as being based on our long-standing support for self-determination in the Western Sahara. We expressed the hope that the conflict would be solved by peaceful negotiations and we urged all parties to pursue that course. We included a reservation about the paragraph which "deeply deplores" Morocco, saying that we hoped it would not prejudice successful negotiations.

P

(Paul Smith)
UN Political Section

RESTRICTED

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION, LONDON

CENTRAL - 53

D.P.

DATE 21 November 1979

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INFORMATION.

IN REPLY
QUOTE

M. LH5632

REGISTRY
CODE

NOV 27

11/11/79

TO. CANBERRA : FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARDS

REDSM.

TO FILE.

935128/2

FM. LONDON

CLASSIFICATION.

FM. FILE. 840/98/1
840/13/1POST
SEQUENCE
NUMBER

4702

SUBJECT.

SAHARAN QUESTION

.... Attached is a copy of a letter of 7 November from the Moroccan Ambassador to the High Commissioner referring to the UNGA draft resolution on the Saharan question. A copy of the High Commissioner's reply is also attached.

Curtin(M.S.G. Curtin)
Minister

Saharan
1 copy of all this please
Paul.
4/12

J
ENCLOSURES ATTACHED*USP.**Mr Smith*

52
EMBASSY OF
THE KINGDOM OF MOROCCO
LONDON

سفارة
الملكية المغربية
لondon

Ref : 2069

London, 7th November 1979

Mr Brulley

As Your Excellency is well aware, tension has been building up in the region of North West Africa. A number of good-will states have offered mediation in a bid to avert a direct confrontation between Morocco and Algeria over the Sahara question but so far no conclusive result could be achieved because of Algeria's intransigence.

Nevertheless the hope has not been abandoned to reach a peaceful solution through dialogue and within the African framework. Thus, fresh conciliatory attempts are presently being made by such African Leaders as President William Tolbert of Liberia and President Nimeiry of Sudan.

However Algeria has just sponsored a draft solution which will be put to the vote at the current session of the United Nations General Assembly on 9th November. The strongly-worded text calls for the withdrawal of Morocco from its Saharan provinces and the support of armed struggle against the Moroccan presence in its legitimate land.

Such a resolution poses, in our view, more problems than it claims to solve because:

- it bestows international dimensions on a problem which is essentially african.
- it impedes the efforts being made by good-will African Heads of State to bring the leaders of Morocco and Algeria around a negotiating table.
- It ignores the legitimate rights of Morocco as established historically and legally.
- By labelling the Moroccan recovery of its territory as "occupation" and by supporting armed struggle against Morocco it leaves no room for negotiation. In fact it prejudgets the outcome of the proposed dialogue since it clearly endorses the view of one side, and precludes the legitimate claim of the other side, a claim based on the principle of territorial integrity.

Rol

*For info of reply
& any necessary action*


.../...

- Finally the Algerian-sponsored draft-resolution bears all the seeds of an extended conflict with the inevitable threat of foreign intervention and widespread violence.

In view of the above and in the hope that the present peace efforts will not be jeopardised and that African blood will not be allowed to be spilled again, the Government of Morocco will be deeply grateful to the Government of Australia, if they agreed to withhold any support for this draft-resolution and I call upon Your Excellency to kindly give your urgent attention to this appeal as the vote is scheduled to take place on November 9th.

May I renew to Your Excellency, the expression of my highest consideration.

Yours very sincerely



His Excellency, the Hon. Sir Gordon Freeth, KBE
High Commissioner for Australia
in London

The Hon. Sir Gordon Freeth, KBE

19 November, 1979.

I am writing to thank you for your letter of 7 November 1979 on the subject of this year's United Nations General Assembly on the Sahara question.

I wish to thank Your Excellency for going to the trouble of setting out the considerations which your Government believes important in relation to the United Nations debate. The vote of course took place on 9 November, but I have nevertheless conveyed your letter to my Government.

(Gordon Freeth)

His Excellency Mr Badreddine Senoussi,
Ambassador,
Embassy of The Kingdom of Morocco,
49 Queen's Gate Gardens,
LONDON, S.W.7

*Mr Denton, Political
for further action.*

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UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



Distr.
GENERAL

A/34/717
23 November 1979
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

Thirty-fourth session
Agenda item 18

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

Letter dated 21 November 1979 from the Permanent Representative of
Madagascar to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a telegram, dated 19 November 1979, addressed to you by His Excellency the President of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar.

I would be grateful if you could arrange for it to be circulated to Member States as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 18.

1. Firstly, we cannot fail to mention that the United States action comes at a time when the heads of State of OAU and of the non-aligned movement, and the General Assembly of the United Nations, have just adopted a position on the question of Western Sahara, recalling once again that what is involved is a problem of decolonization, the only solution of which is self-determination for the Saharan people - a solution for which the POLISARIO Front has been working since its establishment.

2. In view of this disturbing situation and its foreseeable consequences, it seems to us urgent and important that you should call on the States Members of the United Nations to combine their efforts with a view to preventing the United States from taking such a decision and inducing it to rethink its position on the problem of the Sahara and on the decolonization of Africa in general; for it is difficult to see how, on the one hand, the United States Government can make an additional sale of modern weapons to Morocco after the General Assembly of the United Nations has taken a position on the question of the Sahara while, on the other hand, the same Government asserts that, along with the rest of the international community, the United States does not recognize Morocco's claims to sovereignty over Western Sahara.

✓PS

UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
TELEGRAM
19 NOVEMBER 1970
To: SECRETARY-GENERAL
From: PRESIDENT OF THE
Democratic Republic of Madagascar

1. We have just received from the United States Government an aide-mémoire setting out the reasons which impel the United States to increase considerably the offensive military potential of Morocco through deliveries of sophisticated weapons. Respect for the right of peoples and the future of peace in Africa make it a duty for me to inform you of our serious concern at this action.

2. In our view, the United States initiative is designed, in the first place, to perpetuate the occupation of the territory of the Democratic Saharan Arab Republic by Morocco, thus implicitly acknowledging the successes of the heroic armed resistance of the Saharan people against all who seek to flout its right to self-determination. The unjustifiable increase in American military aid is also detrimental to peace and justice in the region because, in addition to impeding one of the last processes of decolonization in Africa, this delivery of arms, perhaps accompanied by "advisers", seems to us likely to cause an internationalization of the conflict, which Morocco would clearly like to extend to its neighbours, particularly Algeria, which to our knowledge has no territorial claim on the Sahara and has never threatened the Kingdom of Morocco. The bellicose impulses of the Moroccan leaders and their repeatedly expressed expansionist tendencies could not receive better encouragement.

3. Lastly, we cannot fail to mention that the United States action comes at a time when the Heads of State of OAU and of the non-aligned movement, and the General Assembly of the United Nations, have just adopted a clear and appropriate position on the question of Western Sahara, recalling once again that what is involved is a problem of decolonization, the only solution of which is self-determination for the Saharan people - a solution for which the POLISARIO Front has been working since its establishment.

4. In view of this disturbing situation and its foreseeable consequences, it seems to us urgent and important that you should call on the States Members of the United Nations to combine their efforts with a view to preventing the United States from taking such a decision and inducing it to rethink its position on the problem of the Sahara and on the decolonization of Africa in general; for it is difficult to see how, on the one hand, the United States Government can make an additional sale of modern weapons to Morocco after the General Assembly of the United Nations has taken a position on the question of the Sahara while, on the other hand, the same Government asserts that, along with the rest of the international community, the United States does not recognize Morocco's claims to sovereignty over Western Sahara.

/...

5. Knowing your unfailing respect for the right of self-determination of peoples, and appreciating your untiring efforts for peace, we are sure that you will give your best attention to the concerns we have expressed in this telegram.

General

Below is the signature of the President of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar (Signed) Didier RATSIRAKA President of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar

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Below is the signature of the President of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar (Signed) Didier RATSIRAKA President of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar

CONFIDENTIAL

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27 November 1979

I wonder may I raise privately a problem of two occasions in the Fourth Committee where we seem to have departed from the texts of explanations of vote supplied from Canberra.

The first occasion was the explanation concerning Western Sahara, which made it necessary for us to send a telegram and for the Delegation to seek and obtain an alteration to the summary record of the meeting.

The second, more serious because it involved a departure from a complete text approved by the Minister, concerned East Timor. The text of the approved explanation was in O.CH854411 but the text actually delivered on 2 November contained two important changes.

One of the changes introduced a factual inaccuracy - the addition of a sentence about the announcement of a further \$333,000 for Red Cross relief in East Timor. In fact, that sum had already been included in the total of \$1.9 million referred to in the statement sent to the Delegation, but it might reasonably have been inferred by an outside observer that the explanation of vote spoke of an actual total of over \$2.2 million.

The other change made was to the last sentence of the explanation. The words chosen and cabled were selected carefully and, although the effect of the change might not readily be apparent, we would much have preferred our original, stronger formulation. In any case, the problem is that the changes represented alterations to a text approved by the Minister.

I appreciate the pressures on everybody at this stage of the Assembly, but I would be grateful if you could please ask members of the Delegation to pay careful attention to the instructions sent about explanations, bearing

27/11

m. Hutchinson

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2.

in mind that these statements are often required to serve purposes additional to the immediate one in New York.

(A.D. Campbell)
First Assistant Secretary
International Organisations and
Consular Division

His Excellency
Mr H.D. Anderson, OBE,
Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL

OMC 5753

TO

BB CANBERRA/71

RP

BB OTTAWA/62 LIMA/63 SANTIAGO DE CHILE/63
BB BUENOS AIRES/63 WASHINGTON/60 BRASILIA/63
BB KINGSTON/29

FM MEXICO CITY FILE 202/11

UNCLASSIFIED

MEXICO: DEVELOPMENTS DURING OCTOBER 1979

After returning from his visits to the United States and Panama, President Lopez Portillo spent most of the month visiting a number of the States of Mexico. He also received the Polish President on a State Visit, and the Crown Prince of Norway. The PRI held a party conference, the leader of the major Mexican trade union received Mexico's highest decoration for service to the nation and Ixtoc I continued spilling oil.

Diplomatically, Mexico "continued" to recognize El Salvador and agreed to exchange Ambassadors with the Arab Democratic Republic of Sahara.

A) Internal

1. The Tenth National Assembly of the PRI was held in Mexico City on 25-26 October. There was much rhetoric about "reforming" the programmes of the party and "up dating" its appeal to the masses, but little of substance seems to have emerged from the Assembly, which was very poorly covered by the press. We shall report further on this after the "basic" documents have been released by the Party's office.

2. The PRI was the host, in Oaxaca, of a meeting of "revolutionary nationalist", populist and social democratic parties from Latin America and the Caribbean. The guest of honour was Daniel Ortega of the FSLN of Nicaragua and the theme was summed up as "democracy, sovereignty and solidarity: a Latin American road". One observer somewhat cynically noted that the recent electoral reforms in Mexico had enabled the PRI to take its place in such company "with a straight face". (The conference was presided over by PRI President Gustavo Carvajal.) Also, various commentators noted that Mexico's oil wealth has helped to give it the self confidence necessary to champion Latin America's special kind of democracy. This type of system bore the hallmark of the PRI's brand of rhetorical nationalism and the various PRI speakers took their cue from President Lopez Portillo's recent statements made at the UN, in Washington and in Panama.

PS
page 15

9. The President of France, in a personal message to President Lopez Portillo on 26 October, expressed "complete support" for the world energy programme presented to the UN General Assembly by the Mexican President last month. The President of France noted that Lopez Portillo's proposal was "expected to encounter strong opposition from some quarters" but stressed that he was "totally in accord with the framework for international action" described by President Lopez Portillo, namely, to increase exploration and to continue economic growth "with austerity".

The Mexican press reported with some satisfaction that eight countries had "strongly supported" the President's energy proposal: they were Turkey, Colombia, Honduras, Costa Rica, Senegal, Surinam, Jamaica and Belgium. The Libyan Foreign Minister, on the other hand, said that the proposal "would create a great deal of trouble".

10. In mid-October, General Carlos Humberto Romero was ousted as President of El Salvador and replaced by a five man junta of soldiers and civilians. On 16 October, the Mexican Foreign Ministry acknowledged that "a change of government had taken place" and that the Government of Mexico will extend official recognition to this new government in accordance with the dictates of the Estrada Doctrine. (This in essence means that Mexico extends recognition to States and not to individual governments.)

11. H.R.H. Prince Harold of Norway visited Mexico from 19 to 27 October. In addition to meeting the President and the Foreign Secretary, Prince Harold had discussions with the Director General of Pemex. Also during his visit, an agreement was signed between Nafinsa (Mexican Development Bank) and Eksportfinanz of Norway for a \$470 million pesos (\$A19 million) credit to assist Mexico in purchasing Norwegian goods. A joint anti-corrosive systems company (Proteccion Catodica S.A.) was also set up, to manufacture cathode-based anti-corrosive materials in Monterrey. It is estimated that the new materials will save \$200 million pesos (\$A8 million) annually on loss of metal structures and machinery particularly those used in off shore petroleum exploration. The US Dow Chemical Company will provide technical assistance.

12. The Spanish Minister for Energy and Industry (Carlos Bustelo) visited Mexico and announced that Spain will participate in the construction of the largest shipyard in Latin America, to be located at Veracruz, in Mexico. Spain would make a "cash contribution" of one billion pesetas (\$A13.5m; \$16m) and would provide both technology and personnel required in building the 50,000 ton tankers for Pemex. The Minister also said that the contracts for Mexican oil sales to Spain "were practically signed", for 10 million tons of crude annually beginning on 1 January, 1980.

13. The Mexican Minister of Defence, General Felix Galvan Lopez, paid a five day visit to the USSR early in the month, when he held talks with soviet defence chief, Dimitri Ustinov. The purpose of the visit, General Galvan Lopez said, was "simply to establish contact" and not to seek arms or equipment. He expressed interest, however, in Soviet training methods and said that he had discussed with President Lopez Portillo the possibility of sending Mexican officers to study at Soviet Military Colleges. No decision has been taken on this matter, however. Earlier in the year, General Galvan Lopez also visited China presumably for much the same purpose.

On 29 October, the General also visited Argentina where he met the President of the Military Government, Jorge Rafael Videla. The General, who was in Buenos Aires at the invitation of the Chief of the Army, Gen. Roberto Viola, according to press reports, raised with the Government the question of safe conduct for ex-President Hector Campora who has been in the Mexican Embassy in Buenos Aires, under political asylum, since March 1976. Also according to unconfirmed reports, the request for safe conduct was refused.

14. At the beginning of the month, 37 Chinese students arrived in Mexico to study Spanish and later to follow courses in medicine, engineering and in the natural sciences at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM).

15. On 24 October, Mexico and the Arab Democratic Republic of Sahara announced that they would establish diplomatic relations at the level of Ambassador. Both governments have agreed to take the necessary steps to accredit non-resident Ambassadors (our MC1313).

16. During the middle of the month the Foreign Secretary, Jorge Castaneda, visited a number of European countries (Austria, Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria) to hold discussions with his counterparts and to promote two way trade. The Mexican Foreign Ministry expressed its "complete satisfaction" with the Secretary's round of visits. In each country visited, the Secretary was received also by the Head of State.

17. The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Sigvard Eklund, visited Mexico during which he exchanged views with the President on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and inspected the nuclear power station of the Federal Electricity Commission at Laguna Verde in the State of Veracruz.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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 ✓ CUBA
 ✓ CYPRUS
 ✓ CZECHOSLOVAKIA
 ✓ DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA
 ✓ DEMOCRATIC YEMEN
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 ✓ DUTCH

✓ DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
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 ✓ SENEGAL
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 ✓ SINGAPORE
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 ✓ SOMALIA
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 ✓ VIET NAM
 ✓ YEMEN
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UNGA 34 : PLENARY : ITEMS 89, 94, 95, 18, 91, 92, 93 AND 12 :
CONSIDERATION OF REPORTS OF THE FOURTH COMMITTEE

AT ITS MEETING THIS MORNING (21 NOVEMBER) THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING RESOLUTIONS, DECISIONS AND CONSENSUSES
(RESULTS OF RESOLUTIONS VOTED ON BY FAX).

A) ITEM 89. INFORMATION FROM NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES
TRANSMITTED UNDER ARTICLE 73E OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
ADOPTED BY A VOTE OF 136 (AUSTRALIA) - 0 - 3.

B) ITEM 94. UNETPSA. ADOPTED WITHOUT VOTE.

C) ITEM 95. OFFERS BY MEMBER STATES OF STUDY AND TRAINING FACILIT-
IES FOR INHABITANTS OF NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES. ADOPTED
WITHOUT VOTE.

D) ITEM 18. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING
OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES:

I) DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ON BERMUDA, BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS, CAYMAN
ISLANDS, MONTSERRAT AND TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS: AMERICAN SAMOA:
U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS AND GUAM WERE ADOPTED WITHOUT VOTE.

II) DRAFT CONSENSUS ON COCOS (KEELING) ISLANDS: TOKELAU: ST HELENA:
AND GIBRALTAR WERE ADOPTED WITHOUT VOTE.

III) DRAFT DECISIONS ON BRUNEI: FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS):
PITCAIRN: AND ANTIGUA AND ST KITTS-NEVIS-ANGUILLA WERE ADOPTED
WITHOUT VOTE.

IV) DRAFT RESOLUTION ON WESTERN SAHARA WAS ADOPTED BY A VOTE OF 85
(AUSTRALIA) - 6 - 41.

V) DRAFT RESOLUTION ON BELIZE WAS ADOPTED BY A VOTE OF 134
(AUSTRALIA) - 0 - 8.

E) ITEM 91. THE QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR. DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS
ADOPTED BY A VOTE OF 62 - 31 (AUSTRALIA) - 45.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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F) ITEM 92. ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND OTHER INTERESTS ETC.
ADOPTED BY A VOTE OF 88 - 15 (AUSTRALIA) - 33.

G) ITEMS 93 AND 12. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE
GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES BY THE
SPECIALISED AGENCIES, ETC. ADOPTED BY A VOTE OF 137 (AUSTRALIA)
0 - 8.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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R E S T R I C T E D

WESTERN SAHARA : OAU POSITION

DR ONU, ASSISTANT SECRETARY-GENERAL (POLITICAL AND DECOLONISATION) OF OAU TOLD US IN ADDIS ABABA ON 6 NOVEMBER THAT OAU HAD BEEN PLEASED WITH AUSTRALIAN VOTE ON QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA. IT HAD DEMONSTRATED FULL SUPPORT FOR OAU PRINCIPLES AND FOR THE OAU POLICY ON THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE.

2. ONU EXPRESSED ALARM AT THE U.S. DECISION TO SUPPORT KING HUSSEIN. IT WAS, FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE INTERESTS OF THE U.S. ITSELF, EXTREMELY SHORT-SIGHTED SINCE IT WOULD ENCOURAGE SOVIET INVOLVEMENT ON THE SIDE OF THE POLISARIO. AT PRESENT, HE NOTED, SOVIET POLICY ON THE ISSUE HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT AMBIVALENT.

3. ONU FELT THAT, ALTHOUGH THE MOROCCAN OPPOSITION HAD, AT THE TIME OF THE VISIT OF THE OAU FACT-FINDING MISSION, APPEARED LARGELY IN SUPPORT OF KING HUSSEIN'S STAND, THIS SUPPORT WOULD QUICKLY EVAPORATE AS THE ECONOMIC COST OF THE WAR BECAME GREATER. HE ADDED THE COMMENT THAT THE WAR COULD WELL CAUSE KING HUSSEIN'S DOWNFALL.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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ACTION: AME JAE

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IOC/A.D. CAMPBELL

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PAUL SMITH/UN POLITICAL SECTION (X. 3488)

UNGA 34: WESTERN SAHARA

PURPOSE

To inform you of a Algerian draft resolution on Western Sahara at UNGA 34 and to seek your instructions.

ISSUES

At UNGA/33

2. ~~Hitherto each year~~, two draft resolution on Western Sahara have been put forward: one by Algeria and one by Morocco. Australia ~~has~~ voted in favour of both, thereby re-affirming our support for self-determination in Western Sahara and also maintaining an even-handed reaction to the Morocco/Algeria clash over Western Sahara.

3. During 1979, tension between Morocco and Algeria has mounted, Mauritania has withdrawn from the controversy by surrendering its claims as a co-partitioner (with Morocco) of the Western Sahara, and the OAU at its annual Summit called for an act of self-determination ⁱⁿ which the Western Sahara would have a choice between total independence or maintenance of the status quo.

4. The "defection" of Mauritania and the OAU decision have left Morocco in a very exposed position.

2.

5. The Algerians in New York have sought our support for an Algerian draft resolution (a copy and comments on it are attached). They said that they would welcome, and be responsive to, any suggestions we might have. We instructed our mission not to enter into major textual negotiations - see O.CH 853641 (attached).

6. The Moroccans also spoke to us in New York, saying that passage of the Algerian draft would damage prospects for forthcoming mediation efforts. It is not yet clear whether Morocco will put up a draft resolution this year. ~~6~~ *They may well not.*

7. If Morocco puts up a draft resolution, we would expect again to recommend a vote in favour of both the Algerian and the Moroccan drafts. However, in the event of only an Algerian draft, we would have to weigh up the following considerations:

(i) Our desire to maintain our support for self-determination in the Western Sahara, (an Australian position re-affirmed by the Prime Minister to the late President Boumedienne in 1978 when Boumedienne wrote Mr to ~~XXX~~ Fraser on the subject) would suggest a vote in favour; this would certainly be welcomed by the Algerians who continue to watch our vote closely.

3.

(ii) Our desire not to offend Morocco, a consideration consistent with ~~a~~ ^{the} strictly ~~we have previously adopted~~ even-handed approach ~~would~~ would point to an abstention.

(iii) The reference in the Algerian draft to the Polisario (a government-in-exile of the Western Sahara) as the sole and legitimate representative of the Saharoui people we do not like. (One consideration is, of course, that the Polisario ~~is~~ ^{claims to be} a government-in-exile and, therefore, not a national liberation movement; nevertheless, since we do not recognise the Polisario in any guise, we would probably at least have to explain our position on this point).

(iv) The text contains stronger language than the Algerian draft resolution did last year; in operative paragraph 5 actions by Morocco are "deeply deplored"; ~~this is the first time that Morocco has been adversely named in an Algerian text on Sahara. This points to an abstention.~~

(v) Some countries draw a parallel between Western Sahara and East Timor. We have supported self-determination in each case and could continue to support it in the case of Western Sahara, though ~~some criticism might follow and~~ ~~claiming~~ ~~claiming our inconsistency between this~~ ~~and~~ ~~of our acceptance of East Timor's incorporation.~~ ~~This might be a major factor favouring an abstention.~~

(vi) The voting intentions of WEOG countries will be an important element in our final recommendation. If a significant number vote in favour - and the chances of this are quite high given Morocco's presently isolated position on Western Sahara - Australia might find it hard not to do likewise. On the other hand, the stronger language in this year's text, compared to UNGA 33, and in particular, the naming of Morocco, may incline some to abstain. We have been told that Austria, France and Japan will probably abstain. The Dutch and the Nordics appear to be considering a yes vote, subject to alterations in the Algerian text.

(A.D. Campbell)
 First Assistant Secretary
 International Organisations and
 Consular Division

8. A complication is that we are uncertain as to when

Because the vote may come on quickly, I am seeking your tentative instructions on a broad guidelines for our vote. If possible, of course, I shall seek further instructions on when the final text of a resolution (or resolutions) is known.

Recommendation

It is recommended that

(i) in the event of both & no-
proccan and a pro-Algerian
text, the Australian vote in favour
of both - subject also to moderately
moderate language in
such in particular no adverse
mention of the other side.

(ii) in the event of only an Algerian text,
Australia abstain subject to the
abolition (if possible) of
voting in favour if the text if all the
modifications in paragraph 11 of
the attached D. CH 553641 are achieved.
In ~~the case of abstention~~ ^{if suitable}, explanations

(iii) ~~your spouse~~
of vote would be given stressing our
support for self-determination in
Western Sahara and noting that
we were unable to support some
elements of the text which would
~~hinder~~ a damage ~~about~~ prospects
of a peaceful, negotiated settlement.

Boycott on Western Sahara - especially in the
pro-Bitter Morocco, a present
but the - but the chances of this are very
recommendation. It's a difficult number to
be an important element in our first
The voting intentions of FEOG countries will

ALGERIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION

The Algerian draft is tougher than last year's Algerian draft. There are firmer references to standard UN de-colonization texts; pre-ambular paragraph 9 refers to "profound concern ... at the aggravation of the situation ... because of the continuation and extension of the occupation of that territory"; operative paragraph 1 refers to "the legitimacy of its struggle" (referring to the people of Western Sahara); there are approving references to the OAU Summit and NAM Summit references to Sahara, both of which - and especially the latter - went against Morocco; operative paragraph 5 "deeply deplores the aggravation of the situation resulting from the continuation of the occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco and the extension of this occupation to the territory recently evacuated by Mauritania"; operative paragraph 6 "insists on the withdrawal of the occupation forces"; and operative paragraph 7 refers to the Polisario as the "sole and legitimate representative of the people of Western Sahara".

A key element in this process of strengthening is that, unlike the Algerian draft at UNGA 33, in which there were no specific references to Morocco, actions by Morocco are "deeply deplored" in operative paragraph 5 of the Algerian attached draft.

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UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



Distr.

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A/C.4/34/L.20

8 November 1979

ENGLISH

ORIGINAL: FRENCH

Thirty-fourth session

FOURTH COMMITTEE

Agenda item 18

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING
OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

Statement made by the representative of Algeria at the 19th meeting
of the Fourth Committee on 30 October 1979 1/

1. The delegation of Algeria has already had the opportunity of conveying to you and your colleagues its warmest congratulations on your election as officers responsible for guiding the work of the Fourth Committee. I have pleasure in renewing these congratulations.

2. I also take this opportunity to pay a special tribute to Mr. Issoufou Saidou DJERMAKOYE, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization, who has just taken charge again of the Department during this crucial phase of the decolonization process, especially as regards the whole of the southern part and the north-west region of the African continent.

3. Now that the Fourth Committee is taking up the items concerning the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, it seems right and proper to express our profound admiration for the tireless work of all the members of the Department of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization whose devotion is contributing in large measure to the achievement of the noble ideas of freedom and independence which illuminate world progress and constitute the *raison d'être* of the United Nations.

4. Of my old friend, Issoufou DJERMAKOYE I have many cherished personal memories, which go back to the time when he was working for his Government.

5. He has now come back to take over the same responsibilities he assumed 10 years ago. However, if his present task may seem less heavy because many colonial

1/ Text circulated in accordance with a decision taken by the Fourth Committee at its 19th meeting on 30 October 1979.

territories have achieved independence during that time, the complexity of the specific problems which are still pending make his new mission perhaps more difficult. In any case, I am sure he will find this task just as challenging because, with his tranquil courage, he is a resolute defender of human rights.

6. With the return of this worthy son of Niger, a country with which Algeria has historic links of exemplary co-operation, Africa is now assuming responsibility for this final phase of its total liberation. For the full success of his mission, we address to Mr. DJERMAKOYE our best wishes, which are all the more profoundly felt because they are commensurate with our hope for the complete liberation of our continent and of all colonial territories. As he takes up his responsibilities as the head of this Department, we can assure him of the support and friendship of the Algerian delegation.

7. A stubborn power is becoming involved in a hopeless war. It is perpetuating the disturbing spectre of expansionism.

8. A people is fighting, suffering, dying and bearing witness. It refuses to undergo a second colonization.

9. The international community is calling for the freedom of that people with justice, coherence and consistency. It refuses to recognize the right of conquest.

10. This is the whole question of Western Sahara in its true dimensions.

11. There is no need to recall the origin nor the dramatic vicissitudes of this problem of decolonization, which is perfectly well-known to everyone. Nor is there any need to recall the impressive list of resolutions and declarations by many international or regional bodies. Since 1966, these have been addressed to the administering Power and since 1975 to the new occupiers, so as to ensure the effective exercise of what President KAUNDA of Zambia so rightly described at the recent Havana Summit as the "gift of God", i.e., the right to self-determination of the Saharan people, which no one else in the world, he said, could take away from it.

12. This is a Territory whose independence has been blocked by the forces of its neighbours at the very moment when that independence was about to be achieved, following the withdrawal of the administering Power. The cause of the people of this Territory is therefore our cause, because it puts to the test the very foundations and basic principles of the international community.

13. It is also the cause of the Organization of African Unity, which, because of its constitutional commitments to the total decolonization of Africa has quite naturally considered that its basic task is to support the struggle of African peoples fighting for their national liberation.

14. It is also the cause of the United Nations which, in conformity with its Charter and in keeping with its affirmed principles, is responsible for protecting the right of all colonial peoples to self-determination and recognizes, in particular, that the Saharan people have an inalienable and irrevocable right to decide their own destiny.

15. It is also the cause of the non-aligned movement, one of whose fundamental objectives has been and remains anti-colonialism and constant support for liberation movements.

16. The problem of decolonization is of all the more concern to international and regional bodies because over the years it has reached proportions which endanger the peace and stability of the whole region following the military fait accompli of 1975 and its recent consequences.

17. The policy of faits accomplis, military occupation and expansionism have always been and remain unacceptable. The use of illegal force to stifle the right of the Saharan people to self-determination is completely incompatible with the ethics of international relations. This principle has been constantly asserted by all the bodies to which the question of Western Sahara has been submitted.

18. By refusing to endorse this policy of blocking the decolonization of Western Sahara, the international community was in fact supporting the resistance of the Saharan people to the elimination of its national existence. The developing struggle of the people of that Territory, the sympathy it has evoked in Africa, in the non-aligned movement and in the entire world, and the general support it has elicited, have made it possible over the years and following a number of victories to confound the annexionists and destroy the argument that the case is closed.

19. The undeniable success of the Saharan fighters in the field have made all regional and international forums aware of the real nature of the problem and have brought home to them the fact that it is basically a problem of decolonization which has been impeded, blocked and frustrated by the military occupation of a neighbouring country.

20. At the same time, there is increasingly wide recognition by States of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic and of the Frente Polisario as the sole legitimate representative of the Saharan people. These States now include the former administering Power and Mauritania. Today some 34 States in Africa, Latin America and Asia have already recognized the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic.

21. Other States have announced their intention of doing so. This reflects a growing movement of support, which carries high the hopes of the Saharan people in its struggle which is felt as profoundly just by the international community.

22. The Saharan people have owed all their victories to their own efforts, their own bravery and their own sacrifices. Their successes at the international level merely reflect their complete control over the political and military situation in the country which has been liberated for the most part, except for a few enclaves in which the occupation troops have barracaded themselves into defensive camps.

23. Thus, the diplomatic situation expressed by the strong support of the international community for the cause of the self-determination of the Saharan people is in no way artificial. It is in perfect harmony with the actual situation prevailing in Western Sahara.

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24. The year 1978 has been decisive for an objective assessment of this situation. Beginning in the summer of that year, certain changes in the political attitude of one of the two occupying States and the decision of the Frente Polisario to maintain a cease-fire offered new possibilities for a negotiated solution. A process then began which seemed to open up new possibilities for putting an end to a situation of war and tension and bringing us to a solution in conformity with the legitimate aspirations of the people of Western Sahara.

25. At the same time, the Organization of African Unity, meeting in Khartoum, decided to establish an Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State to define the framework of a just and lasting solution.

26. Finally, in December 1978 at its thirty-third session, the General Assembly adopted a resolution welcoming the cease-fire declared by the Frente Polisario with regard to one of the two occupying States, reaffirmed "the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence" and reiterated its fervent hope that the Organization of African Unity would find a solution in accordance with the right of peoples to self-determination by the time the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly had convened.

27. This resolution by our thirty-third session was to be particularly fruitful. Indeed the year 1979 will have been as successful as the previous year for the just fight of the Saharan people.

28. Fully assuming its responsibilities, the Organization of African Unity, at its sixteenth summit conference held three months ago in Monrovia, established general guidelines for a just and lasting settlement based on the inalienable right of the Saharan people to self-determination.

29. It took this decision in conformity with the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee composed of eminent African heads of State to whom Algeria wishes to pay a sincere tribute for their devotion, their efforts and the precious time they spent in the accomplishment of their lofty mission.

30. In fact the Ad Hoc Committee responded to the hope which the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity had so rightly placed in it. After having made a direct and careful inquiry throughout the region into all aspects of the problem and having judiciously analysed the question and evaluated the situation, the Committee submitted its recommendations to the Conference of Heads of State meeting last July in Liberia.

31. The capital decision taken at the sixteenth summit meeting of OAU in Monrovia took fully into consideration certain realities and gave perfect expression to them. Among these realities we may quote the reaffirmation of the question of Western Sahara as a decolonization problem; the rejection of the idea that this problem originates in a conflict between the Moroccan occupier and Algeria, a country in no way involved; the rejection of the Tripartite Madrid Agreement which had allowed the occupation and division of the Territory; the solemn reiteration of the right of the Saharan people freely and directly to decide their own destiny; and, finally, the official recognition of this right by Mauritania which had voted in favour of the decision of the African Heads of State.

32. This was a great victory, a victory for Africa, a victory for the freedom of all peoples.

33. In the context of its natural co-operation with the Organization of African Unity, the United Nations should give its firm support to Africa in its historic and courageous decision all the more because two events have occurred since the July meeting in Monrovia.

34. Mauritania had recognized the wisdom of the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee of African heads of State and had unreservedly supported the OAU summit decision of July. It had also completely fulfilled its commitments and on 10 August had signed a peace agreement with the Frente Polisario. In this agreement, duly registered by the United Nations in conformity with Article 102 of the Charter, it withdrew from that part of the Territory it had previously occupied. It also recognized the Frente Polisario as the legitimate and exclusive representative of the Saharan people and the territorial integrity of Western Sahara.

35. This peace agreement was welcomed as a tribute paid by Mauritania to the decision of the Monrovia summit and is a great step along the path of the peaceful and final settlement of the question of Western Sahara. The United Nations can only welcome this contribution by Mauritania and the Polisario to the re-establishment of peace in the region.

36. But a shadow has unfortunately been cast over the events of 1979, which has been such a good year for the freedom of peoples. In a way which no one has forgotten, Morocco rejected the historic decision at the OAU summit at Monrovia and raised doubts about Mauritania's right, as a sovereign State, to conclude a treaty. It then sent its army into that part of the Territory which Mauritania had been preparing to evacuate. Just when Africa and the entire international community were expecting Morocco to help to bring about a just, sensible and peaceful political solution, it had caused a fresh escalation in the military *fait accompli* politics of the region.

37. This warlike act has clearly revealed that Morocco not only is refusing to seek a just and peaceful solution, in accordance with the Monrovia decisions, with regard to the part of the Saharan Territory it has been occupying illegally since 1975; it is trying to render null and void the peace agreement which Mauritania, as a sovereign State, has concluded with the Frente Polisario in respect of the other part of the Territory. Invoking a so-called right of pre-emption from the dusty archives of the colonial Powers at the time of the nineteenth-century Congress of Berlin, Morocco is thus clearly showing that its policy of expansionism is still being pursued.

38. Those who had thought (and admittedly they are few), on the basis of repeated assurances, that Morocco's expansionist policy would stop with the first military *fait accompli* and the partition of the Territory in 1976, are now discovering that its action had merely been a prelude to other activities aimed at escalating the annexation of the Territory by force.

39. The extremely serious problem thus created two months ago and dangerously compounded by many other problems arising from the 1975 occupation represents a new challenge for Africa, for the movement of non-aligned countries and for the entire international community. Morocco is attempting to institutionalize the anschluss policy without any regard for Africa's decisions, for ethical international relations, for Mauritania's sovereign right to negotiation or for the fundamental national rights of the Saharan people.

40. This new challenge underscores in particular the disturbing nature of Morocco's policy, which affects the very basis of peace in the region. When expansionism takes such a free, untrammelled course and becomes such an alarming danger for everyone, the people involved cannot fail to take up the challenge to the survival of their freedom. Now that force is overriding what is right, the option to use force cannot remain indefinitely with Morocco alone.

41. By defying so seriously, with this new act, the historic OAU decision, by opposing the peace agreement concluded by Mauritania as a sovereign State, by undermining the most basic principles of the Charter, Morocco is assuming a direct responsibility for the confrontations which it is actively fostering in the region.

42. The least that can be said about this new version of *fait accompli* by Morocco is that it signifies a dangerous policy of adventurism and, at the same time, brings out into the open Morocco's true annexationist motives, which had hitherto been screened, albeit badly, by the specious argument about territorial integrity. The occupier itself had considered territorial integrity to be fully guaranteed when it partitioned the Territory in 1976. Since it deliberately violated, in August 1979, the frontiers which, at its own discretion, it had itself considered sufficient to ensure its territorial integrity, it is today quite obvious to all that the so-called territorial integrity which Morocco has too often invoked, and always out of season, has time and again served to conceal what eventually emerges as a very clearly defined policy of expansionism.

43. If there was still a country which honestly believed Morocco's specious argument about territorial integrity, the new and inherently serious annexation of August 1979, which aggravated an already disquieting situation, was ample proof that Morocco did respond, both the first time and the second, to unacceptable annexationist impulses and dangerous expansionist stimuli.

44. Africa has been ridiculed and the Saharan people wronged by these new incidents of aggression, which have had an even more serious effect on OAU efforts to find a solution compatible with the legitimate aspirations of the Saharan people. In September 1979, the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries supported the OAU decision and praised Mauritania and the Frente Polisario for the peace agreement they had reached; it also strongly deplored the persistence and expansion of Morocco's armed occupation of Western Sahara.

45. It is up to the United Nations, as guarantor of the freedom of peoples, to intensify its vigilance over the grave situation in our region and to show once again its firm support for the struggle of the Saharan people. This is a particularly fitting time for the United Nations to make such a contribution, thereby demonstrating its loyalty to its ideals and principles, encouraging the

efforts of OAU, doing justice to a people struggling for their freedom and satisfying the hopes that all peoples have placed in it.

46. In these circumstances, the consideration of the question of Western Sahara during the thirty-fourth session assumes special importance. This problem requires from the entire international community a commitment to shoulder squarely its important responsibilities. Commendable efforts, for which the peoples of the region cannot but express their deep gratitude, have been made by OAU and encouraged recently by the non-aligned countries.

47. Accordingly, any acts of incitement or encouragement designed to broaden the conflict between Morocco and the Saharan people will inevitably create turmoil in northern Africa and perhaps in a large part of the continent as well, in an era of dangerous disturbances, instability and great misfortune for our peoples.

48. One super-Power is now gratuitously running the grave risk of exacerbating, broadening and dangerously transforming the conflict. As matters stand, it is as if that super-Power were challenging the peace whose foundations have just been laid at Monrovia; it is as if it were challenging OAU and all the African Heads of State who worked out the elements of this peaceful solution.

49. The problem of the decolonization of Western Sahara is a problem of genuine national liberation war. It is fundamentally different from any kind of subversive war and completely different from any kind of ideological war. The Frente Polisario has untiringly proposed holding negotiations with Morocco in order to reach an appropriate solution in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and that of OAU, and in compliance with the relevant resolutions recently adopted by the two organizations.

50. Political problems require political solutions, but Morocco has responded to the willingness of the Frente Polisario to end the war and to its serious and responsible appeals for peace by increasing its armaments, expanding its territorial annexation, calling upon Powers outside the African continent and, more serious still, on a super-Power which will henceforth guarantee Morocco military support. Morocco has thus demonstrated its intention to elevate a colonial conflict to the international level, with all the disastrous consequences such a change in the nature of the problem could have for the entire region. The fears which we voiced right here about the implications of the continuation of the situation in Western Sahara are unfortunately being realized one by one, with the emergence of disturbing factors which increase the vulnerability of our continent and open the door to super-Power interference, as is now the case.

51. One super-Power is deliberately moving against the trend of events. It has not hesitated to opt for a solution by war at a time when Africa is working towards peaceful settlement. It is thus slowing down the peace momentum. It is compounding the military risk of internationalization of the conflict with a political challenge to the authors of the historic Monrovia decision. And it is taking no account of the growing international sympathy for the just struggle of the Saharan people.

52. Appreciable military support is thus being offered by one super-Power to the forces of occupation in an effort to exterminate the Saharan people.

53. It cannot be over-emphasized that the problem of the decolonization of Western Sahara is a political problem, which requires a political solution. The tragic deadlock in the region is the direct result of Morocco's dangerous intransigence. After the Monrovia summit, it is now more obvious than ever that the will to promote a negotiated political solution is present, except on the part of Morocco. The people of Western Sahara are animated by this will and their leaders have not stopped calling for negotiations for a return to peace. Mauritania has given tangible expression to this will, thanks to the political courage and sense of justice of its leaders, who have had the wisdom to take the road leading to appeasement and reconciliation.

54. In order to defuse a situation in the region which has become more explosive than ever, the United Nations must launch an urgent appeal to Morocco, and Morocco must heed that appeal and enter into negotiations with the Frente Polisario, the legitimate and authentic representative of the Saharan people.

55. In spite of and perhaps because of the present worsening of the situation, and in spite of the military support pledged to Morocco by a super-Power, the climate is more conducive than ever to a political solution, if Morocco would only heed the urgent appeal of the international community. The draft resolution just submitted to the Fourth Committee by 40 sponsors takes account of the obvious and urgent need to initiate political negotiations with a view to restoring peace. The subject, means and purposes of such negotiations are very clear. Any peaceful solution must necessarily be based on the right of the people of Western Sahara freely to decide their own destiny, on negotiations with the Frente Polisario to that end and on respect for the principles and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and that of OAU.

56. The people of Western Sahara want to be the sole masters of their own destiny. The close ties of civilization, religion, tradition and language that link them to other peoples to the south, east and north do not authorize the leader of any of those peoples to vitiate the clearly defined national identity of that proud and free people. Just as the colonizers of earlier times have lost out, so today's occupiers will meet defeat. I can well imagine the excitement, the sweet, fervent joy which the Saharan fighters felt when they recently stormed and invested their holy city of Smara, the historical and cultural shrine which bears such noble witness to their national identity.

57. From their point of view, the forces of occupation are assuming and waging without conviction a doubtful rearguard battle doomed to failure in the impasse of history.

58. However much "Mirage" jets continue to spit fire from the skies on the heads of the Saharan freedom-fighters, they will be powerless to break the mettlesome spirit of those men. The results of those "Mirage" operations will be as illusory as the mirages which appear in the Sahara. As surely as heaven belongs to martyrs, so the land of the living will sooner or later belong to the Saharan people in their homeland.

59. Is it conceivable that so much courage and so many sacrifices and successes in such a just cause will be fruitless? Is it conceivable that the admiration inspired by the inexorable march, in an attitude of calm assurance, by the Saharan people towards freedom can be concealed indefinitely? The war of sand against the new occupiers is five years old. It has now clearly emerged from the shadow and the halo which surrounded it. A Saharan proverb quite rightly assures us that heaven lies at the end of the road of patience. In this desert where mirages lead only outsiders astray and where sand-storms catch only new-comers unaware, only the Saharan people can show us the way. For they are a people who know where they are going, whether at the age-old pace of caravans of peace or at the modern-day pace of military convoys, with only the unquenchable thirst for independence as their compass.

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Thirty-fourth session

FOURTH COMMITTEE

Agenda item 18

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE
TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

Statement made by Mr. Tinguiri Mansour Omar of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO) at the 14th and 15th meetings of the Fourth Committee, held on 23 and 24 October 1979

1. The international situation prevailing as the Fourth Committee commences its work is one in which the racist colonial forces are losing their last strongholds to the inexorable and irreversible advance of the movement to liberate those peoples which are still under colonial or racist domination.

2. As a result, now more than ever the attention and hopes of the African peoples are focused on the outcome of your Committee's work - hopes which demand that your Committee assume its responsibilities with regard to the crime committed against the Saharan people, who are the victims of criminal aggression and savage occupation.

3. United Nations responsibility with regard to the struggle of our people to safeguard their independence and free their country from foreign occupation derives from the duty entrusted to the Organization by the Charter and by General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and it is within the context of the implementation of their provisions that the question of the decolonization of Western Sahara has always been viewed with considerable concern.

4. I do not intend to dwell at length on all the stages through which the process of Western Sahara's decolonization has passed, for I know that each of you follows events there closely. Allow me, however, to recall that our people's

1/ Text circulated in accordance with the decision taken by the Fourth Committee at its 15th meeting, on 24 October 1979.

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struggle, first against Spanish colonization and then against conspiracy and aggression by Morocco and its accomplices, has over the past decade been the subject of resolutions and decisions adopted by the United Nations and its organs on the basis of the Charter and, in particular, of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (resolution 1514 (XV)).

5. In this way, the international community hopes to perform its task of ensuring or safeguarding the implementation of a cardinal principle, that of the right of peoples to self-determination, and to continue to view as clearly and objectively colonialist the war imposed on the Saharan people by the Moroccan aggression.

6. So the United Nations task is to help our people, like other peoples, to free themselves from a situation of subjugation, domination and foreign exploitation which is designed to deny our most elementary fundamental rights and to threaten peace and security in the region.

7. The right of peoples to self-determination is a right which the international community has raised to the level of an irrefutable, irresistible and undeniable sacred principle, by virtue of which every people is free to determine its political status and to pursue its economic, social and cultural development without interference. This principle is stated in general terms in resolution 1514 (XV), on which the relevant resolutions on Western Sahara are based.

8. In 1975, after a long and arduous struggle, when our people were about to exercise their rights and recover their lost sovereignty after more than a century of Spanish colonial occupation, a criminal conspiracy was mounted against them.

9. It is with bitterness that we recall that this crime was designed to prevent our people from exercising their inalienable right to self-determination and independence and to subject them to genocide.

10. The authors of that crime, however, committed a major error of judgement, for they underestimated our people's capacity not only to enforce their rights but also to pursue their struggle until the conspiracy failed and their home and country was totally liberated.

11. The conspiracy thus carries the seeds of its own destruction, for the aggressors left our people no alternative but to fight to ensure that their independence and territorial integrity are respected. In the same situation, any people would respond by exercising their right to self-defence.

12. The situation after four years of cruel war shows, if there is need to, that the aggressors were wrong: the Saharan people are indeed capable of defending their right to independence and Morocco and its accomplices cannot carry out their base designs.

13. By their struggle and sacrifices, the Saharan people have made tremendous gains in the field and have thwarted the enemy's plans. Today, the Saharan Government has liberated almost all its national territory.

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14. Having broken once and for all the military alliance between Morocco and Mauritania against our people, the Saharan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) is effectively in control of the situation and has the upper hand in battles against the Moroccan army of occupation.

15. At the same time, in exercise of our right to self-defence, we have now taken the war to the Moroccan forces' rearguard bases inside Morocco.

16. I should, however, like to stress that our army's military operations against the Moroccan army's rearguard bases are designed solely to force that army to evacuate those areas of our country which are still under illegal occupation. The Government of Morocco must be made to realize that, as long as its army occupies a single portion of our country, however small, our army will intensify its attacks on that army's positions both within and outside Western Sahara.

17. The liberation of almost all our national territory, and the victories won daily by SPLA, show that the defeat of the Moroccan army in Western Sahara is inevitable.

18. The victories of the Saharan army at Amgala, Tifariti, Hausa, Lemseyed, Libtaina, Tantan, Lebouirate, Zag, Engab, Tiguix y Remth Al Lbane Bir-Enzaran, Semora, Mahbes, etc., and the capture of an increasingly impressive number of prisoners of war are facts which neither Moroccan propaganda nor Morocco's customary distortion of the truth can conceal.

19. On each occasion the Frente POLISARIO has, through the press and on the occasion of numerous visits by international personalities to the liberated territories, called the international community to witness the results of the military campaigns. Thus, at every possible opportunity, the prisoners of war and large amounts of war matériel captured have been seen by the press and by foreign delegations.

20. Our country is caught up in a cruel war in which the enemy aggressor forces it to mobilize every conceivable effort.

21. The Government of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, however, has during these four years of war been able to structure and organize the State's institutions. Thus, since 27 February 1976 when our people proclaimed the Republic as a sovereign State, the necessary structures have been created for that State.

22. At the national level, our Government is conducting the State activities required at the present stage through its departments and services.

23. In this war-time period, our concern is to create the necessary socio-economic and administrative conditions to enable our people to enjoy health care, receive an education and meet their basic needs, and also to enjoy freedom and safety in the liberated areas.

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24. Thus, at the national level, the following institutions have been created:

- (a) The "9 June" Education Centre, which provides secondary education;
- (b) A national hospital for patients who could not be treated at regional hospitals and local clinics;
- (c) The "12 October" Military Academy, which provides military training for the various sectors of our army;
- (d) The "27 February" School which provides vocational and military training for Saharan women, who participate actively in the war;
- (e) The Saharan Red Crescent, which is responsible for supplies.

25. At the regional level, in each territorial administrative department or Wilaya, a hospital, a school, a supply branch and other vital services meet the needs of the population of the respective Wilayas and Dairas in the national territory.

26. This sums up briefly the efforts which we are making to organize the country administratively, concurrently with our tremendous efforts expended on our national liberation struggle.

27. With regard to our international activities, I am sure that you will duly appreciate the growth of relations between the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic and other countries and peoples of the world.

28. The upsurge of recognition and support for the Republic, under the leadership of the Frente POLISARIO, shows, if there is need to, that our people's cause commands the admiration and respect of the international community.

29. A large majority of States have relations with the Frente POLISARIO, as the sole legitimate representative of the Saharan people, and the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic is recognized by 34 States, 20 of them from Africa and the rest from Latin America and Asia.

30. This situation is marked by our Government's efforts to reduce the suffering of our people, who are still exposed to the horror of occupation and war.

31. In the areas still occupied by Morocco, our civilian populations are subjected to terror, repression and systematic extermination. Concentration camps have been established by the Moroccan occupying forces in which hundreds of children, women and old people die every day.

32. I use the word "terror" advisedly, because torture, kidnapping and rape are practised daily by the criminal officers of the Moroccan army, whose methods are comparable only to those of the Nazis.

33. Morocco's criminal actions to uproot our populations from the occupied areas and to destroy our culture and traditional values by introducing drugs, corruption,

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rape of minors and other indescribable practices, must be added to those already mentioned above.

34. Speaking from this same rostrum a year ago, we informed honourable members of the Fourth Committee of the latest escalation perpetrated by Morocco.

35. For the past two years, the occupying forces have adopted a policy of colonization involving the settlement of Moroccan civilians in the occupied areas of our country - a colonialist practice with which you are very familiar.

36. The complications which such methods add to the situation need not be described here; they cannot escape the attention of the international community, which must denounce and thwart this dangerous process.

37. It is this policy of settlement, extermination and occupation that has forced thousands of Saharans to live in shanty towns around the occupied cities, while others have been forced to take refuge in neighbouring countries.

38. Before moving on to my next point, I must express to you as representatives of the international community our indignation and disappointment at the virtual indifference of the international humanitarian organizations which are morally and even legally bound to respond in this kind of disaster.

39. At the same time, the Saharan Government would like to express its sincere gratitude to the brother peoples of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Algeria for the fraternal assistance which they are rendering us in these difficult and testing moments of suffering.

40. The Saharan people and its Government are also grateful to humanitarian organizations of Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany for the humanitarian aid which they have afforded to our refugees.

41. The thirty-fourth session marks a final stage in the process of decolonization of Western Sahara begun by the United Nations, in which resolution 33/31 A of 13 December 1978 was one of the most recent developments.

42. That resolution reflected the dynamic and positive developments with regard to the question of Western Sahara within this world Organization. In reaffirming that this is a question of decolonization covered by resolution 1514 (XV) and that our people must therefore exercise their right to self-determination and independence, that resolution rejected categorically the aggressors' attempts to present the international community with a fait accompli of military occupation.

43. Faithful to the goal of decolonization, that same resolution took note of the Frente POLISARIO's initiative in deciding unilaterally and provisionally on a cease-fire in Mauritanian territory.

44. Thus we note with satisfaction that the Fourth Committee's action keeps pace with developments on the spot.

45. The statements by a representative of the Frente POLISARIO in the Security Council and in the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples also reflect the increasing importance which all United Nations organs attach to the decolonization of Western Sahara and bear witness to the failure of Morocco's attempts to place the problem outside its true context.

46. In this way, the international community has rejected its role as accomplice in a blatant manoeuvre by the colonialist forces which, in their inability to stifle the determination of peoples to throw off the colonial yoke and seize their independence, are resorting to accusations against third States.

47. We would advise Morocco that it is time it faced up to the facts and stopped abusing international and Moroccan public opinion, from which it has been seeking to hide the truth for the last four years, covering up its defeat by accusations against third States.

48. We realize that it is perhaps most unpleasant for the "great army" of his "majesty" the King of Morocco to acknowledge defeat at the hands of the tiny Saharan people. But defeat is inevitable, and no propaganda can hide it. The victorious campaigns of SPLA, which have resulted in thousands of deaths, the taking of hundreds of prisoners and the capture of vast quantities of light and heavy matériel daily, are harsh realities which will survive the lies and shams.

49. This year has seen positive, far-reaching developments in the situation which, we believe, have created the necessary conditions for the thirty-fourth session, and the Fourth Committee in particular, to take a decision commensurate with the responsibilities of the United Nations under resolution 1514 (XV).

50. One of the most important developments this year was the decision taken by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its sixteenth session, held in Monrovia from 17 to 20 July 1979. 2/

51. By that decision, OAU assumed its responsibilities by adopting a specific resolution on the substance of the decolonization of Western Sahara.

52. The position taken on our problem by the African States at Monrovia is clear and unequivocal. They reaffirm the right of the Saharan people to self-determination and independence. We can deduce from this that they reject categorically the occupation of our country by Moroccan expansionists. They also decided that the parties to the conflict must have recourse to political channels as a means of finding a just and lasting solution to the problem in accordance with the right of the Saharan people to self-determination and independence.

53. The parties to the conflict were also solemnly invited to meet and initiate negotiations, with a view to reaching a peaceful settlement in accordance with that resolution.

2/ A/34/552, annex II, Decision AHG/Dec.114 (XVI).

and to destroy our culture and traditional values by introducing drugs, corruption, /...

54. In response to Africa's appeal, and in its concern to see the restoration of justice and peace in the region, the Saharan Government invited the two other parties to the conflict (Morocco and Mauritania) to meet with us in Bamako, the capital of Mali, or in any other African capital, in order to initiate peace negotiations.

55. While Mauritania and the Frente POLISARIO immediately embarked on the road to peace, in accordance with the OAU resolution adopted in Monrovia and with their responsibility to end the unjust war in our Republic, the Moroccan Government's response to the African initiative was mere arrogance.

56. You will all recall how the Moroccan delegation in Monrovia reacted with blackmail and insults to the African verdict, withdrawing from the Conference after the failure of its attempts to impose its wishes against the views of the African community as a whole.

57. History too will recall how the King of Morocco treated the African Heads of State and their Organization with scorn, referring insultingly to the decision which they had taken in Monrovia in support of justice and peace.

58. Thus it was that, at his press conference on 19 August 1979 in Fez, the King of Morocco described the OAU conference as a "meeting of tom-tom players" and OAU as a "cesspool" (Le Monde of 20 August 1979).

59. None the less, you will probably recall how at the thirty-third session the Moroccan delegation in this Committee mobilized efforts and resorted to all kinds of acrobatics to make the General Assembly adopt resolution 33/31 B and that the resolution was adopted, on the proposal of the Moroccan delegation, and contains only one substantive reference to the idea of entrusting the question to OAU and its ad hoc committee on Western Sahara.

60. Morocco must be consistent and stop abusing the good faith of United Nations Member States.

61. If it does not do so, the international community must force it to respect the rules of membership of international organizations.

62. The United Nations must henceforth reject Morocco's continued disregard for its resolutions, and for its obligations as a State Member of the United Nations whose duty it is to abide by the wishes of the majority and by the decisions adopted by the Organization.

63. The signing in Algiers on 10 August 1979 of a peace agreement 3/ between Mauritania and the Frente POLISARIO is another new development to which the international community must direct its attention and interest, given the decisive impact which it has had on the situation.

64. In addition to being the logical and natural extension of the OAU Monrovia decision, this agreement is important because:

(a) Its effective contribution to the peace and hence the security of Western Sahara, and of the region as a whole, was considerable.

(b) It is the expression of the sovereign wishes of two of the three parties to the conflict, it brings to an end the war between them and it opens up a new era of understanding, good neighbourliness and co-operation based on respect for each country's sovereignty within the framework of their territorial integrity.

65. A few moments ago, I spoke of the importance of this agreement and mentioned some of its elements. But basically we can say that its signature marks the break-up of the political alliance against our people both of the so-called "Madrid Tripartite Agreement", which was killed on the field of battle by the struggle of our people.

66. Mauritania, which had been an essential party to the "Madrid Agreement" henceforth recognizes, as you will have noted from the Algiers peace agreement, not only the illegality of the criminal undertaking to deprive the Saharan people of their rights but also the Frente POLISARIO as the sole legitimate representative of that people.

67. Before moving on to other aspects of the question, I should also like to recall that Spain, the administering Power for Western Sahara, has in fact by its position gone beyond the "Madrid Agreement", which was Morocco's only hobby-horse. It should be recalled that the ruling party in Spain, the Unión del Centro Democrático (UCD), has recognized the right of the Saharan people to self-determination and the Frente POLISARIO as their sole legitimate representative. Such recognition was recently reaffirmed by Spain's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, in his statement to the newspaper Le Monde on 21 August 1979, in which he observed that Western Sahara was still an international territory and that his Government's position was identical to that of its party (UCD). That position was again reaffirmed in his statement to the United Nations General Assembly on 24 September 1979 (A/34/PV.5).

68. Instead of drawing inspiration from the courage and sense of responsibility of the Mauritanian and Saharan Governments, King Hassan II of Morocco has turned his back on peace and opted for the path of violence over that of peaceful means, wisdom and justice.

69. His persistence in his military aggression and his decision to extend Morocco's military occupation to the city of Dakhla, prior to Mauritania's withdrawal under the provisions of the agreement of 10 August are clear proof of the intransigence of the Moroccan Government and its criminal intention of persisting in its military escalation, in defiance of law, justice and the interests of the peoples of the entire region.

2/ A/34/552, annex II, Decision: Received, understood, accepted, and noted

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70. The paragraphs on the question of Western Sahara included in the Political Declaration adopted by the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Havana from 3 to 9 September 1979, ^{4/} were also a new and extremely important development which cannot fail to add weight to Western Sahara's case at the present session.

71. Although the Moroccan delegation resorted to all kinds of manoeuvres and systematically opposed the inclusion of that question in the agenda of the Conference of Heads of State or Government, the Sixth Conference decided to assume its responsibilities and expressed its firm solidarity with the Saharan people in their struggle for independence by adopting the paragraphs on the question of Western Sahara unanimously.

72. Through this historic document, you will see the firmness with which the non-aligned countries met Morocco's challenge, blackmail and manoeuvres and supported the just cause of our people.

73. When they analysed the problem in its true context, namely as a case of incomplete decolonization caused by colonial aggression, the Heads of State of the non-aligned countries uncovered the dangers inherent in the Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara and demanded that the right of the Saharan people to self-determination and independence be scrupulously respected.

74. At the same time, they emphasized that the historic decision taken by OAU in Monrovia provided a dynamic and positive impetus for restoring peace in Western Sahara by returning their sovereignty to the Saharan people, thereby ushering in a new era in the region in which the demons of expansionism and disregard for the right of peoples will give way to fraternal co-operation, good-neighbourliness, security and stability among our peoples.

75. A few minutes ago I referred to Morocco's intransigence, which has led it to persist in its military escalation to an intolerable degree.

76. While Africa, the non-aligned movement and the United Nations have all agreed in repeated resolutions that the Moroccan aggression against Western Sahara represents a threat not only to justice and law but also to peace and stability on the African continent, the King of Morocco, with the complicity of certain countries, is paving the way for the internationalization of the war.

77. In that regard, I should like to stress that the Egyptian military intervention and the collaboration of certain non-African Powers with the Moroccan army provide irrefutable evidence of the serious escalation towards internationalization of the war and constitute a challenge to Africa, which is working untiringly to find a peaceful solution to the question of Western Sahara.

^{4/} A/34/542, annex, sect. I, paras. 96 to 98.

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78. The recent decision of President Carter of the United States of America to increase aid to Morocco by providing sophisticated anti-guerrilla matériel has dealt a serious blow to the movement towards peace that had given hope for a just and lasting solution to the question of the decolonization of Western Sahara. The United States has thus given material support to Morocco's intransigent and stubborn policy of pushing the region through fire and sword towards the internationalization of the war.

79. This is also a blow to the wise decisions of OAU, of the non-aligned nations and of the United Nations, which had struggled for so many years to ensure respect for the right of the Saharan people to self-determination and independence.

80. If domestic considerations (elections) have prevailed in President Carter's mind, to the detriment of his obligation to respect the right of the Saharan people to self-determination and independence, that does not mean that he can forget the responsibility of his country, as a member of the Security Council, to strive for peace and stability in this region of Africa and the Mediterranean.

81. If we really wish to put out the fire, we should not pour more fuel on it.

82. Whoever wishes to help Morocco should show it how to get out of the war.

83. To turn a simple problem of decolonization into an international conflagration of unlimited proportions is a crime for which Morocco and its accomplices must assume responsibility and take the consequences.

84. The leaders of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, in their desire to spare our continent further suffering and upheavals have so far avoided any action that might lead to internationalization of the conflict, even though that has meant tremendous sacrifices for us.

85. We are still hoping for urgent action by the international community to deal with this threat. But we wish to make it clear, for the historical record and for you today, that the possibility of an international conflict does not frighten us and that we will surely be the winners.

86. Our people, with their initiative and their unswerving determination, will find the best way of facing the challenge of conspiracies that are condemned by history and by mankind.

87. If Morocco continues its military escalation towards internationalization of the war, what choice will we have? Are we to stand and look on while Morocco perpetrates its crime? Or are we to defend ourselves against death? One need not be a wise man to know the answer. We will defend ourselves.

88. I am sure that the rapid summary I have just given you has enabled you to assess the developments in the situation and the dangers that are inherent in the continuation of this war of aggression.

89. The specific developments of the current year, particularly the decision taken by OAU in Monrovia, the peace agreement with Mauritania, the declaration by the Sixth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries on Western Sahara and the evolution of the position of Spain, the administering Power, provide the United Nations with an opportunity at this thirty-fourth session fully to discharge its responsibilities.

90. The developments of the current year make it incumbent upon the Fourth Committee to take the measures necessary to fulfil the responsibilities of the United Nations set forth in the Charter and in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

91. We must face realities, bearing in mind that the problem of Western Sahara can be solved only by guaranteeing and respecting the right of the Saharan people to self-determination and independence.

92. The various types of manoeuvre to which the Moroccan Government in resorting in order to change the course of the process of decolonization of Western Sahara, as well as to undermine the efforts of the African and the non-aligned countries and the United Nations, must be rejected by the international community.

93. The regional economic measures which the King of Morocco has advocated, following his failure in Western Sahara, are nothing but an illusion which can deceive no one but the man who dreamed them up.

94. Having been unable to impose the fait accompli of military occupation, the King of Morocco is now resorting to a manoeuvre typical of colonialists. We recall the tendentious origin of the idea of the "Greater Sahara" as a "sea of sand", over which there is no sovereignty.

95. Hassan II of Morocco will not stop acting as a peddler of dreams. But it is time for him to wake up, for this region has no room for empires and there is no such thing as a "sea of sand"; there are only States living within their respective boundaries which have been delimited and established according to the cardinal principle of the OAU charter: the intangibility of boundaries inherited from colonial times.

96. Like the other States of the region, the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic is fighting to preserve this cardinal principle of the OAU by defending its boundaries.

97. Following the failure of his attempt to divide our country with Mauritania, the King of Morocco is seeking a new partner in his criminal endeavour against the Saharan people. But those States to which he is "generously" offering an outlet to the sea through a redistribution of our country will not let themselves be deceived, for we are certain they can discern the underlying implications of this diabolical proposition.

98. Morocco's true plan is not based on generosity or on a sense of our people's responsibility, but is a manoeuvre aimed at calling into question the principle of the intangibility of borders and thus upsetting the stability of the States it mentions in its letter, so as to divert the ad hoc committee of OAU away from its true purpose.

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99. It is perfectly clear that the war of aggression waged by Morocco against the Saharan people is a purely colonial war.

100. Thus, a colonial Power is trying to occupy our country militarily against our will. It is therefore a case of an aggressor and a victim of aggression.

101. It is the duty of the international community to act decisively on behalf of the victim.

102. We for our part are convinced that peaceful means should prevail over violence. That is why the Frente POLISARIO fully believes that the United Nations has a role to play in achieving the restoration of peace and justice in our country.

103. The international community can attest to our full willingness to meet with the Moroccan Government to negotiate the restoration of peace, justice and fraternal co-operation.

104. The signing of the peace agreement of 10 August 1979 between Mauritania and the Frente POLISARIO is an example of wisdom, responsibility and realism and should inspire the Moroccan Government to desist from its intransigence, which is bound to have dire consequences, and from its preference for a course of violence over one of justice and reason.

105. In any case, we wish to reiterate here an aspect of our policy which has been constant, namely, our willingness to co-operate with the United Nations and its Secretary-General in whatever efforts may be required to seek a just and legal solution.

106. This willingness to seek political solutions is equal only to our determination to fight, as we are fighting now, to defend our independence.

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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TO.
RR CANBERRA/9204RP.
RR ALGIERS/525 UN NEW YORK/835 WASHINGTON/1526
RR CAIRO/306
BB JEDDAH/40

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

WESTERN SAHARA - POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS

OUR IMPRESSION FOLLOWING RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FRENCH IS THAT THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT WESTERN EFFORTS UNDER WAY TO GET NEGOTIATIONS GOING BETWEEN ALGERIA AND MOROCCO ON WESTERN SAHARA.

2. FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF 0.UN15671, THE AMBASSADOR HAD AN OPPORTUNITY ON 30 OCTOBER TO ASK THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY (DE LEUSSE) ABOUT ANY MOVES INVOLVING FRANCE: DE LEUSSE SAID THAT FRANCE HAD A LONG-STANDING GENERAL OFFER TO ASSIST IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE, BUT THAT THIS HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN UP AND THAT SO FAR THERE WAS NOTHING MORE.

3. ON 7 NOVEMBER WE HAD A DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION WITH MOLINARI (RELEVANT FOREIGN MINISTRY DESK OFFICER) WHO WAS INSISTENT THAT FRANCE IS NOT INVOLVED IN ANY SUCH MOVES AND SEES NO USEFUL ROLE FOR FRANCE, OR ANY OTHER ESTERN POWER, IN THE PRESENT SITUATION.

4. MOLINARI RAN THROUGH RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, GIVING SOME IMPORTANCE AS A POSSIBLE OPTIMISTIC MOVE TO KING HASSAN'S INTENTION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FORTHCOMING DISCUSSIONS (EARLY DECEMBER, POSTPONED FROM LATE NOVEMBER) IN MONROVIA OF THE OAU'S "COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN" ON THE SAHARA DISPUTE. THIS MIGHT GIVE HASSAN SOME POSSIBILITY OF RE-GAINING THE GROUND HE HAD LOST BY NOT PARTICIPATING IN THE JULY SUMMIT WHICH HAD ADOPTED, BY A ONE-VOTE MAJORITY, THE SIGNIFICANT DECLARATION ADVERSE TO MOROCCO'S POSITION WHICH HAD PAVED THE WAY FOR THE MAURITANIA-POLISARIO AGREEMENT AND THE RELATIVE ISOLATION OF MOROCCO AT THE CURRENT UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. MOLINARI'S COMMENT FOLLOWED VISITS TO ALGIERS AND RABAT BY LIBERIAN PRESIDENT TOLBERT, AS OAU CHAIRMAN, ON 2-3 NOVEMBER.

5. MOLINARI STRESSED THAT THE KEY TO ANY MOVEMENT IN THE "BLOCKED" SITUATION IN WESTERN SAHARA LAY WITH KING HASSAN. IT WAS NOT EASY TO SEE THE SHAPE OF ANY POSSIBLE SOLUTION: ALL THAT MOLINARI HAD BEEN

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ABLE TO COME UP WITH - AND IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE HAD BEEN MUCH PREOCCUPIED WITH THE QUESTION - WAS THAT NEGOTIATIONS COULD AIM AT A DIVISION OF WESTERN SAHARA NOT UNLIKE THAT WHICH HAD PREVAILED BEFORE MAURITANIA'S WITHDRAWAL, WITH MOROCCO CEDING THE SOUTHERN THIRD OF THE TERRITORY TO A POLISARIO REGIME AND AT THE SAME TIME REACHING AN AGREEMENT FOR SHARING THE PROFITS OF THE PHOSPHATE MINES IN THE NORTH (AS IT HAD WITH MAURITANIA BETWEEN 1975 AND THE AUGUST 9 1979 AGREEMENT). MOLINARI CONSIDERED THAT ANY CREATION OF A POLISARIO STATE WITHOUT ACCESS TO PHOSPHATE PROFITS WOULD BE POINTLESS - TALK OF PASTURE LANDS AND FISHING AS THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF A Viable STATE WAS TOTALLY UNREALISTIC.

6. MOLINARI SPOKE OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT, IN THE INTERESTS OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT, MOROCCO MIGHT AGREE WITH THE OTHER PARTIES TO A REFERENDUM TAKING PLACE, SUGGESTING THAT THE ONLY EFFECTIVE WAY IN WHICH THIS COULD OCCUR WOULD BE FOR ALL THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE TO HAVE ALREADY AGREED ON THE DESIRABLE OUTCOME OF SUCH A REFERENDUM, AND TO HAVE ORGANISED THE POPULATIONS IN THE AREA IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PRODUCE THIS RESULT. (THIS PROPOSAL IS NOT AS MANIPULATIVE AS IT FIRST SEEMS, IN VIEW OF THE SHIFTING NATURE OF THE SAHARA'S SPARSE POPULATION : THE POLISARIO THEMSELVES HAVE ALL THEIR IMPORTANT BASES IN THE TINDOUF AREA OF ALGERIA, WHILE MOROCCO'S CONTROL OVER THE SOUTHERN PART OF WESTERN SAHARA DOES NOT REALLY EXTEND BEYOND ITS BASE AT DAKHLA).

7. BUT MOLINARI WAS COMPLETELY WITHOUT OPTIMISM ABOUT ANY IMMINENT MOVE TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS. HE NOTED THAT BRZEZINSKI HAD HAD VERY LITTLE TO SAY AFTER 2 NOVEMBER DISCUSSIONS IN ALGIERS, WHILE THE VISIT OF US UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE CHRISTOPHER TO RABAT HAD BEEN FOLLOWED BY A STATEMENT THAT THE UNITED STATES DID NOT SEE ANY ROLE FOR ITSELF EITHER IN FORMULATING A SOLUTION OR AS AN INTERMEDIARY.

8. MOLINARI COMMENTED THAT SAUDI ARABIA'S IMPATIENCE WITH ALGERIA'S IMPLACABLE OPPOSITION TO ANY DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH KING HASSAN HAD BEEN REFLECTED IN THE SAUDI DECISION TO VOTE AGAINST THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION AT UNGA ON 2 NOVEMBER.

9. MOLINARI DENIED THAT FRANCE'S DECISION TO SEND TROOPS TO MAURITANIA (O.PA70085) SUGGESTED ANY MOVE AWAY FROM A POSITION FAVOURING MOROCCO, AND STATED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO MOROCCAN OFFICIAL CRITICISM OF FRANCE'S DECISION. HE SAID THAT THE FRENCH GESTURE (STRESSING THAT THERE WERE ONLY 150 TROOPS) WAS DESIGNED TO SUPPORT MAURITANIA'S NEUTRALITY. IT WOULD HELP PREVENT THE POSSIBILITY, IN ANY CASE REMOTE, OF POLISARIO OR OTHER INCURSIONS INTO MARITANIA. (HE SAID THAT ANY MOROCCAN ACTION AGAINST MAURITANIA, THE POSSIBILITY OF WHICH WAS ALSO REMOTE, WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO BE IN THE FORM OF SPONSORING A COUP THAN OF MOUNTING ANY INVASION).

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10. MOLINARI SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO EXAGGERATE MOROCCO'S ISOLATION: IN ADDITION TO THE SAUDI DECISION ON THE UNGA VOTE, EGYPT'S SUPPORT WAS BY NO MEANS OF NEGIGLIBLE IMPORTANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, DESPITE ITS CURRENT REDUCED POLITICAL STANDING BECUASE OF THE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL.

11. MOLINARI SAW THE AMERICAN DECISION TO PROVIDE LIMITED SUPPORT FOR MOROCCO'S AIR WARFARE CAPACITY AS A GESTURE MORE OF A POLITICAL THAN A MILITARY NATURE: HE ACCEPTED THE UNITED STATES STATEMENT THAT IT WAS SUPPLYING ARMS IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN MOROCCO'S POSITION IN UNDERTAKING PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS (PARA 2 OF O.UN15648 SUGGESTS ALGERIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THIS AS WELL.) MOROCCAN OFFICIAL STATEMENTS HAVE ON 5 NOVEMBER (CLAIMING THAT 6000-7000 TROOPS WILL BE INVOLVED) IN RESPONSE POLISARIO SPOKESMAN HAVE (ACCORDING TO LE MONDE OF 7 NOVEMBER) MADE LIGHT OF THE ACTION, BUT LE MONDE IT ITS 9 NOVEMBER EDITION REPORTS A STATEMENT OF 7 NOVEMBER BY THE OFFICIAL ALGERIAN PRESS AGENCY QUERYING WHETHER THE ATTACKS ARE REALLY DIRECTED AGAINST THE POLISARIO OR AGAINST ALGERIA (LE MONDE'S REPORTS OF THE TROOP DISPOSITIONS INVOLVED SUGGEST THAT THE REAL TARGET MAY WILL BE THE DISPUTED TINDOUF BORDER AREA IN ALGERIA).

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
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ACTION: AME

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

0.UN15932 RLOP
TOR 0853 07.11.79

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TO.
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FM. UN NEW YORK / FILE 412/1 103/3/4 REF 0.CH855137

U N C L A S S I F I E D

UNGA 34 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 : WESTERN SAHARA

RECORD CHANGED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH TWO OF YOUR
REFTEL.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ACTION: PSP
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SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	LA	DP
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OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

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TO.
II UN NEW YORK/5RP.
BB GENEVA/5656 ALGIERS/5217 PARIS EMB/345
FM. CANBERRA / FILE 935/28/2 REF 0.UN15892

C O N F I D E N T I A L

UNGA 34: FOURTH COMMITTEE : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 - WESTERN
SAHARA

CONFIDENTIAL

THANKS YOUR REPORTING ON THE VOTE.

2. IN LOOKING AT YOUR EXPLANATION OF VOTE, WE HAVE NOTED THAT YOU FOLLOWED POINTS (A) AND (B) FROM 0.CH854707 CLOSELY BUT THAT YOU DID NOT ENTIRELY CAPTURE THE INTENTION OF POINT (C). WE DO NOT WANT ANY MISUNDERSTANDING OF OUR ATTITUDE TO DEVELOP AND YOU SHOULD, UNLESS YOU CAN SUGGEST A BETTER WAY OF HANDLING THE ISSUE, SEEK CORRECTIONS TO THE SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE FOURTH COMMITTEE TO CONVEY CLEARLY OUR BELIEF THAT POLISARIO IS NOT THE (UNDERLINED) REPRESENTATIVE OF THE WESTERN SAHARAN PEOPLE. WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO ENSURE THAT THE SUMMARY RECORDS TREAT THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF THE EXPLANATION SO THAT THE RELEVANT PASSAGE WOULD READ '... AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF WESTERN SAHARA'.

3. THIS MINIMAL CHANGE WOULD BRING THE PASSAGE CLOSER TO THE PRINCIPLES WE HAD INTENDED OUR POINT (C) TO CONVEY, BUT WE ~~W~~OULD GLAD OF YOUR ADVICE IF YOU CAN SEE A BETTER WAY OF HANDLING THE MATTER.

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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TO.
RR CANBERRA/5196

FM. UN NEW YORK / FILE 103/3/4 412/1

U N C L A S S I F I E D

UNGA 34 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 : SAHARA

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ACTION: IO
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SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	LA
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FAS(DEF)	DP	FAS(IOC)		FAS(PCR)	INF
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TO.

RR CANBERRA 15196

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U N C L A S S I F I E D

UNGA 34 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 : SAHARA

FOLLOWING ARE RESULTS OF VOTE ON SAHARA RESOLUTION
WHICH WAS ADOPTED BY A VOTE OF 83 (AUSTRALIA) - 5 - 43:

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

210.0N158762

FAX 198

IY	AFGHANISTAN	I	CHILE	I	GERMANY, F.R.
IY	ALBANIA	I	CHINA	IY	GHANA
IY	ALGERIA	I	COLOMBIA	IY	GREECE
IY	ANGOLA	I	CONODROS	IY	GRENADA
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IY	ARGENTINA	IY	CONGO	N	GUATEMALA
IY	AUSTRALIA	IY	COSTA RICA	IY	GUINEA
IY	AUSTRIA	IY	CUBA	IY	GUINEA-BISSAU
IY	A BAHAMAS	IY	CYPRUS	IY	GUYANA
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IY	BANGLADESH	I	DEM. KAMPUCHEA	IY	HONDURAS
IY	BARBADOS	IY	DEM. YEMEN	IY	HUNGARY
IY	BELGIUM	A	DENMARK	I	ICELAND
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IY	BUHUTAN	I	DOMINICA	IY	INDONESIA
IY	BOLIVIA	A	DOMINICAN REP.	IY	IRAN
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IY	BULGARIA	IY	EL SALVADOR	I	ISRAEL
IY	BURIMA	I	EQUAT. GUINEA	I	ITALY
IY	BURUNDI	IY	ETHIOPIA	I	IVORY COAST
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A	CANADA	IY	FINLAND	IY	JAPAN
IY	CAPE VERDE	A	FRANCE	IY	JORDAN
IY	CENTR.AFRIC.REP	N	GABON	IY	KENYA
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DAY/MONTH: 02-11 AGENDA ITEMS: 000 - 018 VOTE NO:00

ABORTED

GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIRTY-FOURTH REGULAR SESSION PL

VOTE SUBJECT: DRAFT RESOLUTION A/C.4

VOTE TIME: 17:47

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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PAX 199

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Y	LAOS P.D.R.	I	ATOMAN	IY	ISURINAME
Y	LEBANON	IY	PAKISTAN	IY	ISWAZILAND
Y	LESOTHO	IY	PANAMA	IY	IGWEMEN
Y	LIBERIA	IY	IPAPUA N GUINEA	IY	ISYRIAN A.R.
Y	LIBYAN A.J.	I	IPARAGUAY	A	THAILAND
A	LUXEMBOURG	IY	IPERU	I	TOGO
Y	MADAGASCAR	I	AIPHILIPPINES	IY	TRINIDAD/TOBAGO
A	MALAWI	IY	IPOLAND	A	TUNISIA
A	MALAYSIA	I	AIPORTUGAL	A	TURKEY
A	MALDIVES	I	AICATAR	IY	IUGANDA
Y	MALI	I	IRONAMIA	IY	UKRAINIAN SSR
Y	MALTA	IY	IRWANDA	IY	U.S.S.R.
Y	MARURITANIA	IY	SAINT LUCIA	A	U.A.EMIRATES
A	MARURITIUS	IY	ISANDA	A	UNITED KINGDOM
Y	MEXICO	IY	ISAC TOME/PRINC.	A	U.R.CAMEROON
Y	MONGOLIA	I	ISAUDI ARABIA	IY	U.R.TANZANIA
N	MOROCCO	IY	ISENEGAL	A	UNITED STATES
Y	MOZAMBIQUE	IY	ISEYCHELLES	A	UPPER VOLTA
Y	NEPAL	IY	ISIERRA LEONE	A	URUGUAY
A	NETHERLANDS	IY	ISINGAPORE	IY	VENEZUELA
A	NEW ZEALAND	I	ISOLOMON ISLANDS	IY	VIET NAM
Y	NICARAGUA	I	ISOMALIA	IY	YEMEN
Y	NINGER	I	ISOUTH AFRICA	IY	YUGOSLAVIA
Y	NIGERIA	I	ASPAIN	N	IZAIRE
A	NORWAY	IY	ISRI LANKA	IY	ZAMBIA
A		IY	ISUDAN		

ROLL CALL	> RECORDED	NON RECORDED
0 8 3 YES	0 0 5 NO	0 4 3 ABSTAIN
·ENARY MEETING	23rd MEETING OF...FOURTH...COMMITTEE	
134/L.27 Rev.1		
TEAR SAHARA		

ENDS

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

0.UN15892 RRTP
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0.UN15892 2200 2.11.79 UNC

TO.
PP CANBERRA/5Z12

FM. UN NEW YORK / FILE 412/1 103/3/4

U N C L A S S I F I E D

UNGA 34 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 : WESTERN SAMOA

TAKE IN ATTACHED 0.UN15892

←

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIOACTION: PSP
AME
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OGBAAFASEC DEPSECS EX PPU MCO LA
FAS(SEP) FAS(NSA) FAS(WES) FAS(DEF) DP
FAS(JOC) FAS(PCR) INF FAS(ECO) FAS(LT)
IL FAS(MFS) FAREP-M FAREP-P FAREP-S

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

19
FAX 250

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TO.

RR CANBERRA

RP.

15692 2200
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FM. UN NEW YORK

FILE : 103/3/4, 412/1, REF :

U N C L A S S I F I E D

UNGA 3⁴ : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 : WESTERN SAHARA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF EXPLANATION OF VOTE BY THE AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR ON THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED IN THE FOURTH COMMITTEE ON 2 NOVEMBER ON ITEM 18 : THE QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA:

"MR CHAIRMAN,

THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION JUST ADOPTED. IT DID SO ON THE BASIS OF AUSTRALIA'S LONG-STANDING SUPPORT FOR SELF-DETERMINATION IN WESTERN SAHARA, AND HAVING REGARD ALSO TO THE DECISION TAKEN ON THIS MATTER BY THE ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AT ITS 16TH ORDINARY SESSION.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO EMPHASISE THAT WE REGARD OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 AS A WHOLE AS BEING GOVERNED BY THE

2 | **2** | **15892**

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

FAX 251**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

REQUIREMENT TO ACT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CHARTER. THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT SINCERELY HOPES THAT THE CONFLICT WILL BE SOLVED BY PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS AND IT URGES ALL PARTIES TO PURSUE THAT COURSE. WE HAVE SOME RESERVATIONS ON THE WORDING OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 5 AND TRUST THAT IT WILL NOT BE PREJUDICIAL TO SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS.

WHILE WE RECOGNISE THE MAJOR ROLE WHICH POLISARIO, AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF WESTERN SAHARA ENGAGED IN THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE NEEDS TO PLAY IN THE PEACE PROCESS, OUR VOTE IS A REAFFIRMATION OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE PEOPLE OF WESTERN SAHARA AS A WHOLE.

ENDS

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

17

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

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TOR 0941 02.11.79

0.UN15824 1720 1.11.79 CLA

TO.
II CANBERRA/5144RP.
RR PARIS EMB/681 ALGIERS/84

FM. UN NEW YORK / FILE 103/3/4 REF 0.CH854707

CONFIDENTIAL

UNGA 34 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 - WESTERN SAHARA

VOTE HAS BEEN POSTPONED AND WILL NOW BE TAKEN TOMORROW AFTERNOON
(2 NOVEMBER).

AC. MR.LAMB (IO) ADVISED 02/1018.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: AME JBAE
IO OGBAAFA

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	LA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(WES)	ANZ	EUR
FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	FAS(NUC)	FAS(IOC)	
FAS(PCR)	INF		FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	IL
FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M		FAREP-P	FAREP-S	

ACCRA CAIRO LAGOS LONDON MADRID

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WLN 567
RR CANBERRA
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RESTRICTED Q1 NOVEMBER 1979

FROM WELLINGTON
TO NEW YORK (PM) 1089
RPTD CANBERRA 3388

-IMMEDIATE-
-ROUTINE-

UNGA 34 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 : WESTERN SAHARA
OUR 1113.

1.. OUR GENERAL ATTITUDE IN THE PAST ON THIS QUESTION HAS BEEN ONE OF AVOIDING TAKING SIDES FOR OR AGAINST EITHER ALGERIA OR MOROCCO AND OF HOPING THAT THE DISPUTE WOULD BE SORTED OUT UNDER AN ARAB OR OAU UMBRELLA, WHILE STICKING TO OUR PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR COLONIAL PEOPLES.

2.. WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT THE CLIMATE OF OPINION HAS MOVED AGAINST MOROCCO, WE CONSIDER THAT WE SHOULD NOT TAKE SIDES BY SUPPORTING THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION WHICH ESPECIALLY IN PARAGRAPH 5 REMAINS STRONGLY CRITICAL OF MOROCCO. LAST YEAR WE SUPPORTED BOTH THE MOROCCAN AND THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTIONS AS AN INDICATION OF OUR GENERAL POLICY ABOVE. THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION LAST YEAR DID NOT ATTACK MOROCCO.

3.. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES AND GIVEN THE EXPECTED ABSTENTIONS OF THE NINE, SOME ARABS AND THE ASEAN GROUP YOU SHOULD ABSTAIN ON THE ALGERIAN TEXT WITHOUT EXPLANATION OF VOTE.

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RESTRICTED 31 OCTOBER 1979

RESTRICTED

15

FROM NEW YORK PM

TO WELLINGTON 1113 -IMMEDIATE-

RPTD CERERRA 291 -ROUTINE-

UNGA 34: FOURTH CTTE: ITEM 18: WESTERN SAHARA

THE ALGERIAN TEXT ON THE WESTERN SAHARA, OUR 1962, HAS BEEN AMENDED AFTER A PERIOD OF INTENSE LOBBYING ON THE PART OF THE MORE LIBERAL WEO COUNTRIES AND THE MORE MODERATE AFRICANS AND ASIANS. THE AMENDMENTS GO A LONG WAY TOWARDS ACCOMMODATING THE RESERVATIONS OF THWEO AS WE OUTLINED IN OUR 1961. WE SHOULD SAY THAT AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE REVISED TEXT AMONGST THE ORIGINAL COSPONSORS IS IN LARGE PART DUE TO THE SIGNIFICANT EFFORTS OF THE ALGERIAN REPRESENTATIVE, SEMICHI, WHO SEEMED GENUINELY CONCERNED THROUGHOUT TO BE HELPFUL. THIS OF COURSE WAS IN ALGERIA'S INTEREST IF IT WAS TO AVOID LOSING EN BLOC THE SUPPORT OF THOSE WEO COUNTRIES WHO SUPPORTZZFN+@8 SUPPORT THEM LAST YEAR.

3) 63-4.

2. THE KEY CHANGES TO THE DRAFT ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH 7 NOW READS:

"TAKING NOTE OF THE DECISION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AT ITS 16TH ORDINARY SESSION, HELD AT MONROVIA FROM 17- 20 JULY 1979, IN WHICH THE ASSEMBLY ADOPTED THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY ON THE QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA."

THIS CLEARS UP ANY POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WAS ENDORSING THE RECOMMENDATIONS

RESTRICTED PAGE TWO/1113 14

- OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 HAS BEEN AMENDED TO READ:

"REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF WESTERN SAHARA TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE, IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE CHARTER OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND THE OBJECTIVES OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 1514 (XV), THE LEGITIMACY OF ITS STRUGGLE TO SECURE THE ENJOYMENT OF THAT RIGHT, AS PROVIDED IN THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY."

THIS FORMULATION AVOIDS ANY CONFUSION THAT THE LEGITIMACY OF THE STRUGGLE TO SECURE THE ENJOYMENT OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION IS PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

- OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 6 HAS BEEN SOFTENED TO READ:

"URGES MOROCCO TO JOIN IN THE PEACE PROCESS AND TERMINATE THE OCCUPATION OF THE TERRITORY OF WESTERN SAHARA."

- THE WORDS "SOLE AND LEGITIMATE" HAVE BEEN DELETED FROM OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 7.

IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT THE OAU ALSO SOUGHT THE AMENDMENT TO OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 7 ON THE GROUND THAT THE POLISARIO HAS NOT RPT NOT BEEN RECOGNISED BY THAT ORGANISATION AS THE SOLE AND LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF THE WESTERN SAHARA.

3. COUNTRY POSITIONS AS YET ARE UNCLEAR. THE OVERALL TENOR OF THE TEXT, PARTICULARLY OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 5, SEEMS TO GIVE SOME DIFFICULTY. AUSTRALIA, HOWEVER, IS RECOMMENDING A VOTE IN FAVOUR WITH AN EXPLANATION. OF THE NINE, THE NETHERLANDS, DENMARK AND IRELAND, IN SEEKING INSTRUCTIONS, HAVE EMPHASISED THE MORE MODERATE NATURE OF THE DRAFT, BUT ARE LIKELY TO FOLLOW THE REST OF THE NINE AND ABSTAIN. SWEDEN, AUSTRIA AND FINLAND ARE STRONGLY INCLINED TO VOTE IN FAVOUR, AND WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE NORWEGIANS ARE ALSO RECOMMENDING A POSITIVE VOTE. GREECE AND SPAIN HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY ARE IN FAVOUR BUT THAT THEIR FINAL POSITION WILL DEPEND ON THE

RESTRICTED PAGE THREE/1113

COMPANY. THE ASEAN GROUP ARE DIVIDED. SINGAPORE ALONE IS INCLINED TO SUPPORT THE RESOLUTION BUT MAY BE FORCED INTO AN ABSTENTION. THOSE ARABS WHO ADOPTED A PRO-MORROCAN POSITION LAST YEAR WILL NOT (LAST UNDERLINED) BE DOING SO AGAIN, OPTING INSTEAD TO ABSTAIN OR TO ABSENT THEMSELVES. THE COMMON FEELING IS THAT THEY DO NOT RPT NOT FEEL THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN WHAT THEY REGARD AS AN INTER-ARAB PROBLEM. WE KNOW THAT EGYPT WILL ABSTAIN AND THAT IRAQ AND JORDAN WILL BE ABSENT. THE AMERICANS FEEL THAT THE TEXT IS A SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT OVER THE FIRST DRAFT AND THE DELEGATION IS RECOMMENDING AN ABSTENTION. THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY, YET TO BE CONFIRMED, THAT THEY WILL MAKE A STATEMENT INDICATING THAT THEY HAVE NO PARTICULAR PROBLEM WITH THE GENERAL THRUST OF THE TEXT. THE COMPLICATING FACTOR FOR THEM IS THAT THEY DO NOT RPT NOT RECOGNISE THE POLISARIO OR ANY OTHER LIBERATION MOVEMENT.

4. OUR FEELING IS THAT THE TEXT IS ON THE WHOLE NOW MUCH MORE BALANCED AND COULD ALLOW US TO CONTEMPLATE A VOTE IN FAVOUR PROVIDING WE ARE IN REASONABLE COMPANY. WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT SEEK TO EXPLAIN OUR VOTE PUBLICLY (BECAUSE THE VOTE ON TIMOR IS LIKELY TO BE AT THE SAME TIME) BUT MAKE OUR RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE RELATIVELY STRONG TENOR OF CRITICISM AGAINST MOROCCO PRIVATELY. THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE TWO PRINCIPAL REASONS TO SUPPORT A VOTE IN FAVOUR. GIVEN THE POSSIBLE LONG-TERM ECONOMIC POTENTIAL FOR NEW ZEALAND WITH ALGERIA A VOTE IN FAVOUR WOULD NOT RPT NOT GO AMISS. SECONDLY, THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE CLIMATE OF OPINION HAS MOVED AGAINST MOROCCO. IN THE WEO GROUP THREE OF THE EUROPEANS AT LEAST ARE REGRETTING THE NEED TO MAINTAIN A COMMON LINE POSITION. A FINAL REASON IS THAT ALTHOUGH THE CIRCUMSTANCES WERE DIFFERENT LAST YEAR WITH A SEPARATE MOROCCAN TEXT, WE NEVERTHELESS DID (LAST UNDERLINED) VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION.

5. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR URGENT INDICATION ABOUT HOW WE SHOULD VOTE. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT VOTE MAY NOW BE BROUGHT FORWARD TO OUR TOMORROW AFTERNOON.

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CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

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O.CH854707 1821 1.11.79 CLA

TO.
II UN NEW YORK/9952RP.
RR PARIS EMB/8017 ALGIERS/6828
BB GENEVA/5649

FM. CANBERRA / FILE 935/28/2 REF O.UN15786 O.UN15782

C O N F I D E N T I A L

UNGA 34 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 - WESTERN SAHARA
FOR ANDERSONYOU MAY VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE TEXT OF O.UN15782 WITH A
GENERALISED EXPLANATION OF VOTE NOTING THE FOLLOWING:

- (A) AUSITRALIA'S LONG-STANDING SUPPORT FOR SELF DETERMINATION IN WESTERN SAHARA;
- (B) OPERATIVE PARA 1 - AUSTRALIA REGARDS OPERATIVE PARA 1 AS A WHOLE AS BEING GOVERNED BY THE REQUIREMENT TO ACT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CHARTER. IT SINCERELY HOPES THAT THE CONFLICT WILL BE SOLVED BY PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS AND URGES ALL PARTIES TO PURSUE THAT COURSE. WE TRUST THAT OPERATIVE PARA 5 WILL NOT BE PREJUDICAL TO NEGOTIATIONS.
- (C) WHILE WE RECOGNISE THE MAJOR ROLE WHICH POLISARIO NEEDS TO PLAY IN THE PEACE PROCESS, WE HAVE ALSO VOTED TO REAFFIRM THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE OF WESTERN SAHARA AS A WHOLE.

2. IN DECIDING ON THE ABOVE, WE HAVE HAD VERY MUCH IN MIND PARA 5 OF YOUR O.UN15786, ON WHICH WE SEEK FURTHER INFORMATION IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

11

2-0.CH854707

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: AME
IO JBAE
OGBAAFA

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	LA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(WES)	ANZ	EUR
FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	FAS(NUC)	FAS(IOC)	
FAS(PCR)	INF		FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	IL
FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M		FAREP-P	FAREP-S	

ACCRA CAIRO LAGOS LONDON MADRID

CONFIDENTIAL

93572812

10

INWARD CABLEGRAM

0.UN15786 DBKE
TOR 1336 01.11.79

0.UN15786 1710 31.10.79 CLA

TO.
II CANBERRA/5108RP.
RR PARIS EMB/678
BB ALGIERS/31

FM. UN NEW YORK / FILE 103/3/4 412/1 REF 0.CH853641 0.CH853923

C O N F I D E N T I A L

UNGA 34 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 - WESTERN SAHARA

VOTING ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION FORWARDED BY FAX WILL TAKE PLACE
TOMORROW MORNING 1 NOVEMBER.2. ALTHOUGH NOT ALL THE CHANGES WHICH YOU WOULD HAVE PREFERRED HAVE
BEEN MADE, THE TEXT IS NOW IN APPRECIABLY MORE MODERATE TERMS. OF
THE SPECIFIC CHANGES IN YOUR REFTEL -(A) "THE LEGITIMACY OF ITS STRUGGLE" IS NOW TIED TO THE RELEVANT
UN RESOLUTIONS, WHICH IS SOMEWHAT OF AN IMPROVEMENT.

(B) OPERATIVE PARA 5 HAS NOT/NOT BEEN CHANGED.

(C) IN OPERATIVE PARA 6 "INSISTS" HAS BEEN REPLACED BY "URGES"
AND THE PARAGRAPH HAS BEEN GIVEN A MORE MODERATE THRUST.

(D) IN OPERATIVE PARA 7 "SOLE AND LEGITIMATE" HAS BEEN DELETED.

3. THE CHANGES IN THE TEXT WERE MADE TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS OF A
NUMBER OF NON-EC MEMBERS OF WEOG AND CERTAIN MODERATE AFRICANS.
AUSTRIA, GREECE AND SPAIN HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO VOTE IN FAVOUR.
SWEDEN, NORWAY, FINLAND, IRELAND AND NEW ZEALAND ARE RECOMMENDING
VOTING IN FAVOUR. THE RESOLUTION SEEMS LIKELY TO BE PASSED WITH
OVER 100 AFFIRMATIVE VOTES. MOROCCO (WHICH HAS BEEN UNABLE TO
PRODUCE AN LATERNATIVE DRAFT THIS YEAR) HAS VERY FEW SUPPORTERS.
EC MISSIONS WILL MEET LATER TODAY TO CONSIDER THEIR POSITION. MOST
ARE LIKELY TO ABSTAIN ALONG WITH THE CONSERVATIVE ARABS, IF THE
LATTER DO NOT ABSENT THEMSELVES. INDONESIA WILL OBVIOUSLY
HAVE HEARD NO MENTION OF ANY PARALLEL BEING DRAWN WITH TIMOR: THE
LINK HAS RATHER BEEN WITH KAMPUCHEA.4. THE SITUATION IN RESPECT OF WESTERN SAHARA HAS CHANGED SINCE
UNGA 33 IN THAT IN THE INTERVENING PERIOD, THE OAU, ITS GOOD OFFICES
COMMITTEE AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT HAVE ALL DETERMINED THAT THE

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.UN15786

DECOLONISATION PROCESS HAS NOT BEEN IMPLEMENTED IN THE TERRITORY.
 A VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION WOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE
 CHANGED SITUATION.

5. ONE ASPECT TO BE KEPT IN MIND IS THAT THE ALGERIAN DELEGATION WHICH DRAFTED THE RESOLUTION HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN THE FACE OF CRITICISM FROM SOME OTHER RADICAL AFRICANS IN OPPOSING THE INCLUSION OF AUSTRALIA IN THE LIST OF COUNTRIES TO BE NAMED IN RESOLUTIONS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA.

WHILE THERE IS NO SUGGESTION THAT THE TWO MATTERS ARE LINKED, OUR SUPPORT FOR THE RESOLUTION ON WESTERN SAHARA WOULD BE PARTICULARLY WELCOMED BY THE ALGERIANS.

6. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT WE BE AUTHORISED TO SUPPORT THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION AGAIN THIS YEAR PROVIDED THE CRITERIA IN PARA 4 OF O.CH853923 ARE MET, MAKING A BRIEF EXPLANATION OF VOTE TO RESERVE OUR POSITION IN RESPECT OF THE LANGUAGE IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 5.

... ANDERSON

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
 FOREIGN MINISTER
 MIN+DEP DEFENCE
 DEP P M AND CABINET
 ONA
 JIO

ACTION: AME JBAE
 IO OGBAAFA

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	LA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(WES)		EUR
FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	FAS(NUC)		FAS(IOC)
FAS(PCR)	INF		FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	IL
FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M		FAREP-P	FAREP-S	

ACCRA CAIRO LAGOS LONDON MADRID

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

935728/2
8

INWARD CABLEGRAM

0.UN15782 AMBR
TOR 1023 01.11.79

0.UN15782 1600 31.10.79 UNC

TO.

II CANBERRA/5104

FM. UN NEW YORK / FILE 103/3/4, 412/1

U N C L A S S I F I E D

UNGA 34: FOURTH COMMITTEE: ITEM 18: WESTERN SAHARA.

BEGINS:

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

ACTION: AME
IO OGBAAF

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	LA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(WES)	ANZ	
FAS(DEF)	DP	FAS(IOC)		FAS(PCR)	INF
FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	IL		FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M
FAREP-P	FAREP-S				

935728/2

INWARD CABLEGRAM

FAX058

O. UN 15782 1600 31.10.79 UNC

TO: II CANBERRA /5104

FROM: UNNY

FILE: 103/3/4, 412/1

REF:

U N C L A S S I F I E D

UNGA 34: FOURTH COMMITTEE: ITEM 18: WESTERN SAHARA

FOLLOWING IS ENGLISH TEXT OF RESOLUTION:

BEGINS:

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Burundi,
Cape Verde, Congo, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Ghana,
Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Iran, Jamaica, Kenya,
Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
Madagascar, Mexico, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Panama, Rwanda,
Saint Lucia, São Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania,
Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Zambia: revised draft resolution

The General Assembly,Having considered thoroughly the question of Western Sahara,

Recalling the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence in conformity with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Having considered the relevant chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1/

Having heard the statements made on the subject of Western Sahara, including the statement by the representative of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO),

INWARD CABLEGRAM
2/0.UNIS782 - 2 - FAX 59

Bearing in mind the profound concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries regarding the decolonization of Western Sahara and the right of the people of that Territory to self-determination,

Recalling its resolution 33/27 of 1 December 1978 regarding co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity,

Taking note of the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its sixteenth ordinary session, held at Monrovia from 17 to 20 July 1979, 2/ in which the Assembly adopted the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Organization of African Unity on the question of Western Sahara,

Also taking note of the peace agreement concluded between the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Oro (Frente POLISARIO) on 10 August 1979 3/ and the decision of Mauritania to withdraw its forces from Western Sahara, 4/

Aware of the profound concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries at the aggravation of the situation prevailing in Western Sahara because of the continuation and extension of the occupation of that Territory,

Recalling the paragraphs dealing with the question of Western Sahara in the Political Declaration adopted by the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana from 3 to 9 September 1979, 5/

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, the charter of the Organization of African Unity and the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and the legitimacy of its struggle to secure the enjoyment of that right, as provided in the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity;

2. Takes note with satisfaction of the decision on the question of Western Sahara adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its sixteenth ordinary session held at Monrovia;

3. Also takes note with satisfaction of the relevant declaration of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries regarding the question of Western Sahara;

2/ A/34/552, annex III, decision AIG/Dec.114 (XVI).

3/ A/34/427-S/13503, annex I.

4/ Ibid., annex II.

5/ A/34/542, annex, sect. I, paras. 96 to 98.

INWARD CABLEGRAM

(3/0.UN15782)³

FAX 060

4. Welcomes the peace agreement concluded between Mauritania and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro and considers that this agreement constitutes an important contribution to the peace process with a view to a definitive, just and lasting settlement of the question of Western Sahara;

5. Deeply deplores the aggravation of the situation resulting from the continuation of the occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco and the extension of this occupation to the territory recently evacuated by Mauritania;

6. Urges Morocco to join in the peace process and terminate the occupation of the Territory of Western Sahara;

7. Recommends to that end that the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro, the representative of the people of Western Sahara, should participate fully in any search for a just, lasting and definitive political solution of the question of Western Sahara, in conformity with the resolutions and declarations of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries;

8. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to continue to consider the situation in Western Sahara as a priority question and to report on this subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;

9. Requests the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity to keep the Secretary-General of the United Nations informed of the progress achieved with regard to the implementation of the decisions of the Organization of African Unity concerning Western Sahara;

10. Invites the Secretary-General to follow closely the situation in Western Sahara and to submit a report on the question of Western Sahara to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

ENDS

ENDS

FAX058

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O.UN 15782 1600 31.10.79 UNC

TO: II CANBERRA /5104

FROM: UNNY FILE: 103/3/4, 412/1 REF:

U N C L A S S I F I E D

UNGA 34: FOURTH COMMITTEE: ITEM 18: WESTERN SAHARA

FOLLOWING IS ENGLISH TEXT OF RESOLUTION:

BEGINS:

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Burundi,
Cape Verde, Congo, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Ghana,
Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Iran, Jamaica, Kenya,
Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
Madagascar, Mexico, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Panama, Rwanda,
Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania,
Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Zambia: revised draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Having considered thoroughly the question of Western Sahara,

Recalling the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and
independence in conformity with the principles set forth in the Charter of the
United Nations and its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Having considered the relevant chapter of the report of the Special Committee
on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1/

Having heard the statements made on the subject of Western Sahara, including the
statement by the representative of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia
el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO),

1/ A/34/23/Add.3, chap. X.

Bearing in mind the profound concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries regarding the decolonization of Western Sahara and the right of the people of that Territory to self-determination,

Recalling its resolution 33/27 of 1 December 1978 regarding co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity,

Taking note of the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its sixteenth ordinary session, held at Monrovia from 17 to 20 July 1979, 2/ in which the Assembly adopted the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Organization of African Unity on the question of Western Sahara,

Also taking note of the peace agreement concluded between the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Oro (Frente POLISARIO) on 10 August 1979 3/ and the decision of Mauritania to withdraw its forces from Western Sahara, 4/

Aware of the profound concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries at the aggravation of the situation prevailing in Western Sahara because of the continuation and extension of the occupation of that Territory,

Recalling the paragraphs dealing with the question of Western Sahara in the Political Declaration adopted by the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana from 3 to 9 September 1979, 5/

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, the charter of the Organization of African Unity and the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and the legitimacy of its struggle to secure the enjoyment of that right, as provided in the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity;

2. Takes note with satisfaction of the decision on the question of Western Sahara adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its sixteenth ordinary session held at Monrovia;

3. Also takes note with satisfaction of the relevant declaration of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries regarding the question of Western Sahara;

2/ A/34/552, annex III, decision AIG/Dec.114 (XVI).

3/ A/34/427-S/13503, annex I.

4/ Ibid.; annex II.

5/ A/34/542, annex, sect. I, paras. 96 to 98.

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✓ 4. Welcomes the peace agreement concluded between Mauritania and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro and considers that this agreement constitutes an important contribution to the peace process with a view to a definitive, just and lasting settlement of the question of Western Sahara;

✓ 5. Deeply deplores the aggravation of the situation resulting from the continuation of the occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco and the extension of this occupation to the territory recently evacuated by Mauritania;

✓ 6. Invites Morocco to join in the peace process and terminate the occupation of the Territory of Western Sahara;

✓ 7. Recommends to that end that the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro, the representative of the people of Western Sahara, should participate fully in any search for a just, lasting and definitive political solution of the question of Western Sahara, in conformity with the resolutions and declarations of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries;

✓ 8. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to continue to consider the situation in Western Sahara as a priority question and to report on this subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;

✓ 9. Requests the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity to keep the Secretary-General of the United Nations informed of the progress achieved with regard to the implementation of the decisions of the Organization of African Unity concerning Western Sahara;

✓ 10. Invites the Secretary-General to follow closely the situation in Western Sahara and to submit a report on the question of Western Sahara to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

UNBA 34 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 - WESTERN SAHARA

VOTING ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION FORWARDED BY FAX WILL TAKE PLACE
TOMORROW MORNING 1 NOVEMBER.

2. ALTHOUGH NOT ALL THE CHANGES WHICH YOU WOULD HAVE PREFERRED HAVE
BEEN MADE, THE TEXT IS NOW IN APPRECIABLY MORE MODERATE TERMS. OF
THE SPECIFIC CHANGES IN YOUR REFTEL -

- (A) "THE LEGITIMACY OF ITS STRUGGLE" IS NOW TIED TO THE RELEVANT
UN RESOLUTIONS, WHICH IS SOMEWHAT OF AN IMPROVEMENT.
- (B) OPERATIVE PARA 5 HAS NOT/NOT BEEN CHANGED.
- (C) IN OPERATIVE PARA 6 "INSISTS" HAS BEEN REPLACED BY "URGES"
AND THE PARAGRAPH HAS BEEN GIVEN A MORE MODERATE THRUST.
- (D) IN OPERATIVE PARA 7 "SOLE AND LEGITIMATE" HAS BEEN DELETED.

3. THE CHANGES IN THE TEXT WERE MADE TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS OF A
NUMBER OF NON-EC MEMBERS OF WEOG AND CERTAIN MODERATE AFRICANS.
AUSTRIA, GREECE AND SPAIN HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO VOTE IN FAVOUR.
SWEDEN, NORWAY, FINLAND, IRELAND AND NEW ZEALAND ARE RECOMMENDING
VOTING IN FAVOUR. THE RESOLUTION SEEMS LIKELY TO BE PASSED WITH
OVER 100 AFFIRMATIVE VOTES. MOROCCO (WHICH HAS BEEN UNABLE TO
PRODUCE AN LATERNATIVE DRAFT THIS YEAR) HAS VERY FEW SUPPORTERS.
EC MISSIONS WILL MEET LATER TODAY TO CONSIDER THEIR POSITION. MOST
ARE LIKELY TO ABSTAIN ALONG WITH THE CONSERVATIVE ARABS, IF THE
LATTER DO NOT ABSENT THEMSELVES. INDONESIA WILL OBVIOUSLY
HAVE HEARD NO MENTION OF ANY PARALLEL BEING DRAWN WITH TIMOR: THE
LINK HAS RATHER BEEN WITH KAMPUCHEA.

4. THE SITUATION IN RESPECT OF WESTERN SAHARA HAS CHANGED SINCE
UNGA 33 IN THAT IN THE INTERVENING PERIOD, THE OAU, ITS GOOD OFFICES
COMMITTEE AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT HAVE ALL DETERMINED THAT THE
DECOLONISATION PROCESS HAS NOT BEEN IMPLEMENTED IN THE TERRITORY.
A VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION WOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE
CHANGED SITUATION.

5. ONE ASPECT TO BE KEPT IN MIND IS THAT THE ALGERIAN DELEGATION
WHICH DRAFTED THE RESOLUTION HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN THE FACE OF CRITIC-
ISM FROM SOME OTHER RADICAL AFRICANS IN OPPOSING THE INCLUSION OF
AUSTRALIA IN THE LIST OF COUNTRIES TO BE NAMED IN RESOLUTIONS ON
SOUTHERN AFRICA.

.../2


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2-

WHILE THERE IS NO SUGGESTION THAT THE TWO MATTERS ARE LINKED, OUR
SUPPORT FOR THE RESOLUTION ON WESTERN SAHARA WOULD BE PARTICULARLY
WELCOMED BY THE ALGERIANS.

6. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT WE BE AUTHORISED TO SUPPORT THE
ALGERIAN RESOLUTION AGAIN THIS YEAR PROVIDED THE CRITERIA IN PARA 4
OF 0.CH853923 ARE MET, MAKING A BRIEF EXPLANATION OF VOTE TO RESERVE
OUR POSITION IN RESPECT OF THE LANGUAGE IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 5.

... ANDERSON



31/10/79